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MIC111AEL BORODIN

Tb.O
through
tha
_______Cl11B,~§§:l, Qou)!llqnis:t Ji'e,);'ty ••as begun
,,
'"" ... _., _
,.,",.~~~

~

"

:n_;;;.:~~f~£:!:~.£~§,. ,9.-i:,.J~h!il . . J!Qmj,u:li.~.:r:n .Jn.,.J,,ggg.1

' "

~

~'

"·~·"'-

_,.,,,..~·~~

---

-varst..iifies -and·- its

1
-~
'

'-----a.:tsregal'd for the rights of China. coupled with the dealer•
ation of Ki',rakhan,

Vict:~•Comm:.tssar

for

l:<~oreign

1

Affairs of

l

Soviet RtlSSia, were instrumental in bringing about the
Organization.

!

This decle.rration promised tl:>.at Hussia \·;ould

renounce all the adV!.tntages.

privll~!.$ElS•

and concessions

extorted from China by the Tsarist regime.

1

.-1

X:wo PJ:'Of~ssors .at.J'eklng t,rtJ,ive:lisltY 1 .. Qha11~t~:-~~1,u 2
and ~:1 Te.:"'Cllt19e .t'f.?tl11~G;Cj. .. a soc;i.et;~ J:Q~ th~ §tudy . . ().f 1v1~:~~xism.
:t1?-...1'l!?Yt>. . J,.~~. ~~~~E:;?:"_Y'!>.*.~·~r.!:~!&i' &fliC!.~~:t,~!"t.,.:g;(3El":!.';~.~?!.~~.~~..
:Far Ji;ag:t;e.r,n ...:euJuaau,.. o:r.... tha--Com;tnt"illnt ar:civad in G.hanghai
"

for a,

meeti~ .. 'J;J.:th..,.Chan.

_____ "·'··-···--"""'"""""~""·-~.,~"

•"

<

>'"'- _,,, --~ •;'C""i-'"'•~•'···-'""'">•'''·'~'>.'<Y

'''

1

While i•he Russian v1at1ted Chinese

Coiilmunlsm to enter the political

wa:t~

on all fronts, Chen

1
'

counseled moderation.

He a.,greed to sponsor
..
-~--------~--...-.--~----<~.,--

!l

~.--.-~

..

group... .,...lrnot1n

~----"""'""'~-----·~"

_"''~'-'''""'"'~""'""'-

'

~t>. . . ~~~.-7f.9~--t~_c..;!,~ls.~...Ji?~!!.~..

tion ();f:Jit§.QQQ.()Q
,.• ,,-• "'- - '

'

~

§.~~~t?.l.l!t~.~~- ..~f:... fl: O()t:\~.!~E~:

'

I'

•'

Jnonth f'tom .. t.l1e . .Qo;m;!',.n~~rn. this

1

'• •'·• ,,.,_,,,,.,"-'...,.''-"''·''"••' •On·"·•.>•··'"

1 Victor A. Yakhontoff, 'I'he Qhin!).ls;;s ~~oyili.lts, p. 6.
2 D·ee Chapter VIII, page 150, for a biogra.phieal
sketch of Chen Tu-hsiu. ·
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1

\

\

1

_---~

1

~j

1

j

1

CCC~
·I

1

~-1

'l'sinan, and o~~~~ !l!l.PQ:rt@~ g$,t;:l,~-~.a

~
==~

--... ~~---~"-~"~·,~-"'"'' ,_,·,··-""'"'""•'"""''

-1

-·-:-~
'

..

.

-

'l'hese :;;ocieties

-~.----~·-·'e"-~'''"•''""''-•"'

,,, ..•,._._,_.., __., ______________

~~-:!>~.1>.-~~'13'!. !l!-3~le_roi:!§ . §J·I:!Q,~utJL.itn4 .... 1:!n¢1§~YI~~~- y~a:;~-~-~

influences from people o:r a.ll classes before finally

~;y;~-~;-~iyj,ng_ ~to.

a ..p~~llmi~~

--------

____ ,_____

;~ijt~:
.

------- ------

, . . . .·. . ,.

1

1

-----------During the last__:lieek of Jul.y, 1921, thirteen men met

"':""'~"""-'"''""''·""'"'""'"'·"""''~'-"' ........ .., ·- ~ .. """-~'"""'""-=='"'"'"'''"~-$-}.~,·--. ""~'"'"'>'<-' _,...,_,,,_.,,_,~ -'"'''''"''-""'"'''""'

'fhase man vlal'e Communists from the.•''

,Shanghai.

_,......_,_A"""'-'..»~-

..__,,,_,,,,._...,,,"!~-,•.-., "'-"''""''··••.·~·• "'"""'-•'-~~-"'~·- .-•.><r;•\'' ,,._,__ ·•:<'"-'7,,,,,._,,,.. " "''"'"', ,-,·~•o·,,,,,_,. <-"''"''~''•· ~

1
1

di:f.fer~1nt
C/>"• ·-•·· '",•< ., ,,,_• •

'

,-.'-"'·~-· ,._.,

sections ...:;,1,' g11*AI:!:. Q5l:P;t..•Q.nc sttengthen;lng. . tJ~.e,.. ..Par:t;y..
-----·'-"--·'·"'"''"'o•<'-'~''<

'' "'"' '

struoture.

-

'

'-- •

'l'he con:t'erenoe lasted four days and dealt with

tules t:tnd questions oi' organization.

were not ov:er
-------~·""

land. 4

At this time there

one··t~und:c.e.d....r.aal. . ~

outside aid

•~as

in tha "hole

necessary to sustair< the movement.

1
1
1

l
1

This same year. 1921. the young party Joined the Thi:rd

1

~!l~'!!!l:?:HS,ln~l..!<hQ~5~l:JY.~tl!~~~ng.. :\ih.~.<J'i#.!'t;t<;'!_f()?C__ ,:J.:~.~-::.~.--~?.~£~:t':

1
1

a_:;3,:~~.~~;;.Ja.L~hit. !J.~·~;-t1t~51!..

The All-Chinese
Congress of ·rrade Unions mat for
___
·"
--~-.••·•·->~,.,.,,,_,_,,

~,~~~-•--·~--·~,__.,

'~'""~~"n""''" "<--'"-'"'"'"""' ~ -,,-,,·,~ ... -c"•

" '' '- '" "''" '•-. "_-,,~,.,,.,.' ""~" '., '•''• .,- •

1
1
1

increasing strength

or

the Communist group as the head of

'------1

_j

-==--1
3 Robert s. Ililegant, Qhipa 1 s Had £;Iasters·, p. 43.

4 Robert c. No:rth, and John H. I'aasohe, "Moscovl end
the Chinese Comrllunists," l?acii'ic @pecta.toJ>. 3:141, Spl'ing.
1949.

1
1
1

1

1

~\

_i\
-'

·~

-M

-tj

a working class movement.

Later, in
;

1922~

,

there arrived a
r

missiOl"). .from Russia as an indi(mt1qn of the growing rapport
between the two count!iiss.

~

1

-

l

Doctor Adolph A. Jo:ffe, leader of the mission, held

~

a series of' oon:t:ersnces vJith Doo't;()r_Sun_Yat-ssn--in-Janueiy ;-----

-1

~------------

-----1923,-as-a-resu:rt ot

which a deola.rntion ~~as
published to
'
the ef'teot that both. men
.

, • • considered that neither Communist organiza•
tion nor the system of soviets can be introduced into
China at prast:mt because the neoe:osary conditions do
not eXist there.

1
1

.---1

and that
• • • tho most important and most pressing problem
o! t~hina is to achieve her natiom;l ugifica.tion and
to realize her cornplate independence.

1

writing fo.r the January, 1923, issue of' tr1o

I

magazine 1,.,}.Villi?; J\.s;e • · Jof'fe a:ttempted to explain tt1e

polioies of the

u.s.s.R.

in China.

1

:--1
!
I

His explanation for

such inconsistencies of' lrlOX'd and faot

a~:>

1

the presence of

1

Russian troops in Outer Mongolia g&.l'li>X''alized the theme of
11

national interest," but did not elaborate on the

threat ot this region to his country.

financial exhaustion

s~cific

He stressed the

ot the Soviet Union and cited her need

5 Yakhontoff, 2:12• ·cit •• p. 7; ~: ~'~?llingt;on, Koo,
presetrte(l to the t.ytton CouJm:LSs:ton. p. 761.

!,1emo;yeud~,

1

i----1

d
1

1

1

4

:ror control of the Chinese 8a<?te:r11 RailVJay "until suoh time
'
as she can build a nev1 :.ra:Urc.md in her Ol•m territory. "6
His appeal

\Hl.S

sent to

·tb.{l

Chinese intellectuals • "the true

representatives of thepeople.o:t China," .for an understanding of Russian interes.ts.'~

China every .fet1 months.
a foothold to start work.

l

J

j

No one sa&med to be able to find

1

1n saptemblilr,
1923,
Michael
. . . - . ,..
.. .
..... ..

1

""'--·--·~,.,..__~~-~~~

..--.~.,.., ~ .,.~.~~-·-·=--·"*~··"•"'""~-

~--

Borodin was sent :f'rorn MOsOOiiJ to China as political
adviser
·
''''"'"•'
.-·'""""''-~~•. '"'-·~~.·«. "'< ''""''''"'"'~~·'~"-·""'-'"''""'•"'""•-~"'''"''"~''-·"'·'-''

to the

•"•·-····· _ .. _.,, .. , •••,,,_,, •

Kuomin:l;i~J
·""· . .
'. ..- n.Oanton_..
- -.

-"~_,. ___...,,,,..,.-.""'""·~"''"'''"''.'...,"'

'

'

'""'''"'~·-··-., , ,•• ,.,., '-"'•'"·'"'•"-

, .••• "

,_.,;·,~.!..,, ··'-'•'"·•O•'•"'"'"'~"""'"''-'m"'O"""'""'--'"'"""'~"·'·"''·'~·.

It is in this man

~md

the

po1vers 1,-;hictl b.e posse::med that Russiti :rnalie he:r first

,--~

concerted and partially successful effort for control of
the "Middle Kingdom."

All that tu1.d gone before •,:as but a

nibbling at the skin of the fruit.

This we.::; a

b:l.t~

to the

--~

core.

,

I

Mr. Bo:rodin was the first soviet agent to conceive

ot an e:t.'factive 111athod of' working in China. He se:rved
Doctol! sun faitllfull:r • never

1~hile

1

the doctor lived

1

fOl'111e..rding the cause of the Communists, even apparently

------

6 O.n Iillay 31• 1934, an agreement was signed by
Wellington Koo and L. rc1. Karal.man providing for the provisional management o:t the Caines a .IT-astern Rall\<Jay; Cf.
"1\.gl!eements Bet1~een the nepublic ot Ch:!.na and th.e u.~~s. R.
and Annexes," m rioan Joryal 9.£. Inte:rmati.on§l ,"kaw 4,.41X;
SUP•t (~pril, 1925 , P• 66.
7 Pu A. Jof'fe• 11 Hussia 1 s Policy in China, 11 Li;t£ini
jge, 316;73•76, January 13, 1923.

•· I
i--------4

~

'
I

1

1

-I

5

opposing foJ! a time the Communist l'a.rty of. China.
Counseling moderation, he gained a :reputation. tw an
unselfish adviser. · n:t.s plan for the reorganization or the
Kuoraint~:>.ng 1tJI'l.S

a.ccepted Nith great enthusiasm.

~1~~l_(J.?lll!ll~~~~_s~.,F',I:J.l.':.~.~-~l!l~!»:'!l~~.s . . 2:f:t!l.f.§lil....11.9..

J!!*ll...lt.hS~

KU,?.l!~~:ll:.~a1~.. :l.:!3£1,y;!,gq~;uy, ....t~t!ilY•.I:'l§l'.'il. ...~~:\!.~.~-.~-Doctor-sun

neve:r suspected that this was the first step tot1a.rd the
co11quest of b.:ts group; .for •

af!:,~,t: ..~ll~.J5:~.9ll!tf!~!?:H& h,§,l;i, .Q§!~.

o.a..a.lo.ne...,;t,n . ,.cl1;l,:n§".!al15l!lP stood

~-~r&.sm;!,~~!.l-. b¥····J3.o.too1n..,.•

~

''" "''·''·'•''-<•-•··•-··'•"'

.fully

'd-:,"<"-''-"'''"''•'"-<'•-"~''"'"

...

~1!~ :!'!.2?:!b~ili.lit.•Sl.t:.. 1\ne.••sy,at,GJ),I.•···.a.oo......l:l$l.....Q,Q,gl,4,"nl.l:~.J,nto•. l\:$!y
J;J;?.:;:,;,~.~-~E!@ .. t~1Q~e . . 111M ....owftd . . h:!.m...allegianoa.
~.l':l.~~!ll~'!~gou...m:J.<!. . . .!'o:c.ce..

R:.tx,14Sl. . . .autl.... ru:J..Q

He~':l!:'.~ti.
w~:;L. . <3@.~Y ..VIhE3fLh§

played
on ...:t.ti'l . sectional, . .;le~J.o.usies .oi'.tl:l;;:LJ)hinese
----···· .. ··'----~''"·'·""

P~()p;l,e .~.
Yd.chael Borodin

1~as

bor11 in Russia and came to the

United stat<1lS as an illiterate boy to escape the

opp:ression of the Tsars.

For !H1hile he lived in New York

and then moved to Boston where he became connected with a

branch of the Carnegie Institute.

'.Cra.vel:l.ng

to~ est 1

Borod:t.n settled in Chicago and. opened a schOol to teach the
English language to foreigners.

He married Fanny Orluck,

8 George E. 0olwlsky • 11 Borodin and His Methods •"
tralas-facif!£; 14:5• April 9, 1927.

1
1

l
6
Em American citizen, wt10 bore him two sons.

The. boys v1ere

rsgisterecl. under the nama o:f' Gl•usenberg; \llhen they attended
the

.ft~nerican

Sohool in Shanghai.

Their father was one•

j
~

J
---I

time kno>m as M. Berg in the midi~ast. 9
There is a possibil:l.ty that Borodin \>Has

a~1

.1\mer.:tcen---- - -

citizan._o:c:rviet-consu1ar-~1uthorHies at ~Jhanghai made

~--~-

ttlis claim early in 1927 .~o

lJ&Y ·rwa.ntx·Eive };earJ.l.

report.ll

in

J. :B. Powell in his book.

Cl;!.iiJiih lends o:reden.ce to this

I was v.na'bl(l to g;et ar1y information f.rom the

United Ctates Government to verify this claim.

r<'hile the

question me.y be academic the:re has been some use made or it

The Borodins were ohal'ming 1

intelligent~

ability to that end.

'~as

Michael Borodin might have been

in him, and he used his organizing

His major interest vJhile in the

United States \v&.s in the revolutionary activities
directed against the ·.r:sarist reglmes.

.'4. conte.mpore.ry

--------

9 J. B. Powell• "~dohaal Borodin, ClErverest Hevol•
utionist in ttle world Today, 11 C!lipa l~eek:).j! Rev;!,§\~, 41:159 ..
61, July ~6 1 . 1927.

10 New York Times, Ap~il 6, 1927• p. 2:4.
ll J. B. Powell, My ·rivlmti•Five Years J.!l China, P•

127.

I

I
1

I
·-1

·--·

r'il source-

onG of Chicago •s la.wye:rs t but t.ha dr iva to see the
proletariat in pow:;:r

1

. I

by Kremlin propagandists.

i'ul. ai'l.d devoted people.

j

1

.-- -II
1
1

1

·~

I

1

1

-~
. --~~ -c···~.·· ~ - ::~~~4
-

1
1
1
7

recalls that tbe RusBian students in tlw United Btat®s at

this time t<ere not very popular.

They could .find nothing

-]

I

1
1

1

1

right lvith the Un:!.hd Ste.tes.ll3

.• l

1

tion, Borodin t s Chicago school undertook to-f~:lJ:.-:~.'aaic~.:;:L;-

.-~

---------~

1
1
1
1

Bnrodin ditl not join tile Communist :Party unt:l.l l9ii;l.

on h:Ls return to RUssia, h:l.s natUJ.•t.W. inclir,atiol'l
the ~J!ensheviks .13

~lnd

tol1ards

,

Hm~avex • the Comint;er.n needed people

vets$d in foreign lar:;guag!:W• and Borodin's
English

~;as

lmo;~ledge

1

of

'

spanish made 111m a logioal onoioe for

1
1

th.are served six months in prison for passport
tion.

Upon his relaase he want back to

Mosco~J.

:t:~ue~ifioa

Solnetiws

ls.tar he \'ia.s dispatched to C.birw.

Y..:tonael Borodin brought to Carlton MoiH:JO>-;•s ptoposal
I

to xepudiate old treaty rights held by RUssia and to.
provide China wlth civilian and military experts to help

u: ltath!ill'ine E. Bo1~den, Archivist.
s:i,ty • Ind:l.am•• in a lette:r to che author.

I

~:::::====1
~

1
1

Vnlpare,iso univer ..

1
1

13 David J. DaUin, ~ ~ g,t ;1,1uss:ta J.n. ~.

P• re12.
-

-

--

1
I

8

her in the 'building of. a strong national state.

Ha :round

at Canton an inactive government, a supine Kuomintang,

w.are .rudiments o:f

llll

army, uno. a waa.lt Couaamust Patty.

Bo:rotiin decid(;)!'i the h:ey to his position vlOuld be the
-

r"

~1

J

j

modal ot.' tha Russian__Colll!llunist-cparty-a:s-Taras- the

1

xelut :tons betvJaen t:1e Pa,rty and -t;he government wsra

concerned.
organizational.

1
T.tte loosaly•knit Kuoru:tnta.n.g scatt,•red

ttu:ougb.ot<t the oountl'y had to be welded into e. po,,ve:r.ful

1

--~

i

people vJith tho idea o:t' unity,

Doct;or sun, klO\iail'al',

><~as

d(~visod

thG

~

H:iA Gim l•

a sick and tired mnr,, dyint; \Vittl

---1

I
1

1
necessary .t'o:r tl1.e t'ollmling that h:1d to bo bu.:i.lt.

It is

of. 11 ttla wonder thut Sun int;roduced Bor.odin as a 11 (J;I;;nius

ot:

orga.nizatlon. who undertrcood

~~lzy

i\:uds.lism had become

established during the Hey:ublican period. ,,14

------

:~

~

1

1

J

1

l
1

1
9

1

Having \von a position of respect for. himself' and
his work, Borodin advised tlla placing of discontented,

1

w;\lstarn.. eduaated orientals in. t11a sacretruiat o:t' t;he

J

These men soon

K~:~.omintang,

the shaping of policy.
c'
'

~~~

1

Cl:l.!llEl

ne<~

intQ pivotal prominence in

The rules set down.

-------

adhe~Y<i!r-y-:respeo~~--communism

~-

~Y'_Ho:rodin--t~e:re

1
-1

took over, intent

1

As sun

I

~---

on driving foreign capitaJ.ist nations from Ch:l.na.

Yat-sen lay on his death bed. l'lusaian advisers pushed the

I

l

young Kuomintang into demending an investigation of
This led to ·the expulsion oi' all

Christianity.

C~istians

from the Party and from all Nutiom•11st territory .J.5

~~

.ll.nything -vJit!1 the imprimatur of sun Yat-sen needed
no other .;ndorsement to insu:t'e the whole•hearted support
of south Ghina.

So it was with ·t:;he Hussien advise:r:s.

were invited by Doctor Bun, who gave them hie
To Borodin

he

gave three years of .friendship.

----1

'J:hey

colu~dence.

l'lillions of'

i

1

_____1,
I
1

farmers and coolies • cvho could not und.erstatlct tl1.e

1

political issues involved, thought it su.ft'icient recommen-

1

dation for a man that he ••as a f':rien.d of sun )~at-sen.l6

1

15 lbid. • P• ill6.
~.

16 John M. Roots • ''Cb.inese Head and Chinese a:erut, 11
27:96, l!~bruary. 11127.

----1
___J

-----1
1

1

1

~
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\

These Russians were spread throughout Nationalist

\ Pexty activities.
!

The majority v1exe engaged in the

training of young offioen at the ,,,:hampoa Military Academy.
Here political indoct:I'imttion was mixed with military
exercise.

Every member of the Academy had

\ of the Kuomintang.
- - - - : \ :t'Ight.

·co

be a member

It tvas not enoL1gh that lle l:.:ll,Q"VLhow_to

He had to know ~~hat he was fighting for, alld he h~1d

) to place loyalty to the Party e.bove all else.

ll political

representative was assigned to each company in J•eeping with
the Russian p&ttern.

·rrl.is representative

t~as

charged >•lith

the responsibility for political orientation of tl'le
troops.
His job ;vas !Mlde easier by the excesses o:t.' tl1e

foreigners in Cilina 's brief contact with the western
world.

Unequal treaties,

axtra~tsrritoriality.

impoverished conditions of the masses

enough.

~Jere

and the

propaganda

Here was a government ready to right these

wrongs, renounce all its pl'ior claims, sand in hlfllpers to

load the Chinese to a better life.

Incidents lil<:e the

killing oi' f:l.ft;y Chinese in the Dhameen Affair at Canton
in 1926 by the Brit:l.sh1'7 intensified the ef.f'orts o.f the

17 !b!d. 1 P• 92.

1l

propagandists.

Britain became the primary target of

Borodin 1 r, expulsionist IJrogram.
t'lun Yat-son died in March 1

19:~5,

at l?eiping.

before his burial a :fight broke ou·t to detel'mina >Jllo
be leader in t;he Kuominta.ng.

:u.ven
t~ould

,;,bile the members argued, the

Russians seized control and evolved a party

cri,;al:liza_t;io=n,._~~

which 'made 1Jlicha.e1 Borodin

NGither the

p~lrty

:radioals nor the militarists had
1926.

dictator.
~Jide

support in Ctlina in

The great me:rchant•t;rading class

t~a.s

hostile to

radicalism in politics and economics and the
peasant

clas~;

1iving•l8

:farmer~

was apathetic• bent only on getting a

!Wen up to the spring of' 1927 the Communists

constituted no more than 5 per cent of 'the Kuominteng
membership. 19

Influence was exe.rted througll control of'

Party ,machinery.
system

Box odin had been trained in the Russian

ot organization,

and his efforts bore successful

results.
:Jlt has been said that a social and economic revolu-

tion had never occurred spont<meously in China because
she had no o;rgenized capitalism o:f.' her own.20

The Chinese

18 "Russia's Hand in the Chinese Fuzzle," ~it.ergy
J?iie§t, 84:18, March 14, 1925.
19 New Yorl;t :j:'imes, April 10, 1927, Bection 9, P• 1.

20 "Contrasting Viet1S of Clune,'' IJ.y:!.ng A&it 332:776.
May 1, 1927.
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claim their xavolution began with the Taiping Hebel.lion.
and that t;ha Boxer outbreak and the overthrow oi' the
Monal'chy ware only phases of one continuing moveme.nt.
Howevel' 1 not until 1924 1 when the Kuomintang adopted a

I

constitution that t;pecii'ica:Uy oontemplatad revolution and

----

reconstruction. did t:he_f'orce-become-con~·nrious-and_____.
organized.

'.Che nationalistic tmd basic anti-i'o:ceigll

feelings of the people were channeled thl':'ougtl the :t.'e.rtile

ground of Communist propaganda.

this propaganda was not

of the flag 1t1aving, poster pasting, slogan spouting

variety.

Perhaps the most important kiurl t>as ttmt typit'ied

in th& story by ;uuba.ssado:r Kharakhan:
Propaganda, of course I do propaganda. Last
summe:r when student delegations flooded Pekint:~. I
l'ecaiV<ad tl:l.am alJ•• fad them just such tea. and aakes as
I am offering you. and talked to them. That 11as
propaganda• especially v1hen those same s·tudents 111ent
to your Americml Legation and were :received by a third
assistant t.mde.r .. seo:retary who ·;~as obviously .:!.n a hurry
to get away from them so he could play golf. It v1as
propaganda. last ;.mek ~Jhen \·Je lowared our l~mbassy flag
to haJ.f•mast on the annive.rsa.ry of mm Yat•sen•s d1.mth•
while no other legati~1 remembered to honor the first

President of China.2l

.

r;okolslcy described Russia as "the Gain
amen~ m;.tions" in April, 1927. 22 !:.Vary hand v1as against
Geor~e E~

2l Lewis s. Gannett, "Bolshevism in China," Nr.:tion,
123;171, August 85, 1926.
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b.<al'

ner h.."lnd was D.gs.iilSt everyone.

~>nd

tb.e ostracism or

China

alt>o. .

:felt

-·-··1--~~- :..t••• -~·--···-·

th~J~§/ii!<.... <mi.Lit •.was.....onl.y ..nf;l,:f<~J~.lJilli!iL.~lh!'l

--·-~----~"-·-"··---'·-,'<"'"'"--~··-·~·"''"'"''"''-''""""""~''"''

a_<:~!~L:~•.!!':h . J'.~-~.mt.<t.+!AEJ:;ts. . t~~~!~.~ --~~l·~---~:?I~~ .. J)S~.t1f!.;t;.J;.~g1~.-..~~Jt~~t'!!.~\

&!.!:!!!..!!5l.l:\~!"' :e11e ;:;ov.:l.et Union

~-

kne'~ what S:la

must do to

tor she had b<1en on tl1a "outside"
----since th<> r-avc.:Lu·tion..<Jt'--:l..~<l!l'-l".n(Ctfii)'j;;r.•i'lD:.;y ·-or H:rsst .

win Chinese

I

f'ri~ndstlip

1
~

~

. I

J
2

-~

i

I
'

1
( ... ·······

.~1.

sas;;ion o:t: the etilarg•l<l rt:xecl.lt1\Je GGii!w1tt.ee oi'

I

/ the COt&mwlist :rntldx-;.a.tioxual, held in
ru:td Oeo<nnbGr or

l~J:.Hi,

Chi!lEHHl a:t tl.lttt:cm'l.
c

l•losco·~~~

:.tn ?Jovacib'*r

t:!evotad muoh oi' lt$ f>ttf.lnt.Lcn to the

!t adopted a clOt ol' t;hm><>s c•LJ.ia:l

\•Hilt<ll

J
---i

l.

insure

I~<JtJl'k~l'l.n:l...e 1dtl1 :J:!>.rlict>.l:> in contro;11 '") as to
~Jonti:n"ed <!.l:f'1'ort elcrne; li!liS or non~ee.pitalil>t

dcvelcpm.ant.

·

:a.

Slii!i&EI control of the whole Nationalist

mov~lment

I

lI

by <.m.tori!){l; t!h.<.l Cnnton Go'ii'Ell:Om<:>nt.

3. Once entnnahl!d in tl:l.~ sovarrm.<eut c1mcantrat•~
on thG paasm1tx:,J •
4. Identify nationt\l libe;ration \vitn the agr~>Xil!'ul
:r.avolut1on.:13

\l

Despite. th<> pl'otllsta.t:tom• of Hu:>CJian
ir.~£

otf'ici~lldolll cUscl~>im-

!:lorodin, thei:a is mJlpJ.tl o1Jidanoe 110 tmniou on th!l

~Offllllllnist

:Party

p:rok~:r,am~

.

Solll,. tmti•l:lolst<avilt jmll'llCll.htr; t'lg:rue tht\t soviet

1

14
to a Hussien monthly published in Par:!,s declares

t~t

China is immune to Bolshevik teachings by Vil'tue of her
cult1.1re, .traditions, and xegligious views.

Ij

u

!I!!

l;Jl:'ite:r, V, Vilenski

Siberi~tkov,

Another .soviet

.remarKed:

l'l<l a:re not mrer-optimistic and do not; expect an
, immediate So<li;.c<11st . revolution in China. When the ... _ __
Ch.tnese revolution took plac_e, .thG.Chinese-bourgeosle
were still-too-"laak-to-taKEi power :tn their hands. But
------tl1~bourgeoaie kno;o1 that the morrow will be their
day • • • • The historical process wil~inavitably bring
the Chinese bourgeosia to rule • • • •
Nevertnelass,

~he

J
.=II
1

Collllllunist faction of the Kuomintang oame

close to achieving its aim in ths Gatly yeats of the
struge.;J.e f'o:r yJowar.

F;xaept :Cor Chiang :Kai•shek and ·t.he

seacoast me:rchants they might not h1Wa hl:.'.d to wait for the
morro\~.

~r tJ»a:~Clt.J:tt.lilli£>.~-J.U.. :ll.h.!l..Jll.ijUQ.UM~Jit'!i ~w.;g.~••~L!}.§...J..,~!!..

~..

l1 'l'o~_n.; s ...£ff!.~!. . ~.~...~h'il... il:i'i~A:-.i1Q.it§11.•.§.li."Qoot.gn.••.l!i:Lc.ha.el..

~~!<:J~J.~ -~flo!!.~~q_Jill!il...•~.litiia'l}lit<Al!l!itUt.....Q.f...•~••JJl1l.i.1l.~.i.~~. ..acllc.ol.. .a~.
~!~~E'?.~.~}Y.*.'t)J.•.Qi:);l,.!:J,Xl!i..• Kai~,Shak ..-ti,S ....J;l.t1n9~\.:p,~;l,,.

J)lsshln:s

\~ere

Up to thi:r·ty

as·signad a.s advisers to tl:lis school.

In

Vf!Elrcb 1 1927 _ military graduates of Nhe.mpoa nmnba:red fi va

'--1

I
1
'

1

tb.our~e.tld and formed the nucleus oi' the Kwantung Army. 25

---

1

.~

I

~J
------

1

1

1
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According.., ........to Bo:rodin
this.. ravolutionarx a.riny• was ths
..,,...,.,,,_,....
___..,_,.,.......,,_.,_~"<

,.,,.,.,..,_,_,._,,,:_,,,,<,~-..~

,..,_~......,.,,. ,,"""'"""''"'-'"'"'""''',.,..,''~""-'~-·'-~'>""'nO.,-,'-

means tor bringing China . unl'.\ltt:'·'·""'"'"''<>0<"'"·"''''"''""'''"~'""""""'
.one rule.

.._......,._.,..._._.._,,.._.,...w,«""""''''''""''"''""""''""'<'J"''"""''~'"~"""'~'"'''r,·•e•~·""''~"' • -~"

•"'"'""''~·· ~~ '~'

_.,,.,,,..,,,_,~..,.=·>,""'"'"'-

certainly
this
~-----·--··--··-~·---.."~·~....,-.,...._

e!.!..~!E!.~... ?.~~.~. J;.~.~... £±:~~~!EE!..J.:!!~:r.J£.~;}.y__~,Q...ilJd.ll.~ll~.E!t!!!H?!~.-.
:f.~:tliJt£.:!!.;1. on~ruld=t.o....ax~...mlli-11Ull.d~n.t.~.Y.:PJ;ll,~~-4.J:J;.2l!t.

Russia.26

Eye-witness aocow1ta testify to the element of
idealism v;hich parvuded this f'orce. 27 Til9 ~laticm~\lists- - - - - '"'""''""'"""'"""'''•'"''~·"'''

-------------.rougfi.t :f'or a cause; other troops \vare chiefly mercenary.
OVe:t'

the entranoe of' the h'hampoa Military Aoademy a motto

in gilt cha:ractel'i:J proclaimed-... 11 Ha who seeks po1ver or
riches need not enter here."

Ttlosa \vho did enter

in this motto and acted as though they did.

b~llieved

A .:report

coming out o:C Canton LTJ 1926 s·poke of the inability to keep

men hol':lpitalized for any length of' time.
they

'1We are needed•"

say 1 end Hmp off in ·ella direotion of the

t~ould

!'ighting. 28
If idealism existed in the l'!lllks • dissension was
evident on the part of t.h<; leaders of the. movement.
had not been impressed by his

Mosco~J

Chiang

visit, and took a roa.d

that opposed the policies of BoroO.in.
de~Jth_he

led an unsucoesstul attempt to ou;<;;t the Hussian.

26 ~why Canton Jiinbraced ~3oviet Russia.," Lite:~;ar:l(

Qigest, 92;17, February 19, 1927.
'

'l:.7

Roots, .2J.I.• git-. p. 159.

28

!&2.· cit.
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warrants were issued :for the arrest or all Communist
leaders, but 1:lorodin •s prompt seizure o.f the Central
Executive Committee·ot the Kuominteng resulted instead in
the expulsion o.f' 124

conservatives~

A_~Gii!J!ll.lll9J:L.\:Ifl,S

pass~. gi.,Y~ll!L_~_:_ea~.~~---f~.!.§i!>Q!!!•..~.~---~~!l~--~-;:!I}}.I;,..~.hi~! .'1.-~-~ .•~~-

-~_tr_:>~~!~---~~!~~-~-~-~~--- £~ ..t!:1~tJ'1':t~.§lW.r

an

uneasy_ _ _ __
----tzuce-iv1tlrCniang-the Central Executive Committee then went
Making

on record with a statem€nt saying it could not work .with
the gove:rmnm. t at Peking, and thert the only govermnent <Jith
which it could work was that o:f' the soviet Union.29
Borodin•s influence reached its peak in the period
immediately

:follo~.o1ing

the death o.f sun Xat ..sen.

Using such

incidents. as the Shanghai r!ot30 he sti;red the people to
express their

~lti•foreignism

in violence.

Great Britain

1r1as the focal point o.f' infection according to this Russian
adviser, Md he directed his cleverest efforts towar<:ts
destroying her power.

Since Great Britain v;as the ma;jor

29 Yokantof:f, im• cit. , p • 72; Harold M. Vinaoke • A
W,stgry Q1: the l'l'q;: ~ .tn Mod§::t:n 'l'im§s, P• 444; gt. waln
2:14• ill•, p. 216. 'l'his au·tl1or states that Chiang attempted
a coup d'etat three days after SUn's death.
30 Shanghai ~~nicipal Police fired on a Chinese mob,
Moscow trained Li Li•san ha.d spurred school
boys to agitate against Japan which resulted in the
destruction of the Nagai \Vata Y..aisha !V'lill. Vlaln, £m• ill• •
p. 218.
May 31, 1927.
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po'W~r

in China a.t tha'l; time and, had made nume:rous mistakes

in its J.'elation \1ith the Chinese people, his tasl1: was made
easier.

British journalists recogn:lz ed the internal .force

ot Chinese xenophobia but accused the Bolsheviks of fanning
the revolutionary .f'lames. 31

British political leaders were

more specific in their accusations and more inclined to
----:stress---t1Te-HlrlifS~ian

in:t'luence.

In a speech betoxe the

House of Commons on May 24, 11ilZ7 • Prime Minister c;tanJ.ey
Be..ldwin c.i,.ted instances or Hussian activity in espionage
dmsigned for

~~or1d

oonquest.

Concerning the role o.f'

:SorodJ.n in Cl\ina he says:
On February 1, J.est /J.92iJ Mr. Hos<mgolz 1 ·the
s:oviet Charge d 'Af:l:'aires in this aountry • informed his
government that it "Was essential to give a short
eXplanation to the press that Mr. Borod:l.n was not a
Soviet representative and was not in the service of the
Soviet Goverm1ant. but a. private citizen in the service
ot the Chinese Government.
On February 3, Iilr. Hosengolz published a statement
ih the J.lfiilll 'f'§J:\lgl'aM to the e.t'fect that liiJr. Borodin
is a private indiViduaJ. who is not and never has been
in the service of the soviet Government • • •
On Febru~y ll., Sir Hobert Hodgson, tile British
Charge d 1 Af!'_aires at Moscow, made inquiries of JYll'.
Litvino.ff ~Acting Foreign l"linister o.t' the soviet
Governmeny to which Mr. Litvinotf replied that • , •
Borodin was a Russian Communist • • • and that as i'ar
as th<J allos;a.tio!'l. that Ml'. Borodin was a representa•
tive ot the Soviet Governrr~nt it was without

31 "Red Russia' .s Hand in China," Lita~tqX .pii!iHzJ:i,
86 :l7, July 25, 1925 • quoting from the London ~El'<l Htate§i!!.in and the li;a;i.lY tel§graph.

,-

. 1----

le..

foundation and the Soviet Government has no kind or
conneotion ~lith or responsibility for him.
Mr. Baldwin continues,
Yet there j,s in the possession of' His Ma.jesty•s
Government a telegram dated November 12 last year, from
the Commissariat ot Foreign Affairs to the Soviet
·representatives in C;lhina. in the :f'ollowing terms:
l. Until a Soviet representa.tive is appointed in
Peking Comrade Borodin is to take his orders direct
-------;£-r-om-~1o-seOt·r.
-------------- --2. The Far Eastern Bureau is to be in:f'ormed that
··all o:f.' its decisions and measures regarding· questions
or general policy must be agreed on with ~~chael
Borodin.
s. Comrade Borodin•s appointment as i;t1.e oft'ioia.l
Sovie~..,representative in. China is considered inadvis"
abla. "'
The United States car11e in tor a lesser share of
abu.se; a share relative to her power in Chino..

Borodin

opined that the UnUed States was "rapidly becoming as
imperialistic as Great J3ri taiil. 11 :53 Ho\vEiver, he noted ·the
changed attitude of the masses towards .foreigne:rs and
listed three possible reasons for this1
l. AmerioiJUl and British t~arships in Chinese
waters.
2. A need for /f.i.ormalciJ in order to get :f'oreign
loans.
·
:o. Unions no111 had better control of' the '~orkers.34
32 toot,~ 'J:imes, r•1ay 25, 1927, P• 4:3.
33 Ibid •• Y~rch 11, 1927, p. 1:2.
34

I!la• •

P• 5.

- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -- - - - - - - - - - - -
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one cogent reason perhaps purposet'ully ignored 'by
:Sorodin was his insecurity a:t this time and his need for
stability in govel'l'lll!Emt.

Dorodin•s rise had been

meteoric; his :t'all threatened to be the same.

In J'uly 1

1926• he v1as aD..twunced openly as the chief adviser o:f' the
Canton Oovern:rllt1nt.
\'J0Xlt home.

Mr. Norman. !.merican adviser to sun,

----

VJi·tnin one month the people of China began to

feel that ·cne Russians were not sincel'e concerning Chinese
purposes 1 but only using China as a tool in tl'le machinery
ot World Revolution. 35 Chio.ng K!.ti•shek and the Wes·t had
long lla.rboroo. StH.lh views.

Tr1e pattern sat by the

Spartacist Nlovement in Germany,. BaJ.a rom in Hungary • coolr
in Britain, and the assistanoe given to Kemal Pasha in

·ru:rkay were too !'amilia.,r to mistake in the Orient.
Nevertheless • whatever the feelings

ot the people, it

seemed that having accepted Russian assistance to further
their aims, they must also accept tba Russian system of
coz;trol.

"""

ColYilllunism sp:t'ead .from the o.t'iginal centers of

( Shanghai and Canton into the 1-Jhole country.
\~,on a regional level ren~ained vary loose.

------

Orgal:l.ization

Quanels among

80
~!:,UI:~.!:!~!~LP.QW!lonplaca.-

f~g=<?.~ •

. and ....t.heJ:a ...lilil.S.);J,Q,.,.§.~!:".l2?.~t:,gx .. jl.Q

T.£!~...!!!9~'\! •..:l.,Hglii:!P:~J,.~~"~:t~.~.IL.~...,~l .. ~§.;;'t:l..... tf'!:~

!!.~t'."!!l4J!,li.§.-ci:..;t.he ....S.Q.uth.

Wldar ..Ob.i.e.ng...Yi~ml§.n,.. . . . Jl:!'lr e __was
,_"''''"'''''"·
>---"~.··-,,_.,,,

t!!!~.S~n:t.e,:c...ot:.~.!l'.o.st. :tie:VJ:llut.i.oner.~...ac.ti,;r,:l;ty:,.

s.

.As L.

Gannett wxot;e in 1926:
Red Canl;on, they call it in Shanghai; and in Hong•
talk of. the CantoneS_E!_!l,S lilolshevili:~ .._ _Xou _ _ __
hear mysterious stories oi' their Httssian advisers,
their Russian trained army. their Russian ammunition•·
and the nearer you conle to Canton the more ha,1.r-raising
the stories. People tJee visions oi' four hundred
million Chinese linking arms t~itl1. a hundxed ~nd fitty
million liussians to :l:.:tght the ~lest ern :¥orld. o6

------~k,;;;on;;"g~t;;;h~e:y

Ideally the Communist Party strives to gain about
3 per cent o.f the total population in a.ny country.

By 1927

the Communist Party in China had a good start to·wards
e.ttaining this goal.

Just before the b:r<>ak
~--- .. -----------··~-··-"--

" "•<'•""•""- '-'" •"""""~"-~-"'•

\~ith

the

•>-""''•"- _,.,., •.,~.••'"•""'""'"'

~~()!l'liq'!;§!,fl~ ... !t~!LJ:i.9mmunists..hatlti;l,~~Y ...t~;;:~~~9 . . ~9:!t.!:'LJ.\l.~!!!P~£.~.
and a ;I unior en:r~;~e..u,~...S!~.;r.:" ...t..b;l:t:!t~:::tJ,.:JUlL ..t..l,lQllliMl.n~
"'~""'---'"""·~"'"""'"''~"""'''"'"';">\·,~·~N-'"'.,r""''~"""'~-

t_ge

-

~~"

I.Inde~.-

i.m:.J,..q,<tlJ.£.~-J;~.f_,t,oo.. ..~;r.t.y•...w.a~-43't.sGG 1 -GOO~.~:,:.\WJ,Q!;!,

•vorkru:'~U...lgQ.,..Q.l;ill_.mam.bQJI.s..~~th.a....;p.E~a<>~lt.~uniml.S...3 7
~IJilitaristically

the main souroe of opposition to

!lorod.:l.n came from Ghiang F..e.i-shek and his 'i/hampoa of±'icerea
troops.

Chiang, having compromised Nith the radicals in

:36 L. -"• Gannett, "!n Red Canton•" Asia, 26t488,

June, 1926.

37 Yakhonto.:r.r, .2!1.• cit• p. 74 1 quoting from Foreign
Policy Association Report, prh :30 1 •.J.9:53, by T, .&. Bisson
and from thOse t:tguras given by Dr. w. Koo til tus r{qmoxa,nd§·
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May, 1926, pursued his campaign in the North.

The idea of

a Northern Expedition had been conceived by .Sun Yat-sen back
in 1921

~hen

~arl1e.ment.

he was elected President by a special
Nothing

~as

done in the succeeding years

because Chen Ohung-ming 1 s revolt i'l.ald up the schedule.
Sun, himself, had to leave Canton, and the expedition
suspended until Chen was defeated in 1924 and 19?35.

~as
- - - - · · -

Ea.l'ly

in 1926 the campaign against the North began in earnest.
Soldiers joined the war as crusadeu to :t.'ight the rabble
rec~uited by

wu

Pei•fu and otnsr war-lords.38

ot the same year,

[J\~atot~,

Canton, had fallen.

By November

two hundl'ed miles to the east oi.'

In. a speech before the 5\m.tow Chambe:r

of Commerce on November 16, Chiang rea.fi'il'mea his anti•
Co!lllllunist stand thereby crystallizing agaill his struggle
with Bo:rodin.

VJhen the year 1926 began the Communists were as

strong as ever in the Kuolnintang.

At the central E:x.ecuti va

Collllllittee Congrees, January 1 through January 20, a strong
tie with Russia was urged.

Still . Borodin
..

felt,J~~--.!1f!!t~'tEIQ.

----~-~~ ......_~, ~·--'"'~»-'"~-~-~·>'-"~'~

....

.

~aka_pls,g~__ .f..Q~::.....a . . ~B,;.~e . . ~~. . . ??.'::~!~~~~~-.-~~ :~.s~ ....:~:~~r:: ?~fl}e
to a s.tlowdovm at C!tnton. i:Jith this 111 mind he v;!,sited
~-,e_,,.._-...........~.._~=""'"""''~"""""'"'~''"""'"'"<"o"•o•\•'O''"'"'''-"'·

•\'

"> •·c·,,,. .,,.,_""'-"''"•"·''-""•''·'•-"'f''•:-'c7:::CC-~_.,/..•-~:, '"''-'"'··" -_,o<•:-'c~•''-'"''

General Feng Yuhsiang in !Viongolla.

During
his
....

~--

_,.,.,,.,"fl'" -

a:b.~.§:\1.£!%

-~,..,_,~-----""~~"-'

!38 H. H. Chang, Chi@g ~....§W, PP• 161-2.

Ch~~~-t~~;~l:c <::?!l~rol.

C..~~~~~-~.-~.!

o:t: the Government and ousted. the

~-~~-~~.¥-. . . ~!.~~~!!: . . ,~::,!~.:~!~w•'::~. ,.£1?Z\.~~2:.,,.9J!!,~.. l~,

~s+_inq.u1~,JJ~'"J.;l,.9JJ'l~.

As the GeneraJ.:Lssimo 's influence incrlilased :Elorodin •s
had to diminish.

\~hioh

The :t'anta.stio ease with

the t:r.oops

o:r Chiang marched to conquest a:fter oonquest runa.:oec

tr.~

world and unifiaatmn:nl.ii1ese-behincLtlj,J:ri._ _EJ August 0 1926,

Changsha >1as captured and Wu
lr1uchang.

By septen1ber Cl:liang

:Pei~:f.'u
~~as

----

retreated. trom

_

_r

'

master of' the Yangtze

Va.lley around Henkow and immediately direct.ed tlis atten-

tion to Kiangsi .Provinpe to the southeast.

that province, Nuchanli:h

j

The capitt:J.l. of

captured on the nineteentrl.
I\lukiang, to ttJa north, tollowed suit soon at'ttlt. 39 The
~m:s

j

tuohun, sun Chuan•tang. master of Chekiang and Kia:ngsu,
liquidated in early 1927.

j

~~as

By the n>iddl<> of F'obxua.ry Hangchow

I

l

wa.s taken and in March. soocl:low, Nanldng, and Shanghai \-J<mt

to the Nationalists.

-J

Th<a soldiers of Chiang '11e:re d1:f':t.'exent from the
l

~I

r

I

I

-I

troops of the vJar·lords.

Their training at t'lhampoa had

mS.de tneru unique in the annals of Chinese legions.
Gonsidering themselves as liberators and

se.rVt:U1ts

of the

j
j
------..

~-~-c-~=~~

j
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people, tneir 'b$havior tocvards the conquered popl4laoe was
ftiendly.and above reproach.
skeptical

forei~n

Chapman in his

A typical reaction of

~
·~

correspondents was voiced by H. o.

~-

N

IWt Cll!twse Heyo:Wtign :!,926-.fU:

~-----.__________

It was round that Nationalist soldi'lrs never
:.·. ~-. 1
looted • • • • The villagers and townspeople rubbed
~.
tt1eir eyes 1n amazement; the prope.ganda \4as true ai'ter
I
-----al~ these men >1ere one ~;d.ttl the common people.
~
'l'he people--:~:ac1.pxocat~d this attitude 1dth open
cordiality, and it was not uncromrtJOn-to-see, __
hours
aftel' the ocoupation o:t' a town or village • the solaie&s-~ _
---J
.fraternizing in a mo~st friendly \va.y vJith the shopkeepers and !'amilies on the stree·t front.40
.

ve•1

---~

--

The real ground>vo:rk fo:r capitulation c•ilas laid
l'e!'ore the troops arrived.
for a change.

j

lo~

First, conditions 111ere right

second• the Communists lmm·l ho><J to

capitalh;e on evidences o:r discontent.

A well Ol'gen:l.zed

underground operated in <Jacl:l prima:ry city sel.ectacl on the

itinerary of Chiang.
r~;~ady

As,

soon as the Nationalists ;ve.re

for the assault the banners and slogans VIera uni'u:rlad

to demoralize the dl!l.fanding troops.

ask<:Jd that tl>a

\

~l

O!>ptu~a

j

Mob demonstrations and

parades werG staged to walcome the Generaliss1llio•

After thG

'

_J

of the \vuhan area, Cl:l.i::mg; l{ai•shek

~ove:rnmant

be moved th<l:lW that h>a n<ight be

j

abll> to continue his f'ight !:com a base close to ·the canter
of the activity.

40

~ ••

l3orodin sat1 his JJ0\1e:l.' slipping from him

p. 171.

- ----

-------------

j

j
and either he

stand.

~

or his leftist tollolfJa:ts determined to ta.l1:e a

~

securing control o.f Iw.nko'~ the CoiUlllunists took

possession of' the masses and used them to furtha:r: the
cause of revolution.

A general strike

November. 27 • 1986• Hl<ieh struck

concentrated

(Jn

tar:~: or

the B:ritisht and

~~---1

~~
;~=~

was aallad tor
into the hearts o.f

irr<ranu.ary~.-.l"tB7,

the

~~--~-

British concessions at Bunko11J and Kiukiang ware ente:red.
Mr. Ow;m 0 1Mdley ivafl dispatched from Peking,,to HnnkoN by

the British GQvernment and immediately entered into
negotiations

~<d.th

Eugene Chen, Minister of' l!"oraign Ai'.fairs

tor the Han!ww Government.
F'ab:cuary 19 and r'lalloh

>~.

By ag;raemiilnt;s

rea.c.lled on

the administration of the

l

diapt~ted

concess:ton<J Wlre handed over i;o the Hankot~ aut;hoxities.

This

neW£l ~>las

tavol•ably received by the poptllace and

thGnec1 the Cor'>l!llunist
~

.

]
·j

str..,ng;~

:

position.

$ho:rtlS' the:reai'ter a series of grave cJ.acJhes v1:ttn

j
j

.foreigners occu:n•ed culminating in the ' 1>Ju,nlting Incident"
1

I

of lvhlrcll ;:;4, l~/~7.41

against the tactics of

Pressure outside China mount;;~d
tilfl

COllllnunists.

j
j
j

The Nhole

Kuomintang Party h<:>..d to sl1oulder responsibility :f'oi' the
aations of i·ts oxt:r:em:tsts.

41 Yakhonto:rt. J..9.g.•

.sU•

j

j
j
j
-

--·----~

'
j
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\1hila Borodin vJas busy consolidating his position in
the Ylmgtze area

a.n{l

a.ttarnpting to establish a "Red rt

regime in Cb.ina, Chiang was going on v1ith hi$ rnilita:ry
campaigns do-.m the :t'iver.

·1~ent

But, no matter ho>' far he

the Communist influence wfii.S tn.ere •with t1im and oi'ten before
_ _ ____.him,_.._..

For the capture of Kiangsu m.nd Chekiang J?rovinoas

Chiang had to rely on Ho Ying-chin and l?ai Chung•hsi.
Marching along vJitl:l these
soldiers.

tl>JO

men were Cheng Chien and his

Cheng had pronounced Communist sympathies and

:rushed into N8nk1-ng on !-le,rcl'l. 24, looting and plundering the
city in the m;me of the Nationalist Army.

If' this

>~as

an

organized plot to cause serious international complica.tions
f'o:r Chiang Kd•shek and tl1ereby enhP.nco
I.

I

Borodin, it be.ckfi:red.

tl:lEl

:standing of

Chiang assumed full responsibility

f'o:r what Md happened in Nan..l!:ing and on A.prll 18 1 1927,
formed a ne•11 government in that city Nith ·the support O:f' ·
the Shanghai bankers and the blessings o£ the Powers.
Thj.s Government
of &nkow and

>~I:W

\~as

destined ·t;o eclipse the rise

for t'itlenty years to xul.e Oh:l.na.

It

condemned Communism end the 111etbods employed by the
Russian advise:rs in gGtting control of the people.
faced a virtually impossibl" task.

Boroo.in

On .April 6 trte Peking

police, under instruction !'rom Uh>m.g •rso ..lin, raided the
Soviet Embassy ancl confiscated property purporterl to show

26

that Borodin had complete control of the KUomintang; at
He.nkow and

~ias

ot the U.s.s.R.

using this organization to .:further the air11s

According to one writer this evidence

proved "beyond all question the complioity of the soviet

Government in ·the anti-foreign agitation and its continuous
----J.'~ntt3l'J'e!'ence_in_China•s Civil lla.r."42

Tlle :publication of
----

these dooUinents '"as a serious blo-w to tt1e plans of the
Rus.;;:!.ezis.

Many of the Kuomintang members dl'lserted their

standard.
As i:f' this were .not enough, an Indian Collllllunist,
Mane.bendra Natl1. Hoy, head o:t' the F·ar .Eastern Gection oi" the

Comintern, rl:lvealed in a casual conversation that tha
·rw:rd International had a new progrem :f'or China.

Ttlis

included:
l.

J?oasant oontiscat:lon oi' land. in Hunan and Hupeh.

2.

iUimination of the lett td.ng ot the KUomintang.
'.Cha Gommunist Party of Chinfl was to replace the

Knornintang.

A court viaS to be created to punish anti•
corlllllun:lsts.

5.

tm. armY ot 70,000 was to be :raised in Hunan and

Hupah.~a

__

,

4:3 ~.

SJJ.!i..

---'-
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News ot these indiscreet statements hastened Borodin•s
downfall.

On July 13 the Executive Corlllllittee of the

Chinese Communist Party issued a manii'esto declaring that
it had withdrawn its representatives from the National
Government. 44 On the same day tlle Kuomintang members in
Hankov-J met_e.nd_o.utlaw.®d-Cow..mu~..i-sm-_-and--the-ComJnUn-1-st-rarty-.45---

Borodin 1 s policies ·were repudiated.

All that remained tv as

Dl APril, 1927• Chiang had instituted a purge of

Communists from hiE; govermnent.
Moscow denouncing Borodin.

A message had been sent to

He was accused of using !:lis

advisership to create dissension among the
A~~

the Kuomintang.

membersc~p

Umes dispatCh carried

ne111e; of his detention in Hankow, closely

i~atcMd

of

·~he

by troops

and laborites.46

Nevertheless, political expediency had to be served
as evidenced by the

t'ollot~ing

item out of

HankO'I'Il

soviet sympathizers are assured, however, that on no
accot.m~~ill the Chi~se people cause the late l'rasi·
dent •.s Sun !at.. sen 1w policy or allying •~ith too soviet.
to be
fected by M. Borodin alone.47
44 Xakhontotf, ~· ~·• p. 75.
45 Chang, log.

ga.

46 ~ 'WlS, TJ.msl!h April 21, 1927, P• 1:1.
47 J..Q.s •

.!i!.U·
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In retrospect it is easy to f'ind l!ea.sons f'o r·
Chinese antipathy towal'ds Communism.

Jo:f'f'e, Dorodin 1 and

othe;)IS :l.n 3.923..24, made much of the fact that Cl"lina v1as not

ready to accept Communism.
for accept!mce and

~;as

In 1927 she ><as still not :ready

abll!l to blunt its aggressiveness by

____f'_orJ::e of' arms and a disJ.ike of

.t'o~·eJ.gne:r: s

• evan the

Russian variety.
By the

and or J'\lly pressure had built up a:r.ound

Boroclin nml. Lw decided to leave Hankow.

This decision may

have been made :f'or him although accounts as to ·what

actually did happen are not clear, varying f'r·om auttlOl' to
author. 48 The consensus seems to be that he vms :forced
out.

This vie'' is substantiated i'u:rther by Boroc.tin t s

attitude tot1ards leaving his post.

Otin

On July 14 he asserted

that he did not e; peot to depart ani did not desire to
quit.

At tho same t:trne he emphasized that M tias only an

employee o.f"

Hanko>~

and so must abide by ·che Government • s

d.ec1sion. 49

l!'or all the poli tica.l. maneuvering, ttle slogans,
the striltas, and tho ideals, an army
an army was his do1rmt'a11.

t~on

for Borod:J.n, and

Generals Chiang and I•'<mg

48 Chang, bo. ,gj,j;,.; Yakhonto1':t:, $l.J2L .£l.ll.. 9 p. 76;
Vinacke, £ll.• s.a,., p. 447; McNair and Laah, I!a;Ji. Eastern
Inte;:ne,t.iona;}. .J:l&lat;t,ons, p. o06.
49 New ~ ~wg~, July 14 1 1927, P• 4:3.
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Yu•hsiang met at Suchow on June

~9

and 20 .and. agreed on

plans tor dealing with the COJmnunists in tb,e National.
Revolution.

Thea~

plans

\ciElrEl

publiClized in a. tel.egram

sent by Genere.l J)'eng to Chiang Kai-shelt:
1. Bor<)din 1 w11o has already
to his own country immediately.

.resign~.n'l•

should return

_ _ _ _ _ _c--ae-ThC.lSE:l-IDi-Jmbar.s-of-tha-CtJntr-al-E!xecutiv.e-Con'l!vni-ttaa--

who wish to go abroad f'or a rest should be allot1ed to
do so. The others may join the Nanking Government, if
they desire.BO
Replying to ttus allianoe Borodin said:
If the Chinese leaders Who have been my :t'riends and
:f.'ello\v t~orkers :f'or four long years believe that the
moment has oome ·when they can contim~e their fight
without my help• than I shall submit, for ! have played my part and given my advice. l have no intsntlon or
fighting for Cor!llllunism in China--the t:!.me is not y<rt
ripe.
I oame to China to .fight :f.'or an idee.. The (tl.'StJl.lll ot
accomplishing world revolution by freeing the people
o:r the East brought me here. :aut China itself • with
its age-old history, its countless millions, its vast
social problelllS, its in:t:inite ca.paaities, astounded and
Qverwhelm.ad me, and my thougtlt;s of world revolution
gradually sank lnto the background. 'l'b.e revolution and
the .i'igb.t for freedom in China became en end. in itselt
end no lont?;er a means to an end. JYly task was to grasp
the situation, to start the great wheel moving, end as
time passed it has carried me along •~ith :tt." I myself
have become only a oog in the great machine, 0 1

Numerous reports oi' Borodin•s illllllitlent departure
.filtered out to the :-,'estern. Norld..

As early as ))Jiay 21

60 ~ ~ :r:tmes, June 24 1 1927 • P• 1::3.
51 A. K. Nielsen. "Borodin •s Swan Song," ;&;:l.vtng ~.
December l, 1927 1 p. 999.
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there were two • one that he had aJ.raa.dy fled thl'ough
Ku:!.kiang to Nanchang, and the other that his airplane was
moored off the. rla!llburg-Amer ican landing. 52
On July 12 Ma.dama Borodin was released from prison
in Peking

~Jhere

she hod been held since li'ebruary after

be.j~ taken from the steamer Pamiat Lenina.• 5:3

Papers

taken from hex and translated by Chang Tso•lin supposedly
led to the raid on tlle offices of the Russian Commercial
Agencies and t ..te Chinese Eastern Hailway •

.:/lotually • Eorodin left HankovJ on July 28th.

1"1:. was

announced he vJould return to nussia by vm.y of. Chenchow, in
the Province of Homm, then t;o the Province of' She.nsi ru1d
on through Mongolia.54
:tie reaohed Vernindinsk station on the 'rrans .. Siberian
Ra111flay on Octo bet 1. 1927.

It had 'taken him ova:c t'> month

fpr the (oilauous jouxney from Hankow t sltirting and finally
crossing the Gobi Dr~sert.55
MosC0>1l end the curtain

o~Ulle

A 111eek latel1 he nrrivetl at
down on a career of intrigue that

had mad.e MiotuJ.el 13orod1n t11.e foremost pov;el' in Chinese

ez

-~ nm§<~t

May

·~l

'

1927, P• 7:2.

53

w.

XQrM; umes, July 14. 1927. P• 4•3; waln, ~·

54

m

~ J:imellh July

oit •• P• 27' •

"'

~J9 t

1927, p. 2·13.
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politics.

In 1928 he ;vas seen in »4os<l0>1 "unhonored· and

without employment. a virtual prisonex in tlle soviet
cap1ta.l." 56 Later he became aditol' of a small English

papal' t tho !'WScQ<i wail$' New ;a.
'.1hatavar elsa may be said of Boxodin, he must be

_ _ _ _giJlen-cr-edit-tor-th.e-L'rliti-al-s'UCce-sses---o.f-th~3-Revolut-iona-l'.Y'----Jll'my.

Hi:J l:Jas the brain tllat launched the idea• that

organized ·the p:r:op8lJianda• 'that devised the tactics ,and that
started the revolut:tona:t'y movement.

Hot more than any

other, t·Jas tho man >1ho ma.d<ii the Clu.nesc bury their privata
intxigues and special interests so fa.r as vms humanly
possible a11d fight together for an ideo..

:,ithOut Borodin

the Army would never have gone beyond Canton.

For all the

idealism of his ltJOrds the p:raotlcal welding of' ·tnis force
wao his greatest aohi<:Jvemant.
PJ;·ominant in tb.e Common Hoom o;f' ttle 8un Yat·san

University in [1loscoH hangs a crimson banns: lJith a quo-tation
in Chinese and Russian:

Very soon ~~ill come ·the day Hhen the U.G.s.n. vJill
be ablu to greet in a pov;eriul and free Cll1na a i'l'ientl.
and ally; and both theso allies, in the great struggle
tor the li.beration of the oppressed ~eople ot the
world, 111ill go i'or<~ard hand in hand. 7

56 Chang, 2..12.•

m.,

P• 180.

57 Hoot;s • .Qll• cj.t., P• 91.
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1927 vJas not; to be the time.
b:r:l..ng about the ultimate victory.

Borod.tn had i'a.t.led to
The conservati,Tes in the

Kuomintang ·t;ooict the xeins or govm:nraent and set out to
unify China.

'
!-----

COt~1UNIS1'

PHEi>SURE POINTS

1927-1934

After the expulsion of Borodin, the serious split in
the Kuomintang became evident.

All hope of cooperation

between the communist aml conservative factions was given

up, if indeed there had been anything but a fa.lse hope from

the start.
On August l, 1927, ttw T11entieth Army • under Ho Lung
and Yeh Ting, with the help of Chu

Tehr led an uprising :l.c=n_ __

Nanchang and the beginning of what was to be the Had Army
was organizad.2

A aett1orununt oi' these troops set up the

first soviet Republic of China at

It~iloi'ong

participated in the abortive Canton

Deoe!nber 3.4

ic

li~hile

and

oo~Q d•et~

of

this Canton Comuns lasted only three

days, Party members believe it tum a p:ro:f.'l.ltmd effect on
ColiUllunism in China. 3 lt gave the Reds a "sounding boar(l"

~

for the prOOl8lllation of a policy tlwt promised much to the

I

peasant and working classes.

i

I

agr~ian

I

to the movement.

I

I

revolution.

These promises spurred the

1'he drive to ob·ia;in land gave impetus

Abstract doctrines were neither

he~eded

nor understood.

I
l See Ctlflpter VIII, P• 158, for a biographical sketo:;
of Chu Teh.
2 JJ:de;a.:r: Snow$ ~§tar ova; China, p. 149.

3 V. A. Yakhontofi", ~ Ch:tne§B Bo:yieltS. p. 81.
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Early in 1927 Mao Tse~tung4 had traveled from
Shanghai to Humm to inspect the i'armers' associations.
He spent thil•ty ...two days in thin Province

~tnd

there laid

the seeds for ·the. continuing struggle a.gains1; the

Kuomintang.

Collll!lunism has

ll~ad~ m03

t headway in those

~----'"'r=egions_wbiclLha:v_e_th"Lh:i.g_hast~propor-tion-of'-:!.'arm--tenancy

as distinct from farm ovmership. 5

----

Ml\10 real:!. zed this .from

As secretary of the Kuomintang Peasant

the start.

Colll!llittee 1 he had gathered enough matsrl.al on J.nnd owner•
ship in China to convince him the peasants ware ready to

revolt.

.Poor peasants, numbe:dng 66 per cent of the

pQpulation,

o~med

lO par cent to 15 per cent of' the
1,----

cultivable land; another 15 per cent

\v:il.S

mmed by the

middla peasantry"; th.e remaining 70 per cent vJas owned by
absentee landlorels t ri<:lh peasants, and money-o;mers. 6 The
11

burden of taxation .fell heaviest on thos.til who tilled the
soil.

E;x:horbitant demands were ma.de on the peasant •s

meager

holding~:>.

lead.er to

tal~e

The lo.ng•snffering masses needed only a

lJll:',tters into their o•m llands.

4 Sea Chapter VII!, p. 156, for a
sketch of Mao Tse"tung.

5 Joseph Barnes and F.
goQt'J,ict, p. 26.

E~stetn

w.

"biograpltlc!~l

Field, »ehind the ~

6 Robert Payne, Maq :~s§.,~• P• 89.
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GRAPH l
LAND 0\'JN'li:HSHIF IN CHINA
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Getting the revolt
ing it quite another.

under,~ay

1r1M one thing, sustain..

Chiang Kai•she11: 1 determined to

protect his rear from dissident peasants. as he began l:liS
march to the nortl<• laid plans for military action.
Communists themse;lvGs offe:t'e6 a disunited front.

_____;c..,o,u,.l...,d..__,....a,gree on no detai:l.ect p:roo:eou:re to follmrJ.

The

They
Thel'e we:t'e

those who favored agitation by the proletariat instead of
revolt by the peasants.

d\s a result t.he whole movement was

doomed to failure.
Rocrults

tor the peasant•1:Jorker

army 1t1ere d:r·awn

from the paas!il1try• Nationalist dese:rrters 1 and the Hanyru:lg
miners. 7 ·rhis latter group according to one description
, • • a race LSat7 apart. Pock•markad, fearless,
revolutionax ies '6'y Instinct, nearly all oi' them deat'
beoe,use und.erg:r.ound explosions of dynamite ha(l sl1atter ..
ad their eardrums •• , • They thirsted for war agaigst
the :Kuomintang. or against any authority whatsoever.
Ouch were the spea:cheads of the ne\1 army.
By september an attMk 111as

:ce~<died

upon ChsngsJ:w, but

the oi'i'ensive 1 which cante to be 2mown as tilw Autumn Crop
Upris:!.ngt failed.

MEw \·JE<s captured by some "min•tuan" rmd

-----7

snor,1 1 ;Loc. s!'!i.·

=
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almost e.xeoutecl.

He escaped at the last mamant into a field

arter unsucaessfully.attampting to bribe his captors.
Remnants of this peasant army retreated ·to Chingkanshan
~~inter

for the

of 1927•28.

Chingkansll.lm is a broad pina .. cJ.ad mountain on the

spurs and olit:i.'s, and in the >virrter is covered by .fog,

one

thousand men, the nucleus of the Cc.mmunist Al'l1lY, took over
the numerous Buddhist temples on the mount.ain 1 came to terms
~lith

the local b!md.it chieftains, and set about expanding

their influence,
Other Chinese Communist a:11mies were be;tng formed,
The f2,oviets were spreading also.
K\~antung

From Kiangsi. Hunan, and

to Fulrien, Hupeh, tmd Kw:mgsi they axpanded

west11ard to

l~zachwan ~1.m'l mve:!.chot•l.

.

But, it vJas tha axmy o:t'

Mao, living in the tEmples above the cliffs of Chingltanshan 1
whieh was ·f:;he main strength of' the Communist Party.
It 111as cold on Chingl(a.rlshan in the winter of 1927.
Food end clothing >>ere scarce.

Men uta:rved and f:colile.

Stnall looa.l forces constantly attaeked tb.e Communists

despite efforts to reach an agreement.

With only two

hundred ri.f'les and a. short supply of ammunition, the chance
for det'ense o:f' their position d.epended on the untenability
of its approaches.

~
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This Army had taken heavy losses in its battles with
the Kuomintang and c:oul.d not arford to take any more.

'.rime

was needed to :regroup ancl to replenish d\vindling reserves.
Villagers had to be enlis'lied fo:r .future cP.mpaigna.
Meetings

•~e:re

lleld at vihiah the peasants 1r1era urged

____t•oJ_efli£Jlri'bute ·t;he lend.
tains against ·the day

\~hen

out in ttlis stronghold

Rice

\~as

the Army

1111 th

planted ·in the moun•

-----

~Jould

be forced to hold

their o\m food.

It

\~as

du;l.'ing

this \'linter that Mao introduced the first nml ·most famous

ot the guerrilla slogans credited to h:l.m:
When the enemy advances, '\116 ret:reat.
ll'hen he escapes. we h.arass.
Vll:um be retreats • we pu:rsue •
v.'hen he is t..i:cod, ~Hil a.tta.ek. 9
Great store was placed in tnis and other slogans.
roots

~~ere

'l'beir

doM;Jp itl Chinese history and the people rez;ponded

to them.
Meanwhile, Chiang ro&i-shak continued his campaign
against

tl~e

North.

After his rnarxiage to Soong Mei-l:i.ng

be returned to Nanking rxorn Shanghai to resumc1 control ot
the government post he had relinquished in August, 1927.

Chiang recognized tiu:ee problems whose solutions

t~el'EJ

of

paramount importance to the unif:l.cation of China under the

9 ~ •• p •. 104.
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Kuomintang :
1.

'!he carrying of the Nationalist campaign into
Peking.

2.

The control of Communism.

3.

The strengthening of the Nanking Gove:iunent •
particula:t'ly in the rE:Jalm of foreign affairs.

ition gave Mao the time he needed to consolidate his
position.

The control of Communism was tl1ereby .made mo:t'e

difficult.
China has alv1ays needetl capital.
in his monastery ret:t'eat during his brief

Wh.iJ.e Chiang was
~etirement,

he

reiterated his belief that China's d.astiny Nas along
republican lines after the manna1' of '"he United :;."tates.lO

In order for her to reject socialism, money >lias needed fol'
investment in private enterprise.

sim e there was little

money for investment in China, funds had to coma from
outside.
Socialism was tlle easy way.
needeo. for its .t'ul;f'illment.

No foreign support

High up in the mountains of

Chingkl:l.llShatl t.he Communists started their program

socialization.

\~as

ot

In Nru:1k1ng the Kuomint;ang sought loans.
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The difference came in that this had to be a third oonsid•

eration .Col' Chiang

<~hila

Mao •ms able to make collect1viza.•

tion his primary target.
On April 10, 192Bt the Northern Expedition was

resUllled

t~ith

evidence.

11

added vigor.

Do111n 1r1:l.th the Militarists •" "Dmvn od.th the

Imperialists,"
seen.

E:veryv;here along the route of

11 Jl.bolif>h

the Unequal 'rreatias, 11 cou:l.d be

But the;)' \vere not quite the <Hame as \vhan they ware

displayed J.n f1-,n1l:Ovlo

Vla:JJ against imperia:l.ism never

meant

in Kuomintang ideology vJar agaimd,~ everything .t'o:r:eign.ll
The principles laid

do~rm

in the san

~ ~

,;t;

\~ere

still

follotv0d but the approach differed from th£-1t tal:"..en by the
radical elements of the Par'by.
Bai'owo the end of April. San

Cbu~m-:f'ang

was defeated

in Shane;tung and by June, Yen Hsi•slwn's 1;roops hoisted the
Nationalist .flag over the imp;Jrial city of Peking.
J?ei ..fu

~Jas

in hiding in :;;:;echutm and Chang

death in an explosion outside JY!ukdan.

'l'so~lin

There

~;as

wu
had met

in all of

China the force of Chiang l\Hi•shek and on& t;t1ousand. men
on an obscure mountain peak do11m soutl:l.

ll ~ •• P• 196.
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Mao T:::e-tung remained on Chingkanshan throLlgb.out

1928.

In May o:r that year Chu Teh met Mao for the first

. time.

Chu

-"~--

t:~,s.d

fought in the :rebellion against Y:uan

Shih-kai and had traveled in Europe.

He wes one of the

:first Chinese Gonmtttnists. in Germany.

Together these

'

tt.olO 1

Mao and .Chu, planned a t>i:x•county Soviet linking the
Hm::w""1~Kbngr;i•K•1antung

borde:c dist:cicts.

The f'orutation of a ,;ovi at i'ollovJ<3d e.r1 . a stablished

pat'l;ern in most instances.
end given to tb.e po()r.
in :cevolt.

Lf)Xl(3. 111as taken from the. rich

?easants 'Were encou£agad. to rise

A small body of trained "Red n soldiers i'ormoo

t11e nucleus of the movement.

on an oaaupEJ.tional basis.

Elections were usually held

Selections of cand:l.<lates vlare

rnada by the Communist Party.

Both sexes over si:li:teen

years of age vJGre given the :eight to vote, and allo;.;oo to
run f'o:;; office.

"Only tnose \llho belonged to ·t;he exploiter

class v1ere disenfranchised. • • nlS
poor

pea~lants •

Deputies came :from tho

\vork<J:CS • soldiers, rotudents, and tl'adesmen.

If the proposed six-county .Soviet failod, an
alternate plan called for a 1:;ithdrav1al to the uplands of
YJ..angsi.

Botll laade:t•s fought against tho idea of. an

12 'Ye.khontoi':t', £Ul.• £1!/.• • p. 89.

-----------
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immediate march on Changsha to meet the Nationalist a.rmies
in open combat, find the other plan that called for a
---~-~

retreat south o.f ·tt1e Kwantung border.
"Our main tasks," according to Moo • '1 • • , 111ere two:
to divide the lend and to establish .Soviets. Ke
\vanted to term the masses to hasten these pro,~esses. "1:3
-------Howe'\i'er_,_n~me:cous

disagreemoo. ts were still evident

within tt1e Communist Party.

These d:t:rf'erences 1t1ere orten

aired• but no procedures <•Jere adopted t;hat could lead to
any concrete action.

During July and AUgust, 1928 t the

Communist Party held its Sixth Congress in a suburb of
Mosco''~•

The following rasolL1tions were received in China

that Alltumn:
At the p:resent time the Party mm't every~Ihere
propagate among the masses the idea of soviets, the idea
of the democratic dictatorship of the Il~·oletariat aud
peasantry, m1d the inevita.bility of tb.e coming revolutiona.:r:y ma.ss up:r.islng. It lll\U;t emphasize in its
agitat,ion tne necessity fo:e ova:rthrovling tl1e ruling
bloc 1 and the mob:!.l:tzation of the masses for revolution ..
ary den1onstre:t.ions. • • • It :must oom;istently and
undeviating:t.y f'ollo~l the :ana of sei:mre oi' ste.te
power, Or!;'!ianization of.' soviets as ore;ans of. :tnsu:rrection,
expropriation of? the lnndlords Hnd bi.g property ONners,
and the expulsion of th<-l f'oreign imperialist • • • •
The fut1.1re grov .
e olt1t:!,(>n will place before
the ·l'arty t:JS an immetHe.te practical tasl{ >e )Jl(:lp
n
tor • !Jnd the carrying through of, a.rmec1 :l.nsurreot:ton
as tlllil sole path foi' the completion of the bourgeosie
democratic revolution, and to overthro1r1 the po~1e:r of

the Kuomintang.l4
13 Snow • Jill~.•

W• 1 P• 152•
l4 Payne, ~· ill•, p. 107.
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It is a matter for conjecture as to what Ohu Teh and

i\W.O '£se-tung f(3lt about these resolutions.

L'elegates at a

meeting tl'lousends of miles away from. tl1e scene. spoke o:I.'
organizing the proletariat.

Ho\vever, the. proletariat we:re.

in the very centers of Kuominte.ng influence.
_ _ _____,.o...,n).y r10ne la,y with the peasants.

tJJao knew. his

For the ·t:!Jno being, at

least, the cit:l.es tve:N beyond his reach.
Attar the !'allure o:t:' ·the Canton Upris:l.ng• P 1 eng J?a:l.
had led part of tds. troops to Hailofong end there formed a
. t
oov~e ·,
However, this El.rmy ''""'s soon destroyerl and its men
~

soatter.ed.

Some of them traveled to Cb.ingkanshan ;;here

they beol.lllle members of the second Red .!l.:rmy.
of 1928 the 'J:hird lied Army

~1a.s

In the Epring

organized by the partisans

around Kie.n.
The Fourth Red li.:cmy vla.s formed by oomb:lning the

;forces of Gil.u Tell limd Mao Tse-tung,

·and

tv~.e.o

Chu

1.~as

made commander

took the oi'fice of Politiaal. Co!llll.dssar.

More

troops arrived in the winter of 1928 after mutinies :l..n H.o
Chien's army.

out of these

eme:~:ged

the F:l.fth H<ild t.:rmy.

soviets were established in Gl1ekia.ng o.nd Kiangsu in

Eventually Kirin Province in Jvlrulchu.ria -wa.s ca_lso penetrated.

Nationalist troops made !}t least t-wo eonc ~>rted
efforts to stop this gJJowth by

E~.ssault

on Chingk<'i:cnshan.
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Unsuccessful in both, n blockade was set up which made
oonditiOl1s on the mountain very bad.
contingents wero
Kai•shak.

tr~own

Larger and la.rge.r

against the Communists gy

Chiar~

still the opposition mounted. · ':Vhe "Red"

movement proceeded at a

pac<:~

UUl'ola.ted to

l;b~:1

numbers

.As BUpplies became cr:I:tically <>hort on the mountain

top, a plan !or breaking through the blockade was advatlced.

Mac•s orig:tnal one thousand men had be<Jn supplemmlteo by
Chu Is two thouoand.

from soL<tl:lo:rm Hunan

Anottw:r e:tght thousand t.cl'med p<Jasants
l:lt;~.d

•.

Jo.;tncd :;he gl.'oup. 1 0

squash became

a staple of diet and ·t;he slogru;, "Dovm \v.:l.th oap.:l.tali;;m and
eat squash, '1 111as eohoec1 ruitong the· ·i;roops.

As conditlons

worsened defections to the Kuomintang increased.

Ho, to

relieve this untenable sit;uation• the li'ourtt:, Army took out

in commend ot' the mountain.
'fhe men \iho canH•

dot~n

from Chingk.anshan could hardly

be cs.lled a coherent • OXl;l;anized group.
lice-oover<~d

t

snow~bla.uketed

si;l:Ll >'loiila..:ing

tea::·rain.

15 ~ •• p. 108.

:O:ll!llli1el'

Rng;ged 1 dirty •

cottons, bltey i'ac<>d

Less than half' of th<:i'lli had rifles.
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They hoped to ae.ptu:re some from the enemy.
Fortunately for the Col1l!1lunists, this section of

China vJas eager for ahru1ge.

A succession of corrupt

governors had left tkle Province poverty .stricken.

Numerou."l

secret societies existed to11' the overthrow of the :Kuomintang.

i'ood tor tM tour thousand marchers.
lived on roots.

Quite often ·tne man

Hundreds died from starvai:ion and

exposure.
As the Communists moved through Kiangsi many
engagements were fought with governrnent troops.
half the "Reds"

<~ere

killed.

':Chis fight was later

described by Chu Teh as n 11 mutt;tal bloodl,;tting
.the nrune battle • .,16

At Tapotel1.

Unt~orthy

of

By tl::e and of l''ebruaxy the Hed Army

had .reached Tunghu and Hsingkuo

\~here

they ;Joined :fo.rces

with the local Communists ana organized Soviets.
·troops were divided to

est~i>blisb.

Here the

Soviets in Yunt:lng,

Shengheng, and L11ng Yah.
1,1'ithin the Col1l!1lunist Party the ttvo opposing factions
continu.e!l their struggle for supremacy.

U Li-sanl7 led a

group that asked for an immediate attack upon the cities.
16

!W•,

p. llO.

1'7 see Chapter VIII• p. 166, for a biographical
sketch of Li Li•sa11.
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His opposition .favored a policy ot oonsolidation in the
remote villages o.f Kiangsi.
~Joven

ThroL;gb. the whole movement

a dislil'e for discipline

tW~.pered by

idealism.

~Ja.s

For a

year and a half tl'le "Reds" v1a.udered about Kiangsi sometimes
withou.t purpose except possibly to attract followsrs to the

________b~a~nner~~----------------------------------------------------In an effort to reconcile these differences, two
conferences VJere held in Dacembell', 1929 • a.ud 1!'eb:rual'y,
1950, to discuss the program ot revolt.

The fol'mer, the

Ninth Party Conference of the Fourth Heel lll'll!Y •

;~as

held in

lYest llUkien and paved the t11ay for the establisb.rr1ent ot
Communist power in Kiangsi.

The latter, a local Party

Oonterence, was called in south I\iang:>i to formalize the
policy of lund redistribution and quicken the formation

ot soviets.

At this con:t:'erence it Vjas decided to unify too

local units orga.u:tzed by the Red 1U'my under the Kiane;si
Provincial soviet Government.

EW May, 1930, soviet

territory in weste;r;n ll'ukien comp:riaed eight dist:ricts and
in Kiatlgsi an even larger area.

The Chinese Heel worlters

and Peasants ttrmy had grown to one hundred thousand ra~m.l8

18 "Chinese soviet Congress Galled :for May 30th,"

CUine \'leell:l:y Rqy:t,ew, 52; 502 1 Nay 24 • 1930.
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Fonr months after Mao le:f't Chingkanshan Pang '!'ehIn July J?eng attacked

huei was forced to evacuate.

Changsha £Jnd captured that city from Ho ChiEm.

'J:he

.c::ollll'llunists held. it :tor ton days and ·then vJere fo:rced south
vJhe:re they Joined forces once more ·witll Mao and Chu

~eh.

It was decided that Pang's Third Army should ope:rate along
the K:tangsi,.Hunan bordor ;-Jhile the Four·ttt moved into
FUkien.
In June. 1930 1 these t1110 for<HlS, were again

into the First
the second time.

i~"tont

combinE!\~

Army and r.1oved. against. Ghangsha for

This action \vas un<lertaken with

;r;eluctanoe by Mao Tse•tung.

At Kutien, in December, he lw.d

warnea against this campaign and the lvi1ole JJ. .Li-san line.l9
However, his field commanders despaired of continual roving
through rugged mountains taking sma.ll villages and so 1vere
able to overrule his opinions.

ll'urther 1 a raid on "Red"

l;loadquarters in Shanghai revealed orders !'xom the '.J:nird
International to the Chinese Communists "to ta.lre Changsha.
at all costs. u20

Ho,,r much influe noe this might have had on

the decision to launall the attaok is debatable.

The:re is e.

good ciJ.a;nce it had very little.

19 l?ayne,

20

m

sm.

~

••

p. 112.

~ J!irnes, September 1:~, 1930, p. 10 t2.
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\llhen this second attempt to taka Cbangsha failed,

the policies advocated by Li Li•san \>Jere tempore.ril.y
abandoned.

This faUure may

have saved the "Red"

Al'lllY

from total destruction for had it succeeded a suicidal
attack was planned on tl1e Wuhan stronghold. 2l

Li ;.ms sent

-------1;1-o--Mosco:w-for-fur,the:Ls'l::uo.y_and 25L:reJ:3_(;lnt ot' his

=---------------

·.· · •·fqlJ.owe:r s were ellm:l.nated. 22
• "' , ·• · Na.nking determined to stamp out trw Communist

in 1\iangsi.

surge

At least five separat;e crunpaigns were Lmder-

teken by the Nationalists to bring this area under
oontrol,2:5

over nine llundreu thousand troops •011e:re

mobilized against the Soviet districts.

'J!ha

neu~Ussity

:f'or

this number is dascr:l.bad by !:1. H. C!1ang in telling of his
visit to the :cogion:
we passed through vUlages raaapture<l. from tl"l.e
Colllll!.U.Uistt>, but soldiers "~<lore still stationed there,
ever on the lookout for guauillas. Tne government
troops under Ch:l.~ Kai-shek ware always in pLu~suit of
the Communists always OJJ.:ring the day and sometimes durine& the night. They he.d to cro~;s valleys and
mountains, but as they penetrated i'arthe:t' into the
territory tl1.ey could find no trace of then~o24
The rirst Campaign opened 111:i.th seven Kuomintang
21

8nOt4 1

2Jl•

£I.U•t

p. 161.

22 Yakhontoi't, 2ll• oi t. , p. 127.
23 Some writers list eight drives.
cit., p. 165, footnote 1.

24 Chang, ~· o;~.t. • p. 216.

~. snow, ~·
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columns numbering one hundred thousand men driving down
f'rom the north in December, 1930• along tba !une;f'eng-Kien
road.•

----------II------------~R-o~-e-o*-n~~k~__________}lr,3o;,-m;-~t\lcc;,=11 --------!--------o!f

l(_.o ,.,; "':14-.. "~

fOrceS
Ki~n

f;Jr.:i:rting Futian the "Reds" ma:rcMcl otrt> of Kian and

took Tungh.u in a short battle.

Hexe they waited.

Finding

Kian abandoned the oomxnander of the Nationalists, Ln Ti~

l?ing, stationed troops there and entere(\ the mountains in
pursuit of the Communists.

The cold, thin air 1vas

25 rayne,~· cit., P• 115.
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disagreeable to troops unusect to mountain fighting.
Sporadic skirmishing took place.
columns lost their way.

some of tne

adVal1Cing

The vlhole expedition was a fiasco.

At Tunghu a trap vms :>prung on tha .Eigl1teonth
DiVision.

The

antire Fittieth Division 1tJas destroyed as it

thousand enenw troops had been accounteu :f'or in the
successful Oonuuunist plan with negligible losses to
tllemselves.26 A major engagement vJas :!'ought near Ningtu
resulting in another "Re<P1 victory.

By the and of

Feb;ru~o:y

ln May Nationalist l<orces opened tl:le S(JCond

Campai~

the fighting v1as over.

to destroy the Communists.

Action vJas conf'ined to

approximately tile same area as the .aa:rli<;;r battles.
'r'ul'lghu ·t.he Kuomintang Fifth Army was

equipmant of

t\'IO

numbered on t11o

divisions captured.
'Whol~:J

daoi.m~1ted

Near

and ·the

Chu 'r'eh, While out•

:i'ront, managed to bring llis oonsoli•

dated i'oraes to t11o "Weakes·t. points o;f the 1'\ationolist line

am· thue have superiority :tor the time necessary to win.
Intelligence and sometimes a<:rtive support vms supplied by
·the :friendly natives maldng tho Kuominta.ng task more
difficult.
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A Third Campaign

July, 1931.

>~as

Three hundred

launched by 'lihe KUomin'\Jang in
thou~and

"Whlte" troops opposed

the Communists,. but onl,.y the highly respected

r~inetaentb.

Route Army was able to actueve a Nationalist victory.
All other National.ist i'oraas met daf'aat.

seventeen of' the

----~o:r_iginal_tl·tir_ty-thr-ee-clivi-s:tons-ware-lost-.--C}:er---c-t-hi-rty=.f-1vs---

thousand dasarto:t's joined the Communist :rmnks.

l;lith eaoh

sucoeading inV11sion the "Red 11 strength increase1l.
On Deptember 18• 1931, tMl Japanese inva.ded

Manchuria and Chiang

Kai•sh.el~

·t;um<)d his

atter~tion

to the

north.

their polit.ical infiltrat;i.on.

On.

December llt 1931, the

Fi:t'i>t Soviet Congl'ess met and dret~ up a Con::rtitutiQn.

!>lao

'l'Se•tung c1as elected. President of the .All China .Soviet
RapubUc~-a

tion.

pretentious label for sQ lim:l.ted fll1 orgaruza•

Faith in the f:d.entlsh:!.p of. Russla \ms reaffirmed and

an ef'f'ort "as made to r.t<s;ht some of. China.• s injustices in
tlle field of labor • 27

During this same P''-lriod trw "Red" Al:my c·Jas xeinf'orced
by twenty thousand descrters from the :!'t1ent;y..eighth Route

27 Ya.kl:l.ontorr • .lm• m_. • P• 128; Chapter X for a
detailed report of procedure.
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Army of the Kuomintang.

Tang Ch 11ng•tan and 'rsao Pu-sb.en

lad the uprising at IUngtu. which 'brought these new recruits
to the Communists.

Thus strengthened, and vJith Chiang kept

busy by the Japanese, the Communists began offensives of

their own.

Chru'lgOhO\~.

in Ji'ukien, vJas captured and held

----~f~or_six_vJ_e_eks_;_suff'i~ient_time_to_organiz<LarLundergr<>und.---

gther battles \'llare i'ought at Hsiang, Lo An, Li Chuan,
Chien Ning. T 1 en Ning, ond Kanchow.

Direction of: the

i~.rmy

was lett to Chu Teh as Mao devot.l;)d more and more oi' his time
to political considerations.

mixed success.

Chu 's oamps.igns met with

However 1 his initial wins heightened the

determination of the Kuomintang to push another major

!'o:roe against the Cormnunists .as

so

as possible.

it was that the Fifth Annihilation Campaign began

in April, 193:3.

columns.

quicf~:ly

Tho Kuomintang n1a.xohed south in t.ru:ee

Only one column retur;:1ed north.

Tb.i:rtean

thotlsand Nationalist soldiers st:trrendered in one battle. 28
AJ..tnough this

t~a.s

a complete rout o:t' Chiang's troops the

"Reds" seemed to bave lost ·the

spa:~:k

that had made t:t1eir

earlier e.f'!orts tactical masterpieces.

They had failed to

solve the problems of the border regions and idealism

wearing thin after six years of struggle.

28 Snow, S:Ul• ~·, p. 165.

•~as

_.,..-----

----_-
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Nanking began ita fifth and last campaign of the
period immediately on tt1e heals of the reverses of t.ha
fourth.

:Four hundred thousand troops 111are thrown into t.he

fray and in one year, by October, 1934, the "Red" Army was
inunobillzed.

seventy thousand Communists, all that

remained of' a once potent guerrilla band •

t~e:re

forced to

_ _c___ _

f'lee Kiangsi. 29
While ti1e :Fifth Campaign was in progress. the

Second Ne;tional Soviet Cong:cess was l1eld at Juichin.

On January

~2,

1934, eight hundred delegates mot end heard

Mao Tse-tung speak in e?J.o•!lng terms of Communist victories

while admitting eoonondc di.ftioulties.

J!'or all their

victories it ;vas soon evident that the Communist IJJrmy needad assistance on the field.

The scorched earth J)Ol.icy of

Chiang completely demoralized the peasants withOut Vlhose
active suppol!t tl:le "Reds" were just another small e.rrny
against a large foe.

There could be no

1;/S.Y

to salvage the

dei.'eat short of complete :rebuilding.
Economic difficulties presented e. di:f'ferent problem.
Military fot·ces could one day be regrouped, a lost hill
taken in a. :fight; but a lost ideal may Mve:r again :reach

the high plane of its previous exist<mce.
29 Chang,

&a• cit ••

P• 219.

There is otten

some de:f'iciency \vhen :p<>ople try to .reestablish a set o:f'
principles.

It suspicion supplants enthusiasm, a minor ..

ity•s ideal cannot af:f'o:rd the change.
'l'he Soviets have not p:rogressec1 as i'a.r as they

should ha~e done. New tactics are necessary. A
struggle must be lvaged against bureaucracy and the
habit of dictation an1ong so~iet :t.'unctiormries;
______ .Persuasion_mus~_.l'epl~<HLcl:Lotntion-in-everything-tl:'.at---1ncludes the masses,30
nctmitted

Mao.

Mao could have added that new fields were better
suited to the task.

=
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At the end of' the F.l.fth Nationel.ist Campa.ign,
Communist strength had been cut in half.

Lacking supplies,

harassed on all sidas, one hundred. thousand of them
started.

~:o.

journey of s:Lx thousand miles that was later to

be called the Long Maroh,l Not knov1ing exactly vJhere they

Kuomintang encirclement and join up

•~ith

the other Soviets

in Hunan., Hupeht Honan, Anhui. end Shensi.
peasants joined in the flight.

'J;housands of

Mao.hinery '.'las placed on

mules only to be discarded as the mal!oh lengtMned out.
On October 16, 1934• tro1n a point near Yutu in

southern K:Langsi the order to

given.

s1.j~U"t \i&S

Cou.rageous

rear-guard action held .up the Nationalists long enough to
allow the main body time.1'or esoape.
to spring from this epic of human

Ivla.ny ~mre the

endur~l.llca.

talas

No·t until

1937 were the last of these guerrillas clea1•ed f:rom the .
•

provinces,
Suffering and untold ha.rdsh:tps greeted ttw weary,
battle•sca:rred veterans o!' the '!\ad Army.
every turn in

l~he

road and rained

planes of Chiang Kai•sllek.

do;~n

Death met them at

on them 1'rom the

Thousands perished but other

l For a complete discussion of thEl Long r-!Jarch ,gt.
Payne, ~~o ~-~, Chapter 6; Snow, ~ Jta~ ~ Qb~i•
Chapter •
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thousands took their places.

Still they marched by day and

by night, fight:l.ng, dying, deserting, growing, sickeningi
a barefoot 1 ragged • vex-min-.ridden l1Wb 1 blindly following a

cause that 11romis ad a better wAy oJ.' life than any they had
ever known.

'!'ales of heroism ware recounted daily •

The most _ _ __

critical incident of the Lo.ng March 1r1as the· crossing o.f' the
Tatu River.

As the "Beds" emerged from the :f.'orasts, they.

captured the river ·town of

lin

crossing in three f'erryboa.ts,

Jan Ch 'eng and attempted a

No'l"l the Tatu do01S not; look

impressive on a map, but it is a sv1ii't river and 1rJider at
flood.time in iYiay then tha Yangtze,

~>o

the attempt had to

be abandoned and another crossing had to be fOilnd.
About 140 miles ••est o1' An Jan Ch 1 ang, amidst l:!igh
gorges 1.1l1.ero the river is narrow and de<lP.• thero is an
iron-ol'W.in suspension bridge callao. tt1e Liu Ting Chiao.

It

was towards tl1at bridge an advanced force drove, stopping
only briefly to ee.t rand rest.

In ·these JlHl'iods polit:i.cal

attaches unc";asingly lectured on the reasons behind this
one action.
The Liu Ting Chiao
chains

1~ere

>~as

centuries old.

stretched across the river.

r>ixteen l:!eavy

Thick boards

lashed over the chains made t:h<l road of the bridge.

As the

uReds" came up thay .found half the boards had been removed
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and a Nf~tionalist rnaoh:l.ne g~1n planted at the north. approach.

Thirty suicide volunteers destroyed the machine gun and
secared th<'J bridge be.fore "11/hi te" rein.forcements could be
brought up.

B:ere was an army >Jith a purpose.

mercenal'ies tllese men

\~ho

No paid

raced ·over bare cables into a

hail o£ bullets; they thOught they

~>Jere try:l.ng~tincLa _ _ __

better China.,
Onward pusheo. the CollJ!Ilunist troops• recruiting as
CJp £rom Kiangsi and ;t;Ukien

t;hey 1r1ent.

throt.:~gh

Kwangsi,

Kweicho;;, Yunnan. Szechuan, Kansu 1 and into t;hensi

m~cheil.

the t1orde.
The Great SrlOvJ Mountain

teet on some Chinese maps.
much higher.

an elevation o;t l.6,300

To tl1e .footsore "Re<is'-' it seemed

Kiangsi•s mountains were foothills compared

to these-•a mere
at sixteen

shot~s

t1~0

thOt~sand

thousand feet.

lt is hart'!. to breathe

feet 1.md a man tires easily.

About

forty thousand survived the trip over the mountains and
joined with

·~he

;Fourth :Front _Red Army at Ta--w:.i in nort11-

~1estern Szechuan .for a much needed rest. 2
In August, 1935, the Co!!llUUrdsts PU">hed out f'or

Shensi.

lt was

H

month o.f ra.in and_f_og.-----'l'OJtuar.d.S--..tl'le----

2 Payne, ~· ~.

P• 151.
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s:rasslands and into the soft, damp swa.rnps moved the "Reds. 11
Hostile natives,3 diseasa. poisonous mud that raised livid

welts on the flesh, long plains of black and yellow grass,
e.nd the deathly cold. nights made this the most tortuous
part of t11e tong March.

In October .Pao An was xes.cl:led • and

the ordeal was over.
Iiere in $hensi there

~•as

time to consolidate

resouroas. build up the army, establish

vill~cgs

govern•

ments, and spread their influence over all of Northern
China.

r..ess than tw:mty thousand Communists had arrive:1 a.t

J?ao lln.

It seemed !mp:robable ·that this group could one dey

be a formidable foe for Nanlting.
Meant>hile• jealousy <5pread through the leadership o:f

the l\lme;chantat11h the Chinese Com.munist Party.

Ghang

Kuo-t •ao, someM.nJEW vice•chaJ.rman of the f,J.angsi Soviet and

la.ter cha:tr,;:,an oi' tne Hona.n•Hupeh•Anhwei soviets, disagreed
with Ivlao •rsa ..tung on the disposition of the Hed /.rmy.
Preferring to remaixl in Szechuan, he v1ae finally persuaded
to lead his troops into Kansu and Sl1ensi by Chu l'eh and.

Peng Teh..huei.

A year later, at J?ao

An Che.ng 1

he cont!nuod

3 One incident reported in tlm ~ ~ l:J.me:J.,
September l., 1935, p. 12~7i ·tells o:t.' six-hundred. 11 l'l.eds 11
stripped and chased by Lolo tribesmen near M.enningshun.
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his opposition to Mao and in 1938 fled to Hankow.

defection of Li
nature.

L:l.~san

l'he

in 1931 vias of a more t(;lmporary

Li had disappeared into tl'l.e Soviet Union but

returned to Cb.ina at the close of'

Wa.r II as General

~forld

Lin l?lao 1 s political adviser and viae-chairman oi' the JUl..

China :Federation o:f:. Labor.
In 1934 and 1935 the E;hensi ;.;;;oviet axpancled

A tl'a.ining school Has established i'or tho

considerably.

Communist .Pa.rty in th.is period ot.· political. indoctrination.
The

11

am. p:l!inted money.

Re6s" opened a bank, issued stamps,

Land was con;f'iscated and :t>edistributed.
abolished.
~HilXe

Co-operatives

sta:trted.

1tlliJre

opened.

All surtaxeB 1rJeJ:a

Pr!mal'y schools

By the mid!lle of 1935 the Soviets controlled

t\~enty-t'tJO counties in ;Jl1ensi and l{);),nsu.4

It" was into this

setting that t.he survivors of the Long March came.
Shensi is a farm:l.ng Pl'OVince.
goats gl'aze on tb.e l1igh, loess hills.
peaceful in this part of China.

oally unknown.

C1:1ttle 1

sh~ep•

and

It is usually

Modern liv:tng is p:ca.cti-

Peasants till the poor soil as their

ancesto:rs have done :!:.'or thG r1ast thousand years.

I•1ar.xists

could not have picked a more incongruous locale for the

-----··-
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beginning of a Communist s·tate.
under the banner o:t' i;lle

surrounding cities were

l\iJ.omint~.

Faoed ;dth a peasant society the

11

Rads 11 vlisely

adopt a a a peasant progre.ul of' land and taxes.

Hm1aver • tllll

Chinese Communists re€;a:rded land distribution as me:rely a
preliminar;)' step

jJ:l

·the

inroads in'l:;o indL1stry.

estab:U_stun5lnt_of_a~mass_basELi'or _ _ _ __

The First 1\ll.. China •;oviet Congress

in 1931 left no doubt as to the ultimate aim
in China--a

compl~>te

'.l!se~trmg

Commun:l.sm

Socialist State of tre Marx•

Leninist conception. 6
Mao

or

As 111ith Stalin

am Trotsky • so dth .

&nd I.,i Li•san, it n<.wer vias a question of

\1hat to clo, but how and v1hen to do it.
Because the .3oviets had to fight .f.'rom the beginning,
an a.rmy 1tJS.S of p:d.mr;.ry importance.

The potency of any "lWo."

f:l.ghting force depended on the support ot: tb.e

peop~e.

cut

oft t::wm any outside aid v1ith Ill1ssia. having her own

problems magn:Lfied by a ;vorld in depres<Jion and an
inadequate li'ive Yee:.r Plan, these Communists t1e:re left to
their own :resouxces in a pr!Hltically xesou:r.celess J.f'.nd.

Remoteness txom Nanlting 1 the Japanese menace, and

·~he

inadequate. peasant program of the Kuomintang helped give
the

11

Reds 11 a chance for success.

5

n..1.S.• •

p. 212.

65
Rep~esent;ative

government of tbe communist variety

was established \qherever the regime was stabilized.
Patterned after the Russian system it gave

ot democracy to the casual observer.
universal but not equal.

eva~y

indication

suffrage was

An attempt was made to balance

peasant influence by class5.:t'ying the rul'al popUlation into
categories 1 gl'eat landlords, middle and small lanCU.ortts,
rich peasants, poor peasants, tenant peasants, rural
workers,

handic:~:a:rt

vlorkers, :j,umwn proletariat• and

professional workers.

In the election of the soviets the

tenant peasants, rural workers.

!~dicraft

workers, et

cetera, were given a greater representation than were
other divisions.

Central soviet
~rovinoial

soviet

County Soviets
Distriut soviets
Village soviets

GRAPH

2~
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In each area the Collllll.Uniat Party controlled the choice of
oand.idates.
At this stage tl'le on:tm s:!.on of the Par.ty >;as more

important to the revolution then
O.t'ganization.

;~as

the. governmental

f.1emberslllp drives '<1ere undertaken in the

Young Vanguards and Cl1ildren •s Brigades.

Women 11Je:re

banded. into Communist Leagues, anti-Jap1mas;e societies,

nursing schools. weaving schools,

!lril

tilling brigades.

Adult farmers ;1e:re orgruuzed into the Pool' l'aople •s
Society and into anti-Japanese societies.

Jill ancient secret

given a place in

order, the Elder Brother i:iOciety,

1cJas

social scheme of reconstruction.

Peasant Guard<! and

tm

Partisan brigands took assignei.t positions in the new order.
Committees were set up under each of the district Soviets
embracing flll pru%ses or activity in the Communist areas.
It mattered li·tt:Le to the pea.sant tilling his smal.l plot

or lMd toot he v1as bo:tng .fit to a social pattern that
could not permit indivM.ual political liberty and survive.
Here

~~as

a system that promised economic betterment and an

opportunity to belong.

Small 111onde:r. that it tound in lti.m a

wilUng worker and an ardent supporter.
Redistribution of the land

•~as

in the initiation of Commwust policy.

of great j,mportance
By "Red 11
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definition "any farmer who rented out his land and collected
most of hill income from itt and not from his own labor •
a landlord. "6

1~a.s

In Shensi the problem was simpler than it

had been in the Sou·th.

Big estates were o.ftan owned by

former off:Lc:!.a.ls. tax collectors • e.nd absentee landlo:rds.
---~C=o~nf_is_c_ation_~ms_easy_.

______________________ - - -

Co~operativas ~~ere

established tllat vaent beyond

p:roduotiorl and distribution.
pooled .tn a common effort.
to plant and
~Jas

ha:~:vest

Jlnimals and machines vJere
Labor societies 111ere organized

largo axeas quickly.

f~\rl':ln

used for this work at least one dey each

Communists >vere taking a step

to~tJards

tile army

~ru~ek.

The

tile kolltozes of' the

Russian farm areas.
Poll tioally, economically • and ed.ucational.ly, at
t.'i:rst glance. the Shensi soviets seemed to
and better <ll'a tor the Chinese peasant.

pres~e

a.

ne~l

Ethically, the

\vest and most Western observers took a dim view of t;he
moral aspects of Communist control.
denyir~g

The:re can be no

the mate:rial failure to promote the economic wen ..

being of' the people und€r t11e old :regime, but none can
pra.tse the "Spiritual" rejuvenation of the new.
this that the soviets tailed.

6 ~., p. 216,

It is in

Their economic suooess
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enhances the chance for failure.

It' the Chinese • or any

people, ever reach the point whe;re physical necessities
are easily obtainable then COJPJ!lunism

variety will disappeal'..
Colll!llunism

flourish~1d

o1~

·t11e

~ussia.n

In Shensi, as elset•tlere •

on poverty and had to expand to
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -

Two tasks faced the Soviets in thel
t'll!ed and equip the Had Army •
to the peasantry.

am

to

North~riest:

to bring iul!lledia.te relief'

P:rivf:l.te capitalism, State capitalism,

and socialism existed side by side in the soviets.

The

State owned and exploited heavy industry but allowed some
competition from. priva"!Hil enterp;rise. undur restrictions,
in the transaction of land and its products. 7

A third

competition 111as permitted in the co-operatives wl:le.re

members competed against
Socialism

<~as

p:~:ivate

and state capitalism.

tl1.e aim of these co-operatives and their

functions were listoo to attain these ends:
1.

To combat the exploitation of' the masses by the

merchants.

2. To combat the enemy's blockade.
3. To devGlop the natdonaJ_ economy of the soviet
distriots.
4. To liaise the economic pol:l.tical level of ·the
masses.

7 Mao 'l'se~tung took his lesson from the failure of
the Russian experiment in 1918-1921 when all capital »as
abolished in the Uoi~.~>.R.

..

-
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~ocie.list

6. To prePlil:ra t.he conditions for
construction.s

Consumption, stlles, IJroduction, end credit
co-operatives 1/Jere organized on all political levels.
Shares 11le:re priced so that even the lOtiest peasant could

a!'i'ord to participate 1n tne endea.vo:r and there \'Jere no
restrictions placed on tne number of maaibers-.-However.--a---

member had only one vote regardless of' the number or
s:tw.res he posrH:lssad.

Prizes were otf.ered :!.'or efficiency 1n

mana.gemlilnt; mana.gers being elected by the
with the assistance or the central bureau.

co~operatives

The government

invested and shared 1n these enterprises.
Trade wa.s a problem for the Northwest area.

An

agrarian economy yielded bulky ra111 materials tl'l.l!l.t were

dif.f.'icult to transport a.a:ross the marshy i.'luts and up ·che
:rocky hillsidE>s that passed tor roads.

al'tiales were neede(l.

Manufactured

These had to come from ID.lomintang

areas .for the most part.

Soviet currency \vas not

aooepted outside t;ha Communist zone and a way had to be
round to get enow;;;h Na.tionalist cunency to pay :for imports.

8 Snov1, .9Ji1• .w.t_., · P• 222, quoted i'rom og.tl:!.ne Q!
Co•Ot)eratiy@ Dqvaloi)meut, Department o:f' National Economy,
November, 1936, ··ayapao, Shensi, p. 4.
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1?o eomplioe.te the situation further, exports had to be
sold on a depressed market like sn1uggled goods.

Xh.e need

£or money was acute.
Lin Pa.i-ohu,

veter~m

of the Long March and

Communist Commissar o;t' Finance, explained his three-fold
program. oi' fund raising thusly 1
people,

volu~tary

a direct

contributions, and

tq_~§'l[:i..ed

confiscation~

on the..____

This

last method provided the biggest and fastest source of
revenue. but also had the shortest life.

For all of Lin's

efforts• the unfavorable balnnoe continued.

No adequate

solution short of' legitimate ncoess to machine industrial..
That the "Retis•• managed

ization oould solve the d:Uemma..

to survive under such an economic burden attests to the
tenacity of the movement and to the impoverished conditions
under \'Jhich the people had lived prior to its coming.
Illiteracy in the Northwest was sat at about 95 par
cant :l.n 1935.

soviet adtloation at·talnpted to cover all

phases of human activity.

Hotvever, greatest emphasis .vas

placed on mil.itary education

;~it;h

schools oxga.r1::tzad for

tne in:f.'antry, cavalry, radiomen• medical men, and
engineers.

Teachers tvere scarce, instruction crude,

socialist propagand.a plenti:l'.'ul.

Those who learned to read

could not doubt t-ts to who had taught tl'lam or their part in
the great struggle.

I~ach

peasant knew the Reci lU'my as tha
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Poor Man's Army, the Red li'lag as the Poor Man • s !iJ.eg.
These were !ltlllo.ng !:lis f':trst lessons to be repeatecl over and

Educ11t:.ton in ShQnsi served. the Communists

over again.
~ell.

Rudimentary but effective, a tullY developed system

mi€;ht have been detrimental to tlho cause in the long view.
_ _ _ _ _ _ _..,s=uperstition pl!cy'ed a

ot this region.

v.:!.t~_nar'\l_in_.bhS>_health_habit.,_s__

Vater was considered harmful, and a man

bathed but twice in his lif'e-•once at birth and again at
maxriage.

To combat such practices schools

t~ere

set up

umer Hsu 'l'eh-11.9 H0111ever, these schools were more often
used for political indoctrination than the teaching of
health as suoll.

Children learned. their first characters in

the f'oxm ot revolutionary slogans and then wo;r;ked :t'orwJ>rd
into stories of oontliot betwaen tte "Reds" and the
Kuomintong. landlords l!lld peasants. capitalists, and
workers.
Let us

no;~

leave anensi brie:t:ly and f.iUl'vey the

happenings in ot'.h<ll' parts of China.
~~as

The Japanese threat

beill€; felt all throUgh Asia. and the Nationalist

Govarll.lllent pr as sed to relieve the sltus.tion.

Japan had

gone into r4runohuria in 1931 and gave every evidence of

9 See Chap·tar VIII, p. 154, for a biographical
sketch of Hsu Teh-li.
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staying the:re •. .Despite ti:ds foreign aggression yuallunl$

aontinued their Jealous grasp of portions of China.

A

National Ivti.litary Council composed of ll'ang

Yu~hsii'tng,

Hsi•shan, and Chang Usue-liang v1Hl1 Chia11g

Kai~shel~

cha.l:~.'tuen Nas

short-lived.

_____:.::c.:·m.=an==:t:..::tl=n~g• Bzeohuan, and

Yen

as

CJ.v.U 1:mrs broke out .in

K•~eioho>1 in_l~:.'$1)_j;_o__a_dd_to__ j;he

difficulties in the attempt to unify China.

___________ _

In November

of 1933 a group of Chinese generals led by Ch'en Ming .. ch'u

declared the independence of Fukien and established a
government at

17oocho~;.

Nanking sent land, sea, arld air

:f'orces against the city and retook it by January.
othe~

In

southeastern pxovincas. such as Kwangtung and

Kwangsi, the Nationalists had only nominal control withOut

effective authority.
In the late Spring of 1936, as the Japanese

~on~n~ed

their pressure on thill north, these southern armias took
the i'ield demanding i;ha.t Chiang Join them in on attack
s_gainst the invaders.

:Fe!! av1h.ile it appear<Jd a clash would

'be inevitable, as the Ganel.•a.lissimo roode it evident he
would resist ruzy attempt by these troops to move !10J!th.
However 1 the southern revolt collapsed

~Jithout

ruzy serious

fighting, the l'esult being tl1e extension of Nationalist
authority to the Canton regions.

Thus, we may see the

widespread daf0otions in a land that ne0ded unity above

7l
~

all else.

govermuent at Nanking being pulled apart by

internal txoubles, \va:rlo:rds ple.y:l.ng politics .fox power,
revolt in

t;b.e

>3outl1• and the Japanese in Nanchuria at'id.ed

up to a bargaining point for the Collllllunist Party.

In

1936, at Sian. the capit:U oi' Shansi 1 tho crises oama to a
_ _ _ _hilJlid •._~-------------------

'JJo Sian in 1935 had come the Young i'lal'Shall, General
Chang Usueh-Usng, a.nd appr o.x:l.ma.tely one

~umdrect

thirty

thousand troops to blockade the Red A:r:my in the North-vJest.
These IJ!al'l.churiaruJ 1 having been i'oxcibly rmnoved from their
h.omal.and by the Japanese, oon·tinu,~ly agitated :L'or action

in tl'la·t direction rather than against the CollllllU11ists.

Consequently, the thl·eatened punitive expedition never
seemed to get und;,rway.

Genal'~

Chang even established.

friendly relations vli.th Chou I:::n-lai,lO laison oti'ioial for
the Kungchantung.
Recognizing the inherent danger in trds state of
a1'fai.tw, Chiang Kai•shek fle1tJ to Sian on December 4, in

order to hasten the propoo ed offensive.
acaomplishin.g tkds • -t;lllll Generalissimo

held for

tourt~;H.!ll1

\~as

Instead o:f
imprisoned and

days by CJ1.ang Hsuea..,.liang. l!'irst reports

lO See Chapter VII! • page 161, fo:r: a biographical

sketch of Chou En-lai.

?2

ct.' ransom demands· vla:re said to include five points; .
A grant of ~:30 1ooo, 000 to Chang •s army.
2. A new and better garrison area.
3• Equipment and supplies equal to· those supplied
to government armies.
4. A stron~e:r fwn·t against Japan.
5. O.:f'fiGers of' Chang's F.trmy to get e;tecutive posts
in the p:t'Op.Qsetl n<m l:.llti~J·a.panese army· for national
salvation.u
1.

H:o\'Jever, ·t;hase speci.fioations raay l:lavlil been hast:l.ly drawn

tor later reports modified and broadened the demands to
contain:

1.

A

2.

A

cessation o.f hostilities in tb.e Civil vmr.

re ..organization of tho Nanking Government to

include all parties.
3. Release of' patrict:!.o leaders arrEls.tad in
Shanghai.
4. :nel<mse of <J.ll political prisoners.
5. Guarantee of' the right of. assembly.
6. Assurance o! the r:!.ght of. the people to cs.:rxy
out pa.triot1c movements.
7. Faith.t'ul execution o1' the ~~ill >Of sun Yat~s<m.
a. A oon:teranoo f'or national salvatic.m.l2
Ohiang would raeJta no definite oollllllitmants.

Mrs. Chiang

Kai-shek, T. V;, Soonfh and IN'. H. Donald arrived in Sian on
DeGember 22• to e.f't'aot his release.

SUrprisingly enough•

Chou En•la.i helped in bringing this about.l3 'l'he Commun•
ists were awa.:r.a of: tho Generalissimo • s ab:tlity to unify
l1

ruut

~ Times~ December 21, 1936 1 p. 1:6.

12 Chang, SJ:i.•

19~~7 1

P• 10:2.

W• ,

11. 24 9; Ne1• X!Wi; 'l.'imes • January

the country against Japan.
martyr of a

They also fearecl making a

erson they would someday need to discredit

before t;h<i Chinese people.
On Decembe:r 25,

the spring oi'
_ _ _ _.,C.,olllil~lun...,..,i st
oloser

·~he

lc:J~36,

Chitmg Kai•shek lvas freed.

In

i'ollc wjJ.Jg year • Chou T::n•lai c0as named as

l'iJJ:l.r~e s_enta:ti'\l'e_at~Nanking _bringing-in-an-e ra-o:!'.'-------

eo~opero:t;:ton

between the "Reds" and tl1.o "l'lh.ites."

Meam1hila the soviet Government moved !rom Pao An to
;lenan,. e. site chosen for its h:.tr:Jto.ricul s:i.gnli'icance.

This

city had seen the dov1nfall oi' the last purely Chinese
dynasty, ths !JLi.n,.q;s.

Perhaps lt..ao

a naw kind of' dynasty ho:ve.

Tse~tung

;•is had to bogin

In any <'iV<mt, Yenan assumes

an important niche in tho rise of COJlllllUl'lism in China, a
springboaxd

fox all that follows.

The years 1934 to .1937 111ere ones of consolidation

i'or the forces of Communism in China.

Mao Tse•tung 1s plan

for a communis·t; regime 1 built on land reform and poli tical indoctrination, shmved rosuJ.tu.

SUppoxt affordM tb!:l

Communist Army by the people of the area
effectiVEU16SS •

accentu~?.ted

its

Japanese aggresaion in l"lanchUl'ia, tha

defection o;t' Chang Hsueh-liang, revolts in t.be south•
friction

>~ith:tn

the Kuomintang, and ·!;he remoteness of

Shensi prev<mtad Chiang Kai•shelr from bringing adequate
pressure ·jjo bear ou tlli ~> region.

Lef't alone, the
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Colll!llunists built a hard oo:r.e of resistance to NEttionalist
control.

I

I

II
i

I

I

-1

N.tiNKING AND YENAN

19::57-1945
Early in t;l1e Jnorn;tng of' Jnly 7 1 ..,J•.'>JO.
·"'' 7 f on ·L;ha Marco

the Sino-Japanese 'i11r in earnest.

against the

·~ar:ritory

Nith thi.s overt act

of China proper • the NUJ:l.king auth-

orities had no c11oica but to J:':l.nd a solut.ton to t.he
Cornrnun:Lst problem.

l''our pxomisas

~~bich

had been agreed

upon earlier \Jere published by the Kuomintang on J1.1ly 15 1

1937.

These included:

1.. The Chinese Communist Party shr.J.l stxugglG i'or
the realization of ·the three principles of tl:le

people.
2. They will abandon the policy of overthrowing
the Kuomintang regime, give up the communi.3t mov,>man·~.
and discard the policy of con:fisonting land by force.
3. They \~ill dissolve the present soviet organization• and by carrying into practice '!;he principles of
democracy, they dll help to bring r;bout the
political unity of the t~Jhole nation.
4.

TtJ.ey \dll disband th'; Had Army.l

.!en waeks a;l.'ter the beginn:l.ng of the war the
Communists announced ·tl1ei:r vertJion of thesG :promises:

\

._
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1. TM Communists propo:oe to abandon the agral'ian
revolution they have practiced in the past.
2. 'rb.ey propose not t.o ovortb.rov1 the Kuom:l.ntar~g by

force.

3. They pro;ni.se to l'oorganize the soviet GovHrnment 1n the border region as a democratic. local
govGrnment.
4. '£hey c1.gree to reorganize the 11ed Army as a
national revolLltion!'il'Y army. 2
. ·
_ _ _ _ _ _ _--.:Tha_dis_cr5lpJ:ln_ci.9_s in those interpretations Inay_ be_____

laid to a judicious ef'.t'ort on both sides to ••uave face."
In actual

pract~~.ce

the Conwunist vexsion

vltlS

t;he

011e

'1he "Heds" did not; oi'fe:r much in thu way o;f real

compromise for aJ.l the iluposing 11Jord.ing of their
concessiorw.

I·Jitll a i'ull scaJ.e inva8iOt:l of. ttv> mainland

by a 1uajor power

undar•~ay,

continue a program

or

there i'Jas lit;·t;l& oppo:rtun5.ty to

agrarian rofol'm.

Secondly, l1ussia

recognized. Japan as her first enemy in .t.sia.

So1ne oi' this

fear 'Was tranmuitted to the Chinese Coll'.munist leaders

during ·t;heir

r.P,osoo~>

stay.

It could ba of no benefit to

overtl1ro111 t;he Kuomintang and tllen fall prey to Japan.

'l'he ·third

ag:~:oement

-was neve:c i'ulfilled despite a great

di<>play of iiilections and balloting.

l'he fouxth saw ·tl1G

Red Army become officially the E:'cghth Hou-te Army tdth a New

;--
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Fourth Army organized out of the scattered guerrilla forces
in Central China.

outside pressure had brought an uneasy

truce to the struggling factions within China.
From 1934 to 1937 both Chiang Kai•shek and

~mo

Tse-tung hli!.d refurbished the morale .of' their respective

_____~,:r_on_ps-'byJan~-e_senting their immediate enemy to -be- Japanese imperialism.

'rhe General;tssimo •s "anti-bandit 11

campaign oJa.s a preparation for the fight against Japan.

Every pillbox built was a defense line against the coming
attack from tba Island Empire.

so, also, every step taken

t0\1ards tkle west by the 11 Reda" was training for the

struggle with Japan.
Even after the attack on LUkouahiao there was no
slackening ot

p~essure

on either side.

Not until January,

1938, following the Japanese victory at Nanking did an

actual "modus operandi" become effective, and then only on
a limited scale.
The :formation of the People •s Political Council ;vas
Sj?mbolic of Chinese unity during the

~1arly

war.

Of its tvJO hundred

!t

first met on July 6 1 1931..

members • seven were Communists.
powers:
(2)

period of the

This group had three main

(l) to consider government policies and actions;

to submit proposals to the government; and (3) to

question high government officials and receive reports !rom

tham.3

In the beginninl$ the People •s J?olit!cw.l Council·

served as a :::1ounding board :f."or national opinion, but even

this perfunctory use vsas curtailed as disunity spread.
'!he New Fou:T!th J.\:r:lfi'J

~Jas

permitted to engage in

guerrilla activity on the north and south banks or the
_ _ _ _Y.~>ngtze River.

Recruits f'l·om the provinces flocked to the
·~----

colors of' Yah Ting, its commander.

Political prisoners,

peasants, students • and factory workers jointed the surge.
Mao Tse-tung formulated a theory
divided into three periods:

t~hioh

sa\rJ the war

(l) Ja.panese o:f:t'ensive •

Chinese retreat to gain time; (2) Japanese offensive
blunted against the foothills of Nestern Cl:lina; and (3)
Japan•s internal and international contradictions reach a

breaking point. followed by larga*scale Chinese

I1

I
I
I
I

offensives and victory.4

counter~

These tactics ~ere adopted by

the Nationalist Forces in their retreat to the 1:1est.
ln 1939 Generalissimo Chiang set up a guerrilla

school vlith some ideas borrowed from the Communist
Military Academy at Yenan.

c;hortly before this Chiang tlad

madE! a declaration at Nanyo \vhioh showed a change in the

4 Edgar Snoto, ~Battle ,W ~. P• 178.
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emphasis of ths Government on the

cond~ot

of tM >vat.

He

said:

The people are more important than the army.
warfare is more important than positional
warfare. The political education of the soldiers is
more important than military education. Propaganda is
more important than bullats.6
~errilla

--------Genal:al.-Yeh-Ghien;;;;:yir..g-,-nnea.n____ta.cticie.u., --'Jzas-some• - - -

time adviser in the new school.

Outwardly at least, the

Kuomintang and I\llMhentlln€; seemed to be moving in the
direction o!' oompleta b.armony.
"Whites" were turning

11

pink. 11

It looked as though the

Military n.eoass.ity lett

little choice.

A capitalist system

impossibility.

A non-industrial nation attempting to :f.'ight

11itho~t

capital is an

a war on an industrial basis is likewise impossible.

Fo;r

all of this, the basic dii':f'eranoas between communist and

National.ist remained i:r:reconoile.bla.

<.."hina presented

muon less than a united :front against the irlvlilders.
Throughout 1938 't;he picture o:t.' amicable :relations

was often vigorously port:rayed.6 By 1939 this thin veneer
of friendship had worn smooth.

As enemy pressure

slackened, the Kuomintang; turned. to the task of regaining
5 ~ ••
~ Isl.U; ~s,

P• 183. Chiang's shift in tactics noted in
Peoember 15, l938t P• 14:3.

6 &r!:l, ~
May 1 1 J.958 1 p, 3:5; May 1, 1938,
p. 37:1i June 12,
, p. 30;1; Octobe:~: 7, 1938, p. 16:1;
November 9, 1938• P• 21;5,
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control relinquished to other factions in the government.
Chou

.b~·lai•

Communist vice-chairman of the Political

Department o£ the National Ililili.tary Council, 111as deprived
of all reo.l po\.;er.

Bookshops were raided and l:ttel'ature on

the Eighth Route and New li'Ot.u;th Armies .vas confiscated. 7

cut off.

Arms supply to Communist•led troops was stopped

eJ.together.

A blockade of the Shensi, Kansu, and

Ninghsia areas w~s initiated by Kuomintang forees.e
North Ch~a has alNays r<lma.ined a nation apart .f'rom
the south.

It tb.ere had

b~:K:n

unity in 1938, there had

been no surrender of' sovereignty.

After Sian the Commun-

ists ;>ere left in coxltrol of an area the size of England.
¥11th the union of the Kuomintang s.nl the Com."'Runist Party a
-speo:'..eJ. admi:nistJ:ation tvas set up for the ter:ri tory.

Ienan became the capital of the new provisional goV,ernment
as ·it l1ad been the oapi tal of the soviet Republic.
:remained t>he oente:r of Communist Party

~tctiv:tties

It
as

~Vell

as headquarte:cs f. or the l.t:l.gl1th Route Army.

'7 ~ X!;Wf; Urnqs. November 16, 1939, :p. 8:4.
gwr~a,

8 Israel Epsteinw :Che Qiji'il~!.}heg, Reyolgt:l,on
p. 124.

!n

81
This c5.ty suffered repeated bombardment by the
Japanese during the vJar.
;~e:t'e

conditions

better than had been enjoyed by the

Communists at Pao An. 9
expanded slowly.

In spite of the dest:t>uotion.

Industry, trade, and agrioul ture

li\lblio health progressed to the point

_ _ ___,~...
~h""e.._.r._.e._:plague which was edf;lmic to the regic>_n h_ad_!l9_1; been.___ _ __
felt for two years.
Eoono:mically the Communist controlled areas

•~ere

faced :with a

two~way

Kuo:mintang.

In order to overcome the difficulty of supply

blockade, .from Japan and f'ro:m the

it vJas necessary to establish sel.f-su:f':f.'ioiency in the
regions of' occupancy.

This progl;'am "as launched in 1940

by ten thousand soldiers of' the One Hundl'ed •r;ventieth

Division of the Eighth Route.t\r:my unde.r General 'iang Chen.
T11ese troops turned f.'ar:mel's enlisted the aid of the

peasM·ts to produce 4,600 1 000 pounds o:f :millet, 450 1 000
pounds of. pork• ond
pumpkins by 1943.10

l,ooo.ooo

pounds o:f potatoes and

Not only did soldiers i'a.:rm on a large

scale 1 'but also m!lintained their own smithies • spinning and
v1eaving factories, ta.ilor shops, o:l.l pressing mills• and
food preserving plants.
9

snov1, £m•

~. • p. 266.

lG Epstein, £m•

.91Ji.• 1 p. 262.
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r~hansi•Hunan•Hopei

In the

Area soldiero reclaimed.

l.nrga stretches o:.t:' land in the bnnen Taihrulg .Mountains.
The Army in Shantung supplied its needs to the ve.lue of
~?l,OOO.OO

$56,l56,ooo.oo or about

for O!l.Ch regular soldier.

In central Hopei each man was obliged to cultivate one
sixth of' an acre annually .u

J'apanes<~ .attacks often

coincided with the planting and harvesting seasons.

They

hoped to force the Chinese troops tnto requisitioning food
from the people and thereby to destroy ·the relationship of
peasant to soldier vJithout 1r1hich .gue:r.rilln wa:r.fare is
impossible.

Labor l!;Xchtmge Groups foiled th<Jse attempts by

reducing planting !i'.l:ld harvesting ope:ratlons f'rom six to

two 1.1eeks.

1-ihat had formerly bean done by the individual.

peasant on his

O>~ll

nm~

;f.'arm

Necessity forced community

was done by tr1e t'Jb.o1e Village.
co~operation.

Agriculture has been the fox emost industry in
China from tiroo. immemorial.

The search

tor more arable land

b.as occupied the efforts of sage and pol:l.1;;!.c:l.en 1 conquei'ed

I

I

and conqueror • landlord and peastmt for centurier>.
is the lend of flood and drought.

enough

wat<~r

for o:rops

~lhen

developed.

11 4bid •• P• 279.

China

Her Dumy rivers furnish

:l.rrigt:l.tion

project~;

n.re

__

,
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one of the se:rious effects of theJapanesa invasion
was the deterioration or the system of irrigation.

Punitive eJ::paditions often found :!.t advan·l;ageous to demolish
dik!:!ls.

Hebuilding tvas difficult I'Jith the lack of

mechanical equiplllent I'?..Ild decreased manp01:Jer.

Hov1ever • in

_____.t....h..-e.___.Pe~:l.~ ao region_Q_f' tl'l_e__Sb.ansi..Honan ·Eope:l.J;Gct:ton_ovel? _ _ __
eight hundred thousand e.ores of
l940·l94l.

On t!:1e Central.

n•n~

land 1was oultivated in

Hopei plain 197 major dike
ne•~

bree.ohes \'Jere mended, one hundred ninety miles of

embankments built, and fifty miles of' r:tvor do-:opened.l2

1939•1941 were years of
Japanese lines.

tria~

for the fxonts behind

h'ith the regular .front inacti va, Japan

could concentrtcte on flush;tng the guerrillas.

At the

beginn:l.ng of ·the resi!Jtance th<iNl had been unity .in China.
Now there was no b.ope of getting tmpplies from the
unoccupied areas contl'ollerl by the Kuoraintang.

Consequent•

ly, the gue:r.rillas had to extend their operations, to

capture more arms • and to keep the enemy
many places that

hE1

clO

busy in so

could not concentrate against any one.

First the Japtmese tried conventional methods of
pos1 tional

vial' •

Attacking on a 1vide f:r.ont, they

take some place from the Communists.

~;ould

After finding that
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all they hP.d gained

i18.S

land, tl'le Impe:dal Army next

orga.nizec\ commando ~5ro11ps of about one thousand men to
o~1rry

out quick, deep raids :tnto Chinese terl'ltory designed

to .snnihilo.te directing oe.nterH and sepl'l.rat;e detacl:llllents.

The first such

'lvere <L>livored in the ;;;pl:ing and

strokE~s

autumn of 1939, in the southeast wutai Mounta:tn Jtt'ea.
Lieutenant General Abe, tile highest Japanese colll!D.ander on

the mainl&.nd, had devieed the tactics and died t:.:rying to
lllalte them m;wcessful.
lio. series of foJ::ts v1ere constructeCI. to "str,:;mgle"

the roving Cbinose troops.

'fhese vH'J:r.e also ummccessf'ul.

'fhe guen•illas neve:r let ·the JapHnesG: get their baleJJ.ce,
T11ey ltept the initiative by conr.rtant

t?,tto.cl~,

taining superio:t'ity in the a:reas of activity.

alvJays main..
'.Cl1e mili'ti:il

was pa:rticularly effective in :miping and mine-laying.

,he:roa.s ~ formerly • tl'l<3 Japanese entered villaa;Gs at, i1ill in
t;mall. numbe:r. s, they

n0111

did so only vlho.n a cmn1Jaign extended

thrm gb. the te:r.r:tto:r.y.

F.ri1tlon bc.rtween the Communists end Nationalists
Do;m south• t.ht~ Nevi Fo1.arth A:r.my, which hatl.

mounted.
achieved

~<o.me lllEH>.suxe

resistance

of fame fo:r its anti ..Japanese

in the lown• Yangtze Valley, found itself in

serious uif.fimllty.

In contrast to the :>tony mountains and d:ry plains
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o:t: the Eighth Route Army basl!ls north of tllil Yellow River,

the New l<ourth operated in the rich, green, humid valley
of the Yangtze among nooded rica fields texraoed along
gentle slopes.
!>liiOtor,

Inter-party strife began in 1938 in this

After the de:f.'ection oi' :f.\n•mer Premier 1

~lang

_ _ ____,Ching~\'te1,_to_tha_JapsnesE!l,-1t-was-difficult--to-tell-foG---

from friend.
Three types of national
Yangtze at that time.

f'o:~;~ces

had held the lower

The New Fourth numbered ten

thousand men, the "Loyal and Victorious" Army of
Kuomintang Secret Service Chief Tai Li numbered e.:t.ghty
thousand men, Central /U?my troops numbered about fifty
thousand in ·the area.

It

;~as

not until the Japanese

stopped their general of.fensive that the differences in
the Chinese camp came to the .forefront.

The Ne11 Fourth

continued its program o.f limited offensive against the
Imperial troops.

Kuom1ntang leaders wished to take the

t.:t.ma to consolidate and rest.
Late in 1940 Ho Y.:t.:ng-ohin, \mr Minister and Chie.f
o.f Sta:t'.f to the Central Government, ord<lred the

Ne~;1

F'ourth

to leave its bases behind the enemy l:l.ns s and. to move
several hundred miles to the nortkl bank of tlle Yellow
River, there to join 1vith the Eighth Route.
refused to obey.

'l'l:le

11

Hads 11

In January, 1941, Government units under
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General Shangkuan Yun-hsiang attacked the New F'ourth 1al'ld
destroyed its organizational arm.

.1\~though.

its headquarters

were gone, only one :f.'ourth of its efficiency was impaired.
Like all forces engaged in guerrilla activities, it ••as
divided into tactically autonomous dataohments, each
---~hold_ing_i:ts_o_;m_pocket_o:f'_resistance_and_depend.ent-<>n-----~

headquarters· only i'or general guidance, not .i'or supplies
and day to day direction.
The. Kuomintang versj,on of this a.f'i'air was one of
disciplinary action against an insubordinate unit.
Kungchantung saw in it a renewal of' Civil :rar.
~

The

The Net-J

Iim§![!. sa1r1 other possibilities t

It is not accident or coincidence ttlm.t the most
recent .flareup bet;1een Chiang Kai-s.tulk and the
Communists has occurred while Japa.n•s special. Amba.ss•
ad or is negotiating t11 th Premier and ll'oreign l'tlnister
Vya.chesloff M. }1olotof'f in :Moscow on a. possible
aliireement .t.'ollowing on Japan • ~ formal adherence to
the German•ltalian alliance.l.a
The qu~rel LPetwean the Chinese ConMunists and the
Kuomintallii!/ turns upon two demands. :rna Eighth Route
Army asked to be trans.ferred from its present field or
operation in the impoverished notthvJestern provinces
to the richer and more populous Yal:l.gtze V~llley, no1t1
largely under Japanese control, arguing tlw.t they cot~ld
fight there more effectively. The Fourth Route Army
demanded an immediate national convention with a view
to broadening the basis ot government • • • •
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As to tna Yangtze, a Chinese victory i11hicn ;•ou.ld
leave Communist forces in possession of the cou.ntry•s
richest provinces lriOUld scarcely be palatable to the
government unless it were first assured that those
.f.'orces £~t loyalty to China above adherence to
Moscow.

l'lb.ether o:t pl'i!llary national or international significmnce
the discord in China was evident.
Industrial production in Communist sections 111as
nat.u:~;ally

centere1l in supplying the army.

Each c:t the

nineteen Red areas had at least one base arsenal employing
from ho hun(lred to one thousand i>orkers.l5 The making of
small al'lll!il was their t'i:r:st job.

Hith an extremely lrtobile

force there is little need :tor unwieldy tield pieces.

Then, too, operating so close to the invading army. it was
necessary to move on an instant •s notice.

.11\aSily disman-

tled and easily transported machinery v;as ttte order of ttta
day.

Ra•• material.s
i tsel:f.'.

for arms production came from the <mr

Japanese rails were torn up steel and Japanese

oo:mmun1aa.tion lines for copper.

accounted for almost

aJ~

of the

Captured ''scrap"
meta~s

used.

'l'axt1les v1ere produced largely by the >vomen in tru1
villages.

Conservation came as a matter of course.

l.4 ~ •• January 22, l94l• p. 2012.

15 l£pstein, .lUI.•

.!lU.•, p.

287.
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Un!for1n factories were maintained by the army.· Old uniforms
had to be turned in for salvage before new ones were
issued.

'.!?he cloth

~Jas

torn into

~Strips

am used f'or

padding in shoes or plaited into :rope for sandals.
metal uni:t'orm buttons were made of v1ood.

'.l?o save

Glazed earthen•

_ _ _____c\-l_ar_e_t_o_ok_tt~_plac_lLof_en!l1llalad_metAl_ins1g.n:ta.--------The Communists printed. their own currency throughout
the war.

Init:i.ally, the .flooding of "Red 11 controlled areas

with money printed by the Japanese
printing.

~ave

impetus to the

Then, in keeping 'lvith the ideal o;f' a selt-

oontainea economy • the practice was continued.
agra:ri~ll'l

in most

societies and particularly those that are

socialized, there is little need i'or coin.
as well.

f1s

&rt<I~r

serves

In the eyes of the state it !larvas better, 1"ol1

cont:ol is easier.
grain is congruous.
grain is natural.

To bribe en indi vid~.tal wi·th a bushel o:f
To pay the state with a bushel of
Taxes in kind had been extracted :f'rom

the Chinese people for years.
\'1/ith a governml;lnt constantly alerted to move,

ha~

ever,

it was necessary to have t11e people accept a currency that
-eould be minted by t;hat government.

In this

t~ay

a base

,-

could be built for economic salvation in the event of
military disaster.
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Txade in China 1r1as carried on among its geograph..

ical subdivisions regardless of political affiliations.
Hostile ·terrain, lack of col.lllllunications, and the tvill of a
determined people made it virtually impossible for Japan
to close off its sections.

Txade \'las slow and often

____-"h.,..a,..zardSLUS_but_e.lvJay-s_acti:v-!;1 o-'l:he-Kttom1nt•~•~-'blookade -irlaS
even less effective.

----

Although Nanking protested against

the "Red" practice qf coining l!loney, there was nothing she
could do about it.

l'.nd ••ithout these issues the Collllllunist

economy would have been seriously rest:ricted, if' it did
not collapse.
Education of the masses was stressed whenever
possible in Corr~unist areas.

Iwu Teh-1116, laid the

foundation for an educational system in Shensi.

Before

his arrival there had been one hundred twenty schools
scattered throughout the province.
there were '773 primary

school~>,

By the end oi' lQ39

seventy-eight model prim..

a.ry schools, sixteen higher primary school:;, seven hundred

obaracter .. study groups, 208 elementary schools, four

middle schools, three colleges, an art academy, a technical

training academy, and an Industrial

co~operative

16 Sea Chapter VIII, p. 1541
sketch ot Hsu Teh•li.

.1.'0:11

a biographical
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Vooa:tional :training School i'o:r .Boys.l7 These sctlOols, of

course, devo·ted much of tt1eir time to political indoctdn•
ation on Marxism and the Communist interpretation o;t the

Of singular importance .vas the Nu Tzu 'J!a Hsauh 1 the
- - - - - -

.four hund:red girlt> enrolled in such diverse subjeotc: as
spiml.ing, tho care of infants, and E:nglisl1 and Russian
gra.mraar.

Hel'e 1 also, the central theme was Marxism.

higher the school, ·the more
All activities
1t.'hen

intense

tb.f.l

\~e:r.e channelc~d to~rm.rds

Jap~m

'!'ha

indoctrination.

control by the state.

attaoklild in 19217 the.re l:lru:1 been little

thought in China of a fight to the end.

Kuomintw1g leaders

hoped tor six nwnt.hs of resistance and a subsequent
moderation of' Xokyo •s demands.
Chinese ).I!Jiniste:r vJithdrEnm.

l\lob un"l:iil 19:38 1vas the

From time to time

feelers" were sent .from the JIXis.

11

peaoe

These we:re !'ejected

when it became evident that :paa.ae could mean nothing but
submission to :tUppon.18

peace at any price.

:i>ome Kuomintang leaders favored

A movement

~Jas

insl;itutect i•ithin the

!?arty to b:ring Chiang Kai•shak to terms.

17 snow, op. git., P• 27:5.
16 Ros1nger 1 ~· cit., p. 30.

The Communists

-

=
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violently opposed this action.

They urged a·aontinuanoe of

the war until the Japanese were driven from the mainland.
Since China

~ms

considerably 1r1eaker than Japan both

economically and politically. it had to develop methods of
warfare that would permit the most effective use o.f its
resources.

No

better example could be found of a

cally inferior, ill•equi.pped :f.'oroe

p:rolongix~g

numer~i~-------

a struggle

than the Communist Campaigns of 1930-19;14 in the Kiangsi
hills.
China tor the first time in its long history
temporarily united in a common cause.

t~as

What had been

accomplished by the Communis·t;s in one province could be
achieved on a national scale by the combined weight o;t· the
KUomintang and KUngchantang.
grew as the

t~ar

progressed.

support .from fo:feign pON ers
~J!Ore

and more enemy troops had

to be delivered to other areas, making it e:x:tramel.y precarious for Japan to J.aunch attacks into the interior.
pollcy or trading space .for time was successful

The

ag~;.inst

the

Japanese.
However, the continuing struggle agaJ.nst the
Communists was further weakened by tlais stratagem.

I:f.' the

det'ense of industrial regions was untenable militarily,
their def'ense <•las necessary politically.
idea of

:t'ightii~g

'..l:o give up the

tor positions meant the governrnent tqould
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Trus would prostrate a

abandon its industrialized qoast,

raation within the government where support had come from
the industrial, merchant class.

Moreover. to engage in

guerrilla war:t'are • the people would have to be mobilized
behind the Japanese lines.

This aoula. best be accomplished

by offering them an improved. way .of life.

The peasants:___ _ __

could hardly be expected to support the war effort without

an amelioration of their economic and political position.
In this also we :f'.f.nd the .Kuomingtang being forced to

reduce the povJe;r of a class

'~hich

had supported it• the

landlords.
The Eighth Route Army carried much of ·l;he burden
f'or

s~.accessful

g\H>rril.la

t~ar!'are.

'l:his group was sent to

Shansi in 1937 where it found a demoralized people in
leveled villages.

'l'his populace

\'l~ls

quickly OJrganizad into

an effective force for harassment of the Japanese Army in
occupation and for raids on Japanese supply lines.
F..lnphasis fell on tm cultivation of' peasant support .•
Land was

re~distributad,

rents and interest rates reduced•

and the payment of debts cancelled or extended.

Such

actions helped cement the friendship of the people who
succeeded in keeping large nQllibers of enemy troops in ·che
north thereby blunting Japan 1 s drive for conqw st of all
China.
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HOvJEIVer. all

tiaB

not

\~El~l

with l\lationalist and

Communist.

As early as the spring oi' 19:381 the government

ha.d refused

tha necassat'y oft.\l.cial regist!llat:ion to all

non•Kuomint~

a military
battles

Yotlt!:l Organizations.

c~ash

~wre

Later t!:lat s8llle year

oacurred in nort11. .Honan between the

l'eporteel between Communist and Central forces

in Kansu Provinca.l9
At the Southeast ShamJi
friction threatened to
Japanese.

~eave

mount~:d.r1

base internal

the area easy prey for the

The political history of ·this base involved

two provincial administrations e.nd overlappoo that of ·the
Shansi•Chahar•Hopai and .:>hansi•Suizan regions. Difficulties
with Yen Hsi•s!:lan, 20 tMCh!.Jll of Shansi, led to small scale

civil war in the former province W1iah was finally quelleC.
by elements of the Shansi Nevi .Army.

The Eighth Route

assumed Jurisdiction over the latter area.
In l:lou.th Hopei Governor Lu Ghung•lin, t•h.o ht'!d been
sent in by the central Government, dispersed tha loonl
administrators and brought back old-line ofi':l.aials.

19m~

Uroef$,

He

November 16, 1939• p. 8:4.

20 li'or a brief resume o:f' this lnan•s activities from
1912-1946 ct. Bpstein, 5m.• SU,., PP• 167•68,
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disa:rmed the Militia and entered into an agreement with
Governors .·Yen of Shansi and Shan Hung-lieh
inter ..provincial defense.

or

Shantung. for

The Eighth Route Army struck at

this coalition and in 1940 sat up the .Shansi,.Honan.-Hopei
Government.
From its northern base• this Army_ finished out th_..e.___ __
·~ar

against Japan.

Because of a shortage of supply, it

engaged primarUy in guerrilla activities.
\'Jere e;enerally

!WO

ided.

Occupied cities

!''or the most pa:rt the Communists

were content to harass and let the Japanese come to them.
Reports :f'iltered out to the ,,Jestern
and lost.

Verification

Conditions
Kunchangtung.

•~as

~;orsened

\~orld

of battles won

dii':f.'icult and otten. impossible.
bet;veen Kuomintang. and

Early in 1941 Chungking accused Communist

troops in North China of refusing to go to the aid of
Nationalists trapped by Japanese forces in the Ohungtiao
Mountains.21

The Communists, in turn, accused the

Kuomintang of. '>lithholding supplies and

not figl'lting the

invaders.
!~ter

the collapse of Allied positions in southeast

Asia, Japan moved more troops into North Qtina.

'l'he Eighth
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Route vJas driven out of Central Hopei altogether.

Its

centJJal headquarters :l.n th@ Shans:l. Mountains ><as
surrounded, and the Chief•of-staf:.f' 1 Tso Chut?.n• was kiUed.
A

ne;~

method of exterminatii:>n ·..vas tried by ·che

Imperial Army.
_ _ _ _f,.o""'r a
ta11t

Forces were concentrated in single villages

tb.ree_~month

per_iod dul:'J.:OO 1rhich time every irl.ha..,..b...i._-_ _ _ __

~~as Q.Llestioned~

•rhis was doomed to failure as the

Eighth Route once again forced the Japanese to deploy by

attacks on their weakest positions.
1\.s the :1\rnerican :forces approached the J?hil1ppines

and the Unite@ States Fourteenth Air Force swept the
Chinese skies clear o.f' enemy planes, Japan changed hell

strategy and launched an attack against the Chinese
regular ;front.

In early 1944 the whole Province of' Honan

!'ell t1£1en Tang En•po • s Central Armies disintegrated.

Next

came the capitulation of Changsha and a move into lla.nyang
to meet columns coming noxtl:1 from KvJantung.

This gave the

Imperial r,xmy possession of the entire Canton.,.llan.kow
raihm.y and cut Cl1:!.na in t1r1o.

x!lovt:Kl td.th

astonishin~

ln 'the South the Japanese

rapidity.

\ilhole .fron:ts collapsed

as the Ch:!.r1eso armi0s reeled back, often '"ithout l/esistanoa.22

22 lllpstein, .2.n• ~., p. 326.
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Chungking was a mass o.f' confusion.

city.

Of.f'ioials worried.

Rumors pla&ued the

People waited for the invading

islanders.
Meanwhile• the Co!ll!l!Wlist forces in the North began

a series of coordinated attacks

i'l'Oill

all bases behind

anything but guerrilla action, these attacks avoided the
big cities and major Japanese centers.
prompted this oftens:l.ve:

Three objectives

(l) to relieve

the pressure along

the regular front; (2) to destroy the net of blockhouses
built :l.n North and Central China; and

(3)

to extend

Chinese areas along the ca;u:Jt so as to provid.e facilities
.f'or Allied landings.

Some measlU'e of success was attained

in all three • but it remained fo:r those Al.lied troops t

island-hopping in the Pacific to play the major role in
their eventual fulfillment.
Throughout this campaign the Col'll!l!unists expanded
considerably.

In March, lti44• the regulars totalsd .four

hundred seventy thousand.

By lata fall this nwnber almost

doubled to eight hundred thousand.£3 Opinions differed
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sharply on their relative worth to the war effort.
A military review for a Tokyo daily wrote:
OUr major anemy 1 s now the Communist forces. seventy
per cent of our engagements in North China are fought
against, them, Chungking Army has lost the will to
oomba.t,24
However, when General Okwnura, Japanese Commander-in-Chief
in China. made fils report-to-tti:Ill-Al:l;te::q:ti'ter-V-J-Day.-h(l)---es~!ma:ted that the Japanese had lost less than fifty

thousand men to the g~aen:l..lleu3.2f:)

So obscure are the

raoords and so aonfused was the f':ront it is virtually
impossible to tell where the true figuret\ lie.

1\nother

souroe credits the Gommu."lists with ninety-two thousand
battles in seven years of war and inflicting one million
one hundred t;housand casualties on ·the enem:y.£6

Still

I,

another author says, "for every Japanese they claim to

I

have killed, they have kllled at least five Chinese. • • a87

~

II
I

on

tha political front things were no bettor.

In

!Ylay of 1944• Lin ChU... an, chairman o:t: tM Communist led

Ghen:si-Ka.nsa-Ningb.sia border region, arrived at Sian for a
24 Epstein. loa. ~.
26 Theodore H. \\'llite and Annalee Jacoby 1 'J!hunde;r: w&
p. 210.

21: Qhina.

26 Harrison F?rman. Htmo:t trom Red Qh:l.n&, P• 126.

27 Lin Yutang 1 ~ )lig:tl Qt: t!te Nation. P• 125.
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conference with Central Government officials to plan for
closer cooperation between the two groups.

Later the.t

month another Communist, Lin ·rso•han 1 v1ent to Chungking for
a series o.f' conferences with Chiang Kai·shek.

'rhese talks

centered on (l) the degree of autonomy for communist-~--d-<nr..i-nated-a-r-e~t-;-~f~-)-the-d-eg-rse-cf-pa.rtici-pat-ion-b;y

-------

Communists in the Central Government; end (3) the e:K"tant
or cooperation in the J'apanese '·:ar.28

Very little agree•

ment was reachec.l in these oonferences.

If anything they

ser'lred to .foous the attention of all concerned on the b!:tsic
differences between Kunchangtung and Kuomingtaaa.

It may be significant that one month attar the
start of these conferences the ban on :foreign conespondents
traveling in Communist sections \lias lii'ted by Chungking.
News sent back to the outside i.Jorld \vas for the most part

complimentary.29

Correspondents praised the economy •

educational program, and military !'o:rces at Yenan.
Describing the opening meeting of tha Communh;t-led
Shensi ..Kansu-Ninghsia Border Mn:dn1stra:tion, these
newspapermen list eight of the twenty-two members in

,-
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attendance as Communists.

others ware

~a.ndlords,

gentry, teachers, a doctor, a soldier, a shop

minor

e~erk,

a

tenant-farmer, and a poor peasant.
People's councils in the villages numbered fourteen
at that time.

Great emphasis is laid on the fact that of

---~t-he-9--,9tV7-v-illage-oou-not-l-lors-,-5-.649-are-poo:r:-peas-ant-s~,-----

3,435 are middle peasants, 690 are rich peasants, 502 are
hired laborers, 394 are
ge~try,

and merchants.

work~rs, and

the rest are laborers,

The Communists number 2,477, or

24 per oent.30
1rlhila Chinese Communists initially we're drawn :f'l:'om
all classes, there is no doubt that the class struggle was
the f'ounctation of party sucoess.

ThOse of the gentry llad

to submit to the will of the Party leaders. The 24 per
cent did the l:'uling.

Party polioy, if flexible in this

stage, was nonetheless established by a small group.
Implementation could come on the looal level but little
else.
Harlordism he.s
tne Mancllus.

pl~ued

China. since the overthl'O>'I of

Clliang Kai•sllek was never able to completely

unity the country.

Certain sections continued to exercise
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varying degrees of autonomy right through the Japanese
invasion.

In Shansi the m:l.litary governor 1. Yen Us.t-shan,

fought a "gentlemanly" war with the Communists.

If the

"Reds 11 caught a .Sha.nsi soldi&r or of:f'ic:tal tl'l.ey trained

.him for a month Md then sent him back.
------'Cornmu.n:ts1:i___9o,p_t!yes !'or only a week.
principles ~~ere stronger.3l

Y<m trained his

He believed his

Suoh ludiorous exrunples of
I

local resistance to Communism aided its growth in China.

In September• 1944, the series of conferences
between Lin Tso-han and Chiang Kai..shek •. begun in May t

finall.y broke do,,m.

No progress Nas made in the settlement

o:t: basic issues. 32
Early in February, 1945, ChOu Un•la.i started
discussions with the Central Government at Chungking.
:Foreign pressure, notably that of the United ,t;ta,tes, had
been instrumental in bringing this about.

American

Ambassador • Pat:r:iek J. liurley, assisted .in tate negot:tt>.t;tons.
Still no solutions to th'<l problems could be effected.

Vlong

Shih•ohieh, Information Minister, gave the Nationalist

3",_ 1\le\~ ~ ~Ul!Uh september 16, l944•J• 4:2, for a
discus s.ionOf the clif'i'e:renoes in Communis t-Na onalist talks.

lOl
version of its concessions as follows:
.J... A readiness to recognize the Chinese Collll!lunist.
Party as a lawful political party.
2. Inclusion ot a high ranking Conununist o.f.f'icial
in the National military eounail.
3. Inclusion of Corrunun1st representatives in the
executive Yuan.
4. Establishment of a collll!littee of three, including
eqllt\l ste:tus, on it fo.r C~unists. to reorganize and
-----~s_upply_the_Col!lll!Uni st_fi.,rmy_., 5
---ChOu disagreed with this report saying tkl.e.t Wong •s
concessions ••ere contingent upon g.reat Communist con-

cessions.

Communist troop'J had to be surren<:: el'ed before

legal recogn:l.tion would ba given ·to the Party.
alleged tnat

llllillllM~ship

He further

in t;J1.c !'!ational vJilitary Cocmcil

and Executive Yuan were 1nean:tngless since neither body had
any po~<ex. 34

So ena eO. anotne:r attempt to reconcile

divergent views.

issues vital to

Neitb.a:r side was idlling to concede on
'~heir

ideologies.

No comp:rorn:lse could

pe lasting.
Ji.S
bet\~een

the World ltlar Il: dl'OVJ to a close the ::rtruggle

Conllllunists and Nationalists \10Xstmed.

On August 12•

1945 0 Chiang sent e, messt.ge to Communist armies to hold
positions and awt,it further orders. 35

33

,NeJ,~

Y.PJ1lt Urnes., l''ebruary

Chu Tel1 refused to

15, 19451 p. lltl.

34 ffew ~ T!~§€, February 16 1 1945, P• 5:1.
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obay.

Instead he called on Gene:ral Yasuji Okanu:ra,

Comraamler of ·th'a Japanese expeditionary forces in China• to
sur:cende;~

to h:h troops.

Chinese Communist

t:t~oops

occupied

vJanping ten miles southeast of 1?'31ping.36

Rapo:r.ts
filtered in of CommuniGt fighting in Shansi. 37
-------~~'l..,_o_TsJJ-tJ:ln!!;_Has_inv:!.ted_t<LChungld ne;-fo:r-a-f-i."lal

---

attempt a·t settlement of diffe:rences in ·!;he late summer of
1945.

But • ev•'ln as these ta1lts

\~ere

in p:t•ogress f Yen<Jn

reported ne;v Communist army offensives in the NnnkirliS
a:ren.38

Rumors of the mtglltb Army :receiving supplies from

I~ohuria oi:t~m.llated

freely in Nationali.st quarte;vs.3~)

Littl.e hope could be held for successful :negotia.t:tons in
this atmosphere.

So it continued

dOllil'l

to ·the Close of

cO:t;ld Vial'

li.

Puppet f'oroos swt:Ul8 over from Japan to Chungktng enabling

the Central Govermn<mt to control many cities.
Army occupied

C~tnton

and the Sixth

J~rmy

The li':l.:rst

occupiect Elhangl:lai.

Commun!st ..r~at~ionalist skirmishes :raged in eJ.Gven :Provinces.

36 ~ ~ T~mas, August 18, 1945, P• 2;1.

3'7 -~ Umqs, August 21, 1945, P• 1:'7.
38 -

~

Tilll!\)S t

August 29, 1945, P• 1:6.

39m~ l;:!,me§, October 5, 1945,

P•

3~4.
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1!:rt:!.llery and mortars thuntl.erad along ·t;he coastal.

E;ncl

of'

China • s GrefJ.t Wa.ll "Jllere Communists blocked the· path of.

thousands of Nationalist troops into .i.ndq:;tr:tally rich

Manchura.4°
~fuatever
J~1panese

bonds o:f' unity had been forged by t;he

invasion, colltiJ:>SEld with t.he s_ul'.l:'_en.der._As_t.be_ _ __

Kungchantung gained in s1:rength and popularity • the
I\Uom.intang lost suppo:r.t.

·.~he

fight for Ghina, started :l.n

1920 and interrupted briefly in J.937 1 was on again 1r1ithout

---~~----

CHAPrER V

CIVIL

1,~/U\

CON'l'INUES

1946..],951

"lllithin forty-eight hours o.f victory t,Pver ·the
_____
Ja'-'.p._an
___e=ail_ civil 'War was raging_~O:t'Q_ss China._..:I._J.l'or-twooty'---years the Red Jl'rmy hau flourished on the stony soil of
China's political front.

From the first; fol'oe of three

thousand men organiaad by Mao ·rse-tung and Chu '.l'eh in
1928, they had grown to six million strong at ·the time the

Na.tionalists ware driven from the me.inlnnd.

By 1946 tJ:w:r.e

1r1ere approximately one million two hundred thousand in the

lUghth Houte and New Fourth Armies.

Mother 1ndeterminate

number operated in the Northeast, the Joint Democratic
Armies, while about one ndllion five humred ·thousand
irregulars followed the Communist !'lag.

Opposed to these

Chiang .Kai•shek could muster four million lnen in the armies
of the Kuomintang end one million irregulars.
As World war II drew to a close, Chu T'->h ordered an

offensive by the Chinese Had

~miea

coming down from the north.

Chungking attempted to

to join the Russians

1 'l'. White and A. Jacoby., T!lHnc1er out Q.t: China, P•
279.
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oountermand this order by

instruotir~

the Eighth Route and

the Ne'u'J Fourth to remain at tlleir posts.
to press the attacks against the Japanese.

Other units were

Yenan

disregarded these instructions, and the race tor China

t~as

underway.
_ _ _ _ _ ____,In.,..__..J\""u,gg.st, 1945, Japan ca.Il_itula.ted to the lil'--"-l=ia_c_d_-_ ____
Forces including a soviet Union in the struggle for only a
weak• but a soviet Union whose proldmity to China in

general and Manchuria in

p~t:l.cular

made her a potent

i'aetor in the control of this strategic area.

I•'orty years

before her armies had lei't the Northe.rn Provinces.

At

Portsmouth her dreams of an FAstern Empire had been
th\>Jarted.

Some wondered i:f' this time she 111as bac1t to stay.

However. the U,S.<'l.R. had other plans for this
region that did not include prolonged .military occupat.i,on.
Her i'irst

ob~eetive

was to immobilize z,l.anchurian industry

and then, her second, to establish a government "i'rientlly 11
to the soviet Union.
ment

~las

'I'M old 'l'sa:rist method of encompass-

revived 1vith a

tion, the Chinese

ne~J

Con~unist

and vital force for implementaA:rncy.

In september, 1945, the Chinese Government e:t
Nanking had dispatched a. note ·to Russia and the United
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States cla.:!.ming; all Japanese property 1n Manchuda.2
The attitude of the Communi5t :Party 1 it one of'
una.dulte:ratect Nationalism, should 11ave been in ha:t'mony with
this pronouncement.

Communist leaders hnd long recognized

the need for Chinese indu stl'ialize.tion.

Nevertheless 1 Li

_ _ _ _.L;!. .. san,_the_lBader_of_:t.l:HL:l.ndustrial-faotion--of--the

Kung;ch.antang; 1 nev1ly arxived from Mo&COill• declaJ?et.l in a

speech at l:Iarbin:
I feel that the movement of machinery /)5y Soviet
Forces from iv1anohuria to RusslJal .is not an important
problem at all. Of course the soviet Union moved some
machinery bJtt not a large amount oomparea with its
·
war losses. 0
As early as August, 1945 1 negotiations were started

between Yenan and Chungking in an effort to avoid the

coming struggle. Mao Tse-tung flew to the Nationalist
capital for a series of talks, but nothing came of them.
There was too
favored a

1.~ide

a gulf to resolve with words.

centl'a~hed

Chiang

govermnent 111ith po<ver to appointed

provincial and district

magist;rates.

M.ao

tvanted a

2 ~ ~ 'l:;l.mes 1 Mn.rch 15, 1946, quoted in Dallin,
r§oy;l.gt Rus§Ia .!m!! tu'l! Far ~.:lb p. 845.
3 Ibid., quoting the J?ij,ilY \'iorlter, New York• July 26,
1946. The American Reparations Commission set the total
damage to Manchuden In_dns_try a_t _over $2 ooo ooO,OOO;
um.tag §tat~§ Javartmen;!i 52.t Sl'll!!.te fmll.et;_n, 946, P• 1154.
Russia setne value of removed equi~ment a't; $97 ,ooo.ooo;
j;mrsmti;ya, January 29 1 1947; quoted nom Dall.:tn, p. 244.

1 1
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decentralized organ:i.zation with semi ..autonomy tor the
village.

Neither understood nor a.pprecj.atcd democracy.

Both probably felt they had the interest of' the Chinese
people at heart and that they alone held the lrey to futlll'e
·prosperity.
On October 11, the

Communis't#fLl'_e_tu:r_l1§l!Lt_p_Ye1J~n, _ _ __

all. hopes for a truce diss.ipahd.
In January, 1946, General George

United States,

~;as.

c.

Marshall of the

p:ropm ed as intermediary i.u thB

Nationalist•Com.rnun.ist dispute •

'.t'his plaooo. h.im in the

embarrassing position of trying to be impartii'.J. vJhile his
nation supplied one of the parties in the contest.
All!Ell'ican equipment and training had bolstered
Nation~1list

hold on the clties.

:Co .Hanll:ing had gone the

Jlme:rican tro.inea Sixth Army o:t' Ch;tq.
the

Ninety-Fourth~

too

Into Shanghai went

A third t'rmy had been f'lovm to Peking

from Hankot>J,

Gov<Jrnment proposals for peace

st~ggested

that the

People •s Political Council eleot i'ive impartia.l observers
to 1'orm a m:Uitary insp<iCtion tee.m to lGok into all fl.reas

of coni'lict.

The Communists asked for. an immediate cessa-

tion ot' hostilities with impartial inspeetion.4

On
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January 10 the J?olH:i.cal Consultative Council
promised internal reform.

m~t

end

An immediate cease-fire order

was issuea.5 Nevertheless, reports continued to come in on
Commun:i.st ..Nntionalist clashes. 6

Agreement vias made

increasingly dif'ticult a.s both sides fought to have the
biggest voice in the ad.option oi' the New Co!ll)tl~lltiol'l.-_7 ~----

0n January ol Chiang Kai•shek pledged full liberty
to all parties. 8 The Communists won thE!! right to carry on
free,

nation~wicllll 1

politice.l activity and a

lty in the National Coa11tion

GoV<Jrnment~

~tt:rong

minor-

:More impmtant,

the Commun1st Arrnies were to rema1n in control of their
ter:ritor:!.es. 9

Maldng the promise Nas easie:r. than making

the implementation necessary to carrying it into
completion,

V'io:rking against the success of' this pJ.an were:

(1) ·the"opposing philosophies or the t-wo factions, (2) the

t'·IO a:l'mies in the f'ield 1 (3) the methods employed by both

Parties to control territory, (4) the :restlessness of the
people, and ( 5) the Hussia.ns in Manchuria.

5 ~ ~ '£;l.me§ 1 January

u.

1946, P• 1:3.

6 New Io~k 41ru§s, .January 17 ~ 1946, P• 16 :3.
7
~ nmes, Jtmua:r.y ::a, l94Gf p •. 2:2.

w

8~~,l~. February 1, 1946, P• 1:4.
9

Ne>>

~

l'j.Ines 1 February 2, 1946, p. 3:5.
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Jl.s the soviet troops witt.l.d:cew from Manchurie.,
Natione~ists

and. Gol!llllunists rushed to fill the vacuum.

Because of its :pro:xtmity &nd its oco(!pation by :forces
politioally affable to the Chinese "Reds," this Northern
Province presented overy,Jl:J.elming advantages to the latter.

Disregarding ll.m<n:ican a.dvico to

corMolid~rt;e

llier positions
------

in the Southt Chie.ng entered the unequal
Gol!llllunist offensives
Si4"ll1Sit Fm.d

Hopei.

of the Yellow

\~ere

lcJitb.in a few

mver

capital,

·raiy~<an,

Ul'ldertaken in Stwntung,
\\1(3el{S

al.l traffic north

'\vas disrupted 8l.1d 1;he

control of t<o1o thirds of Shansi.

cont~wt.

II

Hed s" gained

Their drive to the

vms :repulsec1 by the toxm<?.:r 11ll:tr1ord

nov1 governor, Yen H.si-shan.lO

f.Jnd

However, the capture o:t' the

rail\\tay center, I\algan, and a large store

or

J'apanese

equipment more than compensatoo for this loss.
pes session ge.ve ·the Communists a

sect~;re

Its

route for moving

troops north and effectively cut the lll'l<tionalist line to
Mancb.uri.a.
Blocl.ced by the

<~hiner>e

Had Army from bringing in

large conM.ngents of Central t:roops, the Generalissimo

-------

10 Gent-lral Yen Hsi•shan had been retu1•ned to the
governorship of Shans:!. ~~ith the help of forty thousand
Japanese tl'oops under General Sumita, foi·mar Japanese
Col!llllander in Shansi. Na!cl York. :~imas, February 13, 1946• P•
10:6.

110

unwisely turned to tl'aito:r generals who were completely
out o.f Sympathy with the peopJ.a.

Manchurians had lived

urcter these same men during the Japanese occupation.
Changing .flags could not change the memory of unjust acts.
Supposedly noting upon the request of the
Government, Hosoow said

c~mtra.l

thSJ_Bussians!_withdrnw~'~Lfrom ~~~~-

Manchuria would be postponed and intimated its last
troops would not leave until the Americans la.ft.
Russian parades were held in
Chinese cities.

lianko1~,

Anti-

Peiping, and other

Russian txoops were rushed to xeinforce

the garrisons at Port Arthur and Dairan.ll

Mean"~<Jbile,

continued Soviet stripping o.f Manchurian industry proceeded
at an increased pace.

Some estimated the removal o.f

machinery at 50 per cent o.f the tota1. 12
In the South, Communist lea.dership was less

e.ff'ective 1 Commu11ist propaganda less virile, and Communist
force less potent.
KUominta.ng.
materialize.

Large cities were securely held by the

A projected coup in Shanghai failed to
'rhe Fourth Army marched north to Mukdan.

"Redsu had decided to concentrate their strength in the

11 New ~ TimsHh Feb:ruary ,;,7, 1946, p. 16:2.
12 New XQ.t1& ·r:tma!'}, J)ilarch 17 1 1946, Section IV, P•
5t7.

The

lll
northeast.
Communist General Lin Piao seized szepinkai on
March 16, 1946, rour days after the Russians lert the
city.l:? The Kremlin announced ·chat Hussian evacuation of thJ
whole province ~1as completed on May 3.14 Seventeen da.ys
---~late-r-CentJ.I-al-tr-oops-r-eca.ptu-red-Szepi-l"'...kai-and--pushed-to----

within twenty miles of Changchun.l5

A concerted Kuomintang

orransive was launchecl in the summer of 1946.
1947, Nationalists warl!l in Yenan.

By March,

Thxoughout these two

years it seemed that Chiang '>las winning the 1:1ar.
one hurtired sixty cities.

He took

The taking of cities, however,

proved to be a weak point in the campaign.

As General

Chen Yi of the East China Communist ilrroies declared :
By orthodox military strategy t.u; should deploy our
best troops to defend our capital and consider b.ow
long we can hold it. We are not doing this at all.
We are considering hO\~ many oi' Chiang's troops we can
annihilate in their sorties, how long before his
casualties will force his ;~ithdrawal and how ·t;o diminish his armies still further in their retreat. \ie
would never make the mistak-e that Chiang made in 1937
;~hen he used up all his best troops to defend Shanghai
and Nankiu.g. 1ivhen these were taken his armies were
orushed.l6
13 lliiUi ~ 'J:im!)Hi, May 15, 1946, P• 12:3.
14 ~ ~ Iirnes, May 22, 1946, p. 10:3.
15 New York 'J:imes, May 23, 1946, p. 2:6.
16 Anna L.sti' ong, The Qhinese Congue: Chin§,; pp.
?302-3.
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l<'or each. city captured the Generalissimo's striking force

t-Jas reduced ·by just so many men as >·Jere needed. :for garrison
duty.

',£he ability of the "Radsn to disperse and regroup in

aJ:lother area llu.nrJ:reds o.f miles away used t;ne countryside to
bast advantage,

Once aga.in the people had to play the

_ _ _ __..i=mpo rt~mt role or

St1J2!2:l.Ying_gove~_t'or

the_s;ue_rr il~a__t;_r oop"'s"'.'----

I.f at 1'irst the Conunun1sts .gave groqnd 1 exchanging
land f'or men. they

1191'8

Cl11a:ng•s soldiers.
fight.

ment.

aided by the l!ld'Gatist at"t;ituc\e

Of

h'hole units S\ll.'renderad without a

Many did not even bother to d<Jstroy their equip-

The :r1Nenty-sixtll Division. oa.rrying all tn.e

mente o:f modern >1ar, vmnt over to the enemy.
morale reached a new

1mplo~

Kuomintang

lOti.

In spito of this • the Nationalists pushed ±'or•1ard

over the land by sheer vleight of nuJJ!ber:;.

Heavy fighting

was reported in Shantung in the .fall of. 1947.

Kuomintang

victories \•are announced daily \d.th some refermwo to
Communist drives.

'.Che world awaited thG ml•1w of Wfled"

capitulation.
Let tls leave for r,n1hile the military r;tory o:r tile
Civil 'ciar and look e.t the political developments in 1946-

1947.

With the failure of American mediation efforts,

Kuomintang and Kungchantang settled into e. battle of words.

Chou Jlln•le.:l.

di:ra~rted

a strong

prot,a~;1t

against tile

113
decisions made by tl:te Central Exeoutiva Committee o.f the

Kuomlntang coJhich closet! its session in Chunglting on
Ma.rcb, 17, 1946.

He charged that the Nationalist Cl()vern-

ment hHd failed to live up to its promises of' popular
l'j.gb.ts and libertios, with violations of the cease-fire
agreement, and vlith pursning plans '.;o circumvent the.___ _ _ __
compact for rednction and reorganization of the ~trmies.17
Differences or opinion on the general theme of the

constitution

~r1ere

given an s.iring.

The Kuomintang favored

a strong central government, \•Jhereas too Communist Pal!ty

advocated greater provincial autMrity.l8
On January 11, an agreement had been reached calling

for five Government armies and one Communist army to be
stationed in ManchU:da.19

The Communists held out for a

revision of this agreement, but events in tt1e field

rendered tltls unnecessary.
Fo110illing Soviet tdthdravla). f':rom r'lanchuria 1 Russian
mmspapers accnsetl the United. states of pushing China qack

into the Htai;us of a ser!Ji•colonitll country.

Simc11tarH~ous

attacks by I'1oscot4 and Yenan on American policy in CJ:1ina

------l2U
17 N§.i•

Times, March 19, 1946, p. 14:3.

18 NevJ X.QD; T;!Jn~§, March 30• 1946, P• 8:2.

l9

~ ~

'J;j,mee, J'une 11, 1946, p. 15:2.
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were promoted.

If', as I,ord Iverchapel, former British

Ambassador to China, maintained, the Chinese Communists
were not a.ffiliated 1dtl1 Russia but vJere .simply

a~rnrian

re:f'ormers.20 their paths ran parallel courses.
In July a repressive campaign
Kuomintang in its large cities.
stands

t~ere

1r1es

unde::;>taken by the

Book stol'_es !:1n<Lmagazine_____

searchec\ in :;hanghai.

One book store was

stripped o:r all books with titles tlJ.e.t bore such vJords as

"democracy 1 11 "people," and "emanci-pation. n2l
did more harm

th~m

These tactics

eood t<l the Nationalist cause.

The Kungohantang vJere extremely . touchy on tho

subject of' American

l:.tid

to the Central Government.

Considerable anti .. lunerioan feeling 11as mustered in areas
under "Red" control.

On Ootober 6,

t\•JO

hundred armed

Chinese attacked the Marines at Tangku in an a:ctempt to
get axms and a:romunition.

our mili·tary differed on the

policy to follcw in dealing 1:1ith the whole Chinecm question.
'!:here \Hll'e those v!l10 :felt 1•e ;;llonld stop ass:f.st:l.ng ·the

corJ:upt Nationalists

~~hUe

others acottsod t;he sohenling

----·--20

Ne1~ ~ T3,mes, June 23, 1946, P• 5;1.

£l })!e:ll! ~ '£tmes, ~fuly 23, 1946, P• 4;6.
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Corrwunists of sabotaging unity.22
Gene:raL Marshall said:

The Colllll!Unists franld.y state that they are Mer:xists
and intend to v;o:rk towards establishing a· Corrwunistic
.form of governm<mt in China, though fi:rst \~Orking
through the medium of a democratic .forn1 or government
.
·
of' the American or British type. 2!.'5
There were some indications of: this lvhen

Mal'sh~lLmadiLhis,_----'--

statement, but correspondent Micha.el Kaon proved the better
prophet in mai11taininz that the Gllinese Corrwunist8 T.vere
heading to;mrds a dictatorship of: the nussian typ~.24
IO.tudents have played a vital rol.e in Chinese

politics since the cverttll'ow of
they revolted against ·the
Japanese Gover11ment.
~tnd

Vorsailles

thE:

TvJenty~one

~qancnus.

In 1915

Demands of. the

1919 saiv their protest s.c;ainst

srwrtly thereafter the beginnings of

Colll!llunist agitation.

H:toting bro.ke out in student

compounds over the Japanese invasion of Manchuria in 1931 •
. Not~ 1 in 194 7 • there ~~e:t'e student demons·!jrations ac;airwt

the \~entral Govel'nment.

'fhese prot·ssts voiCO(l thd ploa.s or

nine tenths of the> Chinese people. zr.;0

'rh~l

Commtmist :Pm;ty

-----<14 •
~.::5

m

~ :J;'iini'Hh

X2.tlt

October 19 1 1947, P• 15 :l.

l'irm:Hh JtJlY 8, 1947, P· 130;4,.

ll6
was xeady to capitalize on the situation by espousing the
student cause

~9

their own.

Howevex, the people were

instinctively e.nti•Commurd.st e.nd. could

lw~ve

been

\~on

over

to a txuly reformed National Government.26
For the fil' st time a neN note entered

negoti~rtions.

The Shensi Red Radio asked for a coallt::ton __government
a provision for i;he punishment of war criminals.

l~i_t,..h~--

'£his was

genera.lly thought to apply to Chiang Kai•shek. 27
Internal friction hastened the dovmfall of the
Kuominh.ng.

Constant bioker:l.ng, inept leadership, gra:t't,

e.nd the vacillating policy towards needed socio-economic

refor1ns caused the people to turn elsewhere .for relief.
Chiang took over the pramia:rllhip fr.om T. V. lloong in

March.

Tie;hten.:Lng the :t'eins of government only bllought more

discontent.

Gt~n<>ral

political farce.

results

i~ere

elections called in .November were a

There was no secrecy in ballotill,{(;.

The

a t'oragona conclusion.

Meanwhile, the Communist Party continued to groN.
At the end of 1947 estimates placed membership r;>t

ti~O

26 John L. stuart 1 "Observations on North China and
United Si;atalij Halations Vlith Ch;J.n;a.,. 30:254,
AUgust 1 1949.
Jl!~tnchur1et"

27 ~ ~ t.tmas, July J.f,, 194'7• p. 10:4.
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million people.28
In 1947 ..1946 the

11

Hed" Army bega.n its victory drive.

Gathering momentum 1r1ith each victory. the Communist wave
rolled down from the north.
fell on June 22, 1948.

Ka1i'e:ng, c1;1.pi tal of Honan,

Xsinan, a city of' eight hundred

thousand, capital ot.' Shantung, .fell in
army of' Su Yu.

eightd~§_1:;o

tt1e ____

Eit£;ht hunclrerJ mil1.>s north, Changchun

capitulated afte: a long se:t.ge by Lirl Pia.o.
Mukden. the industrial center of Manchuria

On November 2,
"1M

occupied.

Thus, Chinese COmmLtnist territory increased .from
one ninth of China in 1946 to one fourth of China in 1948.
The population controllet'i by the "Reds" want from
one hunired thirty million to t1~o hundred mill.ton,29
A thousand miles to the south the

J~a.st

China. People 1 s

Army \4hich had tPJI:en Tsinan, zaoved to Hsucllo"J• gateway· to
Nanking.

l?urther inland Liu Pocheng; swept tovJards Hankow

>1h1le Peng Teh•bwai advanced en Sian.

Military succ('lss !'cllov1ed into 1949 with ci'ties
fe.lli:ng into Communist hands almost at will.
drove against Peip!ng and Tientsin.

Lin Fiao

Marcl1ing six huzitred

28 ~~Times, November 30, 1947 1 p. 40:4.
p. 4:3.

29 Ne\v

1m Times, December 19, l94B, Section IV,
.
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miles in t>·amt¥ days • hb toroes took Tientsin on
January 15, in a

t~!enty-s!iiven

as::~a.ult.

hour

De1nonJ.iaad

National.is·t troops llllXI'enr.lel'ed :tn la.rgf> groups c•r fell beck
to the ;;,outb.

Peipil'$

wa~>

oooupi.M1

t~ithout

!'iring a sh<lt.

On Jnnua.l'y l4 • 1949, Nlr:10 'J;'s.,-tung ou:U.<l<l for an

eigt.rt ...point progrsm

£1lllOLt!l~ine; 't!2_t._maqndjj;lQnltl_c_~Jrr§lntlf.ll',_ _ __

!or Chitmg Kui .. st;<~L~:/iO

This Nas in llli:lsponne to a

proposal by the Uanernliasilllo01 and 1Mlt.ldetl:
l.

Ftmhlling thlll

1l.

tlbrogntinr~ tht.l

&.

t~ar

oriminl'll$.

c:onst;ii;ut:i.on

o.r

1~146.

Abolistl:tng the Kuomintang "legitilnaoy ot

traditional institutions."'

6.

Hato;r:m..tng the

7.

,r\orogertil'$ the troet!es o!' ntltil.m!'l.l blilltray<!W..

8.

O<.:mvok~

a

agr&~rian

oystem.

Politi<:~ll C<>:tlS!lltativ~a

C:on:f'orenoe

t1ithout the pe.<.rticipation of ranction1H:y

elements i!md eu;;tc<blishing a
t:l.on e;ovaramtl!ilnt.
soven

day~'

d(Jll\OC::t'atio

1a1>H:t' Ollieng rasign<>d atld

·tur.n~!5

coal!•
the

Govarnment over to Ll l'slmg .. jen to attell!pt reace
30 fJtol<!s.:tr ~mtl lAJCh, BRthlt'll Fa:r
P• 653.,
""-"=-

B!:ti1ficnu..

y

ii~~;rlislrn :pltet:n;rl•;l,<mMl

•

31 .llil:li. .X!ll:k nm!Z£,. January 1, 19411, P• 4::3. C!1iant~ •s
proposals eallad'for upholding ·t;bo Constitu:1on 8 maint!i:Lt!blg
Dtmooraoy, ma.:l.nta.tning the <llntity ot too A:t'!Jled Fo:r.c~w, and
msintainin.g a, lll:!.n1mum livin;;J; t>tandard.
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negotiations 1FJith the Co.llllllun!sts.

The "Reds" proposed

separate settlements .f.or s:.l.xteen Nat5.on.::!list areas:
llianking• Shanghai, Hangchow, Nanehang, Ch.angsha,

Sian,

Foooho1~,

Chengtu, Formosa, Canton, rtunzning, Uaim:trh Taiyuan, LauehOw,
K1~eisui,

and Ul'Ulllehi.

Peiping 1qas to be used as the model

for. an interim government.
Milit;ary i'ortunes did not

considerations.

In .April a twan·cy-i'our point peace draft

was submitted to the Li Government·.
demands

for political

~iait

Its :tour ftmdamental

~~ere 1

1. Uncontested Cl'ossing of' the Yangtze.

2•
.Army.
3.

Heo:r.ganiz!il.t1on of all branches oi' the Nationalist

Eventual Co.llllllunist occupa.tion ot all China..
4. Abolishment of' the Nanking Government attar the
formulation of a coalition by a pollt:i.ca~ consultative
con:t.'erancEil .::s:z
·

AJ.most before the ink

v1as

dry •· Nanking

1iJ&S

in '1Red" hands.

Shanghai fell the ne:xt month, and by autumn the I>fationalists
had been driven into south\<Jestern China and Formoso..
Chungking oapi tula:tac1 in Decembel'.

l:!;!'feot:t.ve Kuomintang

resistance on th'l mainland. can1e to a halt.
On .September 18, l949, eighteen years to the day of
•

the

~~~~lukden

Incident •'1 the Chinese Communists announced

-.
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their plan of' gove:rnment for China.

:rn Peipi:ng a Political

Consultative Conf'erence -was convened to establish an
interim regime until the convocation of an All-China
People's Congress. Mao 'J.'se•tung was elected Chairman ot the
Central Cormnittee, :rolitln.trea.u. Military Council, and

Secretarie.t.

Madame Sun Xa.t .. sen, Chang Lan, and Li Chi•sen

v1ere elected Vice-chairmen.

Foreign e.ec:reta.ry

~md

Chou En-lai t1as designated

Jen Pe-shih nrunacl Finance fJliniste:r.

Liu Elhao•chi33 was Party Leade:r in the Becr<,tarir.t.

'!'eh :retained cow.rrtEtnd of' the a:rmies.
tlle

proletar;t~;,t"

ChU

The "diotatorsllip o;f'

vJas p:roclaimed.

It 1949 sanv the advent of t11.e first Marxist State in

the O:rient, ·the ensv.ing three yea.rs
its ultimate collapse.
destitute

~Jhen

Sl':l'-'l

the probability or

China \1as a nation economically

the communists crune to power.

Plagued by

twelve yea:rs of constant vJar, her people needed a return to

peace.

"Hed '' methods promised. this could not

cOl.lNil

for a

long while.
As the (Jom!nunist Armies approached. Nationalist
canters. inflation ran rampant.
·the deflated Kuom.i.ntang currency.

sketch

Baskets ·ware used to ca:rry
Prices rose at

33 .:;ee Chapter VIII, p. 167, ror a biographical
tiu Shao-clli.

or
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astouishlng rates.

In an e;i'fort to con·t.l'o:L the economy the

''Heds'' set up tv1elve companies.

'£hese

six~

the Cent:ral

F'oodstufJ:'s Company, the Central Cotton and Cloth Company 1
the Centl'al Geno:ral Me:rcl-:.?.ndise Company, the Oent:raJ.
Salt Company, the Cont:ral Coal and Bu:l.ld:i.l1r; Company • and
the Central Nat:tve J?xoducts Company, conholled domeBtic

e.ffai:rs.

F'ol'oign 1;:rade >vas entrusted to <:ix others;

the

Central Hog Bristles Company, the Ceut.:ral trative Products
Export Company, the C<mt:ral :F'ats and Oil Company, the
Central l'an Company, and the Central Mineral Pl'oducts
Company.

These trusts handled the bulk oi'

tlHl pul:'chase and

distribution of :rood and other <H;santial goods• pJ.aoeo
processing oxdexs, and collected finished goods from
private i'actories on a contre.ct basis.

They tllso alloca-

ted xaw matel:'ials a:ld, in conjunction viHh the !!tlnistry of
Trade and locml gove:rnmont trade bureaus, f:txed mal'ket
pxices and determined margins or profit.

Soma room

l'las

left for private enterprise bu·t undel' govornmental
presoxibad l'ogu.lations.

Human nature probe,bly ge.:ve this

scheme some serious jol·ts at its conception.
~<Jas

Surely, M:ao

:fle:untinc; h:l.story vJhon he m;:,de such an abrupt change.
An axpandins net1e1ork of cooperatives vJas establlshetl

to provide a link

bet~J<Hm

state companies and organized

groups of sma.ll p:rviate farmers and handicraftsmen.

Consumer coope:i;atives wel'e set up in factories, schools,
government offices, and aJJmy units.

Mo:re than. ·t;vJenty

million persons 11'IeJJe enrolled in thi:rty":'foUJJ thousand rural

and three thousand urban o:rgsnlzc.tions.34
Throughoti.t April and May, 1950• :t:<>ports of business

In
.Jur:~e, ~,lao

urge,, Ghinese businessmen not to fear Communism.

He statecl that. those

1'orgotten;3a --,i'hey

1~ho

"'1e:re

helped the caLtse would not be

not fo:rgott~?Jn.

come one year later '-'Jhen all Chinese

Their reNard '"as to

indt~strial

coopara-

tivas we:re ab:3orbed by thlil Government-sponsored All-China

F'ec1eration of Cooperatives. 37
Lanc1 distribution has long been the curse of the
ga.st. Reform under !;he Communlsts took the direc·t; method

of confisce:t;i<>n from t;he rich and loan to the poor· v1i th the
state holding titla.

Initially successful, this pxogram

had to be eased somevJhat to prevent thq sp:r.oad of

34 ~a~~ ~~me~• October

a

a,

1950 1 P• 17:1.

a5
X!:W1; ·rim!llS.• A'prll 1s, 195o,
1960, p. 19:3.

P•

44:~); ;Jiay 24,

36 New Xo~k ~~me~t J~~e 25, 1950 1 P• 22:1.
~7 lJieN ~ ~t':!Jn&s. March 6 1 l95J., p. 4:3.
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resistance.

The :Ba.sia Agrarian Reform

1950, caused further

uphea:~tals.

Lat~

of June 28•

At tbis 'time 1snd had been

distributed to eighty thousand peasants in .i'iva hund.red
counties. 38
That a1.1 is not 1r1ell

>~ith

the Cqlllll'lunist plan is

evidenced by disorders on the Contincmt.

operate in Kweichow, Kwangsi, Yunnan,

Guarl'illa bands

r>zeotuvan~

Hupeh, Tsinghai, Sl'l.ensi, and Ninghsia. 39

Hunan,

Further proof

lies in the tl:1ousands killed by the Communists for politi•

·--cal ortenses.'G.O Extortion practiced on Chinese abroad41
38 ~ ~ T~e§, June 11, 1951, p. 3:1.
39 ~~Times, January l, 1951, p, 3:1.

40 Nationalists ol~c;imed 210,000 executed in t;h;t:ee
ProVinces in January, 1951. .~ ~ ~. March 9• 1951,
P• 3:1. Three hundred shot in Hn>.tow .~., .February 15,
1961, p. 4:8. Fifteen executed in Canton, Ibid., February
6 1 1951• p.o 5;1. One hun!lred twe.nty-t11Jo k.i.lled in Shanghai
ancl Canton, Ib,\d.! APril 3, 1951, p. 3:6. :J:\40 hundred
eighty-four shot ~n Shanghai, Ibi%•t June 21, 1951, p. 3:5.
l''if'ty-f'ive executed in N8nking 1 I ia. 1 June 25 1 1951, p.
5t6. One hundrad fifty-four executed in DhanghH:l., ;tbii;. 1
July 4, Ul5l, p. B1l. Two hundred seventy-seven shot
Peiping, Ibid., July 20, 1951, p. 2:1. F'orty kUled 1 2 1 748
imprisoned In Shanghai, !big. 1 August fJ4 1 1951 1 p. 2:7. T~Jo
hundred thirty ... saven executed in Peiping, IBid., August.; :'IO,
1951, P• ::):7; 28,332 "counter-revolutionaries" executed by
the Colllll'lun:Lsts in KvJantung ove!' a t•m-month pE,riod ending
Sep·t:ember 3t 1951, Il.x!.d.l fieiJtem'be:r 20. , 1951, p •. 4:5. I•'orty~
three shot J.n Ganton. ~. 1 SE.~ptembar 3 1 1951, p. }3 :4. The
ChfmHl§ Dfil._l,y N§l!l!t rep~ more than one Inill.ion poUUcfU.
p:r soner~Kwan ung, Ibid., October lO, lt<5l, 1'• 2~6.
I''or~y-tv1o executed in Chungking, Ib.:tu., Novembe:r 3, 1951 1
P• 3:7.
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indicates the poverty of a Governmlilnt faclild with a full-

scale ;1ar in Korea, a herculean task o:r ;reconstruction at
home 1 and

f<'JW

ha.s added to

friends in the
th~l

11JOl'l£l.

Intra•PHrty strife

btt:rden.

At a convention o.f the Central Committee of' the

Chinese Communist Party in Peiping;, Jun!i!, 1950, an
intensive self'-criticism and criticism

'I'JaS

leaders were judged to be without blemish:

held.

Only f'our

Mao Tse-tung,

Liu Shao-chi, 42 .Lin Piao, 43 end Je.o Shu..shu. 44

Plans were

laid to p<!ri.fy the Party and to complete the unification of
Pm~ges i~ere

China.

instituted leading to more disol'der •

Communist Pa:t:ty membership was stated to be foul' million

five hundred thousand at this time.

iV!ao o1arnoo the 11 Reds"

to slovJ thei:r. :recruiting lest mo:re undesirables .filter in.
some relaxation o.f political absolutism was offered
as inducement to the. mUiCU.E: class to back the Communist
program.

Rec:r.u:Ltmont of non-Communist left-wing parties

42 Head of the Sino•l2llv1et F:r:tendship Association.

Held by some to be

l\~ao•s

successor.

43 Commandel' of the Fourth Field Army.
44 .secretary of' the gast China Bureau of the
Central Committee.

'~as
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allowed on a limited basis.

The six parties cl:losen45

were, o:f cocu.'se, requi:rec! to uphold the policies· of the
People 1 s Political Consultative oonter1mae, ·No dissansion
would be tolerated.

Propaganda techl1iqUe$, eminently successful in the
vlhole :rise of t;he COlll!llunist Party in China, :r;ere Jc)o,. l. . ,i._. s__.h,. .e. ,.d_ _ _ __

and used at frequent intervals.

Ono sueh, ·t;he complaint

meeting, shovJed careful planning in the following .four

steps:
1. Extensive prepftra:tion t·lith world.ng out in advance
of main problerns,
2. Concentration on concrete, persom.tl experiences.
3. Usa of' slogans to stir the audi<inee.
4. Cooperative par-ticipation by neighbOring
schools,46
11

iJpontaneous" meetings were then called at

change of ideas was encouraged.

~1hich

an ex-

Artificial creation of

mass hysteria, became a potent weapon.

Organizers were told

to search for evidence of atrocities. cultural aggressions,
exploite,tions, and calamities that might be linked to the
pte~,ttern

of the de,y.

Gases were so

arrm:~ged

that

------

46 Revolutionary Conmdttee of the Kuomintang; China
Democratic League; China Dornocratic J;ssociHtion i'or
Ntltional Heoonstruotion; China Peasants and Horkers Demo•
c:ratio :Party; China Association for Promoting DemocraJJy 1
Chuisen t . oaiety.

46 fiew Iork I.a,me§• January 1, 1951, p, 3:1.
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psychological methods or pliJrsuasion could. be rohea.rsed on
cue.47

Jllways a, gJ)od sho;.J 1 tttese demonstrations gave to

the peasants a feeling of havir.g a voice in

th<~.

Government.

Actually, they served to minimize resistance by directing
energies e.long channels outlined by the Party •

There is no end to ·the Givil \lax in. sight in the

sprlng of 1953.
11

Chiang Kai•sJ:Hlk is entrenched on :Formosa.

Reo11 Ch:tna is engased in a major conf'lict \1lith Uni·ted

Nations !''orcas in Korea. a

vHilEl.k resources.

~;ar

that is Slil.l)pj.ng her already

Many necessary c5.vilian projects are lett

undone. . There 3.s dissatisfaction at home but lit'tle hope
of evalnating its true stl'e11g'l:>h until so.me later date.
witness l!wcounts

V(~ry.

As

r~ye

Derk :Bodde, Professor of

Chine.se, University o:t Pennsylvania, writes 1

After spending a recent year in China under botll
the Kuond.ntang and the Oonwunists, :r nave no hesitation in saying that tho bullt of the people t;.here • • •
definitely preferrec1 IVJHo 'Xse-tung, Commun:ism and all;
to Chiang Kui•shek,48
!n reply to Doctor Boc1de• John A. Bottorff', says:

I have lived in Peipin(.l; under t.he Kuomintant.:t: several
years before Dr. Eodde a.r :dved • and lived undaJ1 the
Communists several years after he left. • • • I have no
hesitation m se;.ying that the bulk of the people the:t'e

47 m_.~ TWJ~St August 7, 1951 1 P• 3:1.
48 ~ ~ :f.!ll!Ut August

u,.

1950, p. 18i6.
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• • • definitely preferred the Nationalists • Chiang
Kai•shek and all• to the Oommunists.49

49 ruw, Iru:l!;. Till!!l11!h August 21• l95o. P• 18:6, in a
letter to the editor.

To assume soviet assistance to Chinese Communism on
a scale large enough to bring about control of tho urvliddle
~10uld

Kingdom" by the "Heels"

to deny nussian int<ll:'es't; in

be inconsictent \vith tho facts;, ____
~lnd

approval of any metms

establishing a Jvlarxist govern.rnent in China

1.~ould

fOl'

be folly.

!{ussia has coveted parts of China fol:' over tlu:oee hurttred

years.

In 1580 Yermak$ a Cossack brigand • t oolt possession

o.f.' t3:l.beria.

Expansion l:tnde:r the Tsars continued until

1689 when ·t;he i"lanchus forced

of the Antur by the

TJ~eaty

wi·thdr~mal

of Neroh:!.nsk.

res·ted :!.n an uneasy truce uni;il 1858.

Jv!uraviev.

Governor~Gene:reJ.

from the regions
Here mat;tors
In that

Y~le.r

of Siberia, signed the treaty

of Aigun vlh:tch fixec1 the 1\L1sso-Cl1inase boundary at the Amur

River as for as the Ussu!'i..

An additional agreero€nt

•~ith

the Chinese Gova:rmnent secured i;ho tEJrrit;ory oast of' the
USSIU'i

River :Ln 1860.

Vladivostok, no·.v J.n the Russia."l

fold • fur nishad a good port, but not the lce ..frae one she
desired on tho l?Mific.
~y

the ternw of the

'J~:reaty

o:r Shiminosoki ending the

Sino-Japnnase .·;ar of 1894·1895, Chinu

~~as

to coci.e the

Lia.otung Peninsula itlitla its excellent harbors o:f Fort Arthur
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and Da1ny to Japan.

Russia. Franca,

~~d

Garmany protesteu

this provision P;nd it was never carried to completion.
In May, 1896• a secret agreement vJas concluded at

Mosco,~

giving Rtlssia the right to extend the 'J:rens-sib ~aill'oad

ao:ross Nanchuria. 1md setting up a RL1sso-Cl:tinese Bank for
consti•ucti.o.n oi' the Chinese ll:astern Railroc.d.

Th<m.

Ilussia occupiecl. Port Arthur and deiDLlllder< a lease on the
Kvumtung area of th€l Liaotung l'romontory.
fo!! a t'Wenty-:f'ivo year poriod.

This was granted

Up to 1904 :Russia spent

her time 1.n the economic penetration of Manchuria ana. the
buil<Ung of a pov1erful naval base at Port il.rthur.

All

this vms negated by the T:r!<'laty of Portsmouth at the

conclusion of the Busso-Japanesa \1ar.
The Soviet Revolution a..>1d the establishment of.

u.s.s.n.

seemed for a t1.me to promote a

for ·the Far Ii:tlst.
11

unequa~"

ne~.,

Hussian policy

On May 31, 1924, she renounced

treaties of. the Tsars.

t~ha

s~l

t.he

No<4 there was to begin a,

campatgn or ideolog1.oal penetration fostered by existing
politica.l

e.nd economic conditions wh1.ch •.ueJ.•e a continuing;

pha.sa O·f tho Chinese Hevolution of 1911.

Bponsored by the

Third Int•srnaM.onat, Communist adv:tsers c•1ere at·cached to
tile Chinese Government at Ganton from 19g4..1927 .1

J!fter
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192'7 the SoVitJrt Union
Kungchantang tJhiJ.e

\~hen t;h~;

~;:)ave

little but moral support to the

trainin~£

some of her .future leaders in

Japnnese invadec1 !4anchuria, ·Russia was

grHvely conceJ:nec!

fol~

the sa.fety of her :t:rontier.

Threatened also tvas ·the f\Ussien interest in tlw Chinese
.!~~\stern Ha.:!.lv~ay

which

'~as

of Eianchukuo in 1935.2

fin<:1lly sold to the puppet state

Realizing the itupo tence of the

Nanking authol'ities to l-umdlc a.ffairs in

~hioi

no:cttie:m

aggressive moves by ref;:•a.ining :from any action wllich might
b:t'ing about :full-scale \Va:r..

BGing expedi<m.tly friendly

to Japan in l·lfmchuria left litt;J.e time fol'

ntll':t<arif'.l.S

~tssistance

to

too badly at home to Sl'l8.l'O truam I"Jith a group or

"Reels" a.t Yenan.

Hmvevcr, she cUd aid tl1e Ku,ngchantang

indirectly by hsr actions in outer Mongolia and SiDkiang3

t'lbJ.ch f'o:rccd s'till anoth<.n: divcr::d.on on t;he already vJeighty

program or tho rJo:t;ionalists.
Chiang

__

I~ai•shok

__,.•

--

It> must h!l.Ve seamed to

ttmt the unifii>d Cl1inoso nation Nas

b~Jing

£ H. L. Moore, Gov;tet JYar ~tern Policy., pp. 27·30,
i'or a brief history oi' the Chinese Eastern Railwa:y.

3 Aitohen K. \riu, Qkj.ina au«;l t!Ml ~~oviet Uniorh Chapters
XIV and XITI, fol' the story of f;oviat in:f.'luenrJe in these two
Provinces. !~Y9rk
Feb~uary
P• 3411,
sta.tes that; .:, · ran:g s
rtually under Hussum control.

f1m®!•

9, 1936,
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further removed from the ideal o:l.' the 1911 Revolution.

sun

Yat-sen • s "Nationalism" had to struggle against the designs
of two nations whose policies were ostensibly instituted
for self':-proteotion.
0.1' paramount importance to Japan 1 s scheme or Empire
~Jas

With inimical ideolog:tgal._ _ _ _ _ _~-

containment of Huss:ta.

ooncepts, it vias inevitable tha\t ocmf1iot should 'begin.
The growth of Collllllunism in
fears.

t~orthwest

China added to Japan •s

In N'ovember, 1935, General Hayao Tada, Colll!llander of

the Japanese garrison at Tientsin, declared:
Should th.e •Reds • in .Shonsi become as strong as they
i:Jere in l<iangsi they \vould de.finitely ntene.ce peace in
North China, as it is virtually certain they would
attempt to corrtroJ.. otner province. s. Iiowevar, :nora
important is prevention o:r the •Reds t t'xom lJ.n.i!i.ng up
with soviet Oll4Sll Mongolia and receivirlg aid. from
Soviet Russia.
.
___ Thi~ _f'e_a);'_o_.t' joint a.c_tiQn 'by tM Qollllllunif.lt!'l

ot

Hussia and China prompted violent reactions on military and
political levels vlllich Qtherwi<Je might have had. less
serious consequences.

Numerous

t~a.rnings

spread of Commu.nism issued from 'l:okyo.

against the

However, these

t;h.rea.ts \rlere directed against the moxe :J.Illl!lediate danger to
Japanesa expansion. 0 The

u.s.D.R.,

plagued.

by

j.nternal

4 Nexl ~ '.t;~mes. November 2, 19:315, p. 5~1.

"5 New~ "times, li!.arch 17, 1936, P• 15:1; Ma.ren 4,
1936. p. 16:2.
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dii'.fieulties,6 was in no position to move effectively on a
milit<ll'Y f'l'Ont in 1936 ..1938.
d<~pend

Chinese Commu.nist.s could.

on li'ttle help from the soviet Union.

Russia had an intense interest in the "Sian Affair."
She realized a unified China could modify Japan's demands
and make he:!;' ov<n fiontiel' n10re secure.

the attitude of the
convinced

Mosco\~

uni:f'ication,

so~1t11erners

On the other hand,'-·----

over the abduction of Ch:l.tmg

that he was the logical man to bring on

Stalin assumed the Japanese thraa.t to

first consideration.

~1arrant

He saw in the failltt'e of the revolt

an indicstion of the direction Chinese politics '</Jere
heading, a trend that t·Jould les.d to ol<.1ser co-operation
with th""

Centra~

Government and an avoidance of any close

tie with the Communist movement.
Sinkiang and outer Mongolia felt the .pressure of'

l"iussie.n imperialism.

In 1939 the U.,s.s.H. admitted the.t

she considered the frontiers of Mongolia as
frontiers.7

act1~ally

Russiat'l

Air bases ware establisnec in both Provinces,

6 The Communist Party Furge Trials began in
January, 1937. In 1936-1937 many Sovl!:hozes wer!l abolished
as failures and Kolldl.ozes (collective i'arms) t~ere expanded.•
The second Five Year Plan v1as falling short of expectations
in :t·ts production ot consumer goods and there 1:1as the poss•
ibility oi' abortion e,s had happened 1\l:l.th the ll'irst .Plan.
·c\.

7 ~ ~ J:imeth November 16, 193~), p. 8:2.
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some ·reaching as much as t\·W thousand miles into Chinese
territory. 8

f. rt>po:rt cii' culated that there wera three

hundred tb.ousand men inside Sink1ang 1 9 presumably led and
supplied by tb.e Hussians.
Tha linltup of.
Moscow via.S

s~wvm

poli,tica~

ma.chinery in Sil1kiang and

by tl").e fe.ct that purg13s of "deviation1sts 11

-in Russio. were accompanied by similar cleanups in the
:Province.

Trotskyist hunts in the ,Soviet capital brought

"Left Opposi:tion"

s~1arches

in 'l::Uma.

Vlhen Henry G.

lagoda was shot in IVlosm:>w, the head of. the Buxaau of Pub..
lie safety in ;;1;tnltiang. Yagoda's man, l'Ja.s lll<;:el¥i.se

exc1cutect.

Hoi; far tn:!.s xagion had come from Cl1.inese

control is best illutrt;ratad by ·ti:l<> traveler who sought to

go thaxe, asked ·che ChUngldng Government for a visa, and
\iEJ.S

told I
• • • tha:t; a visa ca.n be granted mlly if the
applicant can obtain a po~t from the ~>oviet :€mbassy
for travel through Russia.
Nominally, Sinkia.ng was under ·the rLlle of an old•

style tuchun, Jheng i:>hih-tsoi.

-4,

In keeping \vith the

a .tWrl ~ Ximqs.,

December 2, 1939, p. 6:2.

9 New

october 3, 1939, P• 1:4.

~ I*mes~

10 .tWrl York: '{imes , January 2. 1940, p. 10!2.
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policies of his office, General Bhang's allegiance varied
ivith the noliticsl tides.

First espousing a B.ussian

alliance for development o!' .natural rasourct>S, he reversed
himself in April, l.942, and decla.rea his complete loyalty
to Chiang

1'\r~i~shek.

'l'>,JO years la.ter he \vas replaoed by

\'lu Cht:mg-hsin, cliai:rrnan of ·!;he

Affairs Commission.

.11.

M.ongol~lM

and '£ibtJtan

closer sooporation

:l.'oste:red by tt1e Soviet TJnion.

rr.d.ner~>l

larly tungsten, were exported to the

wa~1

agai11

re so1uces, !l'J.l'ticu-

u. :,;.a.H.

p.f·ter the Japanese ocoupo:t:l.on of

~~n.nchuria

numerous

border clashes took place bett,raen llussian r:J.nd Japt'lnese
troops.

gach I.H>amad to be testing tb.e stl:angth of the

other with neit!10l' willing to risk
~Jere

brought to a ll!>lt by

~m

WiJ.r.

These hostilities

uneasy truce in 1939.

Nevertlleless, 11Jhateve:t: sttpplies were shipped into Cl'l.ina by
Russ.ta during ,vorlci War II came dangerou.sly close to
contested a;t'eas.
On August 26, 1945 1 an Alliance axl.d :F'riendt•hip Pact

between the U.s.s.R. and the Cn.inese Hepublic

111a,s

s:l.gned.

Supposedly good fox tllirty years, Article V bound the
contracting pa.rtiras "to work together in close and friendly
cooperation after thl!!l conclusion of peace.nll

Its
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prinoi.pa.l provisions

includ~•d:

J., 'I'he Chinese lilastt1rn Raih1ay and south ManchUrian
Railway become joint property of China and ·the u.s, S,R,
2, Port A;rthur to be used as e. n~tVlll l:!ase i"or both
parties,
3, Dairen to be, f:t free port ~1ith a. soviet citizen
as harbor master,
4, The U.s,n,H. to guarantee to restore Nationalist
lead~u.•snip in Menchu:ia.
5, SinkiatJ.&; to b<~J considered an :l.nteg;ra.l part ot'

hina..
6, outer Mongolia

plebesoi·te so directs .•

1% be

tree aftEll? the war, if a

As Russian sympathy for Chinese Communism t>las more
openly manifest, this tl'ee.ty became increasingly

\~orthless.

All througb. the Kuomintang-Kun.gchanta.J.').€; post .. \var struggle,

Russia postponed impleJnentation of her obligations.

Final.

abrogation canla in the signing of the Traaty of' t'l'iendsh1p,
Alliance

1950.

~md

Mutual .Aid

~Jith

"Red11 China on February 14,

Its four main parts called for:

1. Mutual e.ssistanoe in case of aggression.
2. The retm:n ot Port Arthur • Deiren, and the
South t<lanohu:r.'ian Railv1ay to China by tha end of 1952.
3. l1 credit oJ: $;300 0 000,000 ext<mded to China by
Russia.
4. The ratu:m c>.t:' !v.~anchurbn lndusltries.l3
Possibly the single most potent factor :i.n the

control of future Chinese action by ·t.he Rttssie,ns has been
the extent of the education given to the Chinese in Nlosco\v.

12 N~'" ~ T;l,mef;~t loc. cit.

l:ii ~ ~ ':C:j,Jnes, Februa.:ry 16, l9t10, · P• · 21:1.
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Thousands of students leave each month for intensive
t;:ra:!.ning in
,~3ov:!.et

t,~arx:!.sm

under the Comnmnist leaders in the

capital.
L:l. L:t-se.n left China. to reaei ve f'u:ct;her training

after disagreeing vJith

lJlt,lO

'rse-tung on policy in

l~l3l,

and

did not :rct•xrn until the closing d&,yll of' 'dorld ''l8,l' II,

His irmneditl.te resumption of po•,oer could leave little doubt
as to tha ef'i':!.caoy of his stay

~lith

the Me.:rxist hiel'achy.

In mo:re l'ecent times Chou :En•la:!. and !Jlao :rtHJ-'Imng have
mad.e pilgrimages.

Chou made his trip ln r;eptember, 1939 •

ten years and thre<:J months bef'o:re Mao could be persuade1l to
·take the ,jouxney.

Thi:; latter visit :resulted in tho

'f.J:•eaty mentioned above.

l;Jhat Rt:tssin

r~Jcelved

for the concessions she made in

the Treaty o£ 1960 have not been publicized.

;J;ip:les l.isted i\'tosco\,1 as demanding sev<>n ports:

The

N~'i ~

ChingvJangtao,

Ha:!.cholrl, Chefoo, \'feihaiwai, Tsingtao. De.i:ren, and Port

Arthur in p:r.elimirta:ry nGgotit'.tions.

i3he a180 11as repox•ted

as asldng for lnc:re.ased shipments of' .f'oodrri:Lli'fs from
Manchuria, a labor force of one half million m•m to be
ava:!.labl<:l for use in Hussitt, Gnd oonoessj,ons by J?eiping ·t;o
Sinldan[~, Inner lciongolia, ~·1nnchuria, and Tibet ,14
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soviet advisers have now infiltrated all :fields of
Chinese endeavor.

Two Russian companies

'~ere

given the

right to exploit oil and nonferrous metal resources in

An order to abolish the use of English in

Ginkiang.l5

business vias posted • 16

In .Shanghai a health program >1as

launched using Hussian aquipmant.l7

;3·i;alin 1 s pictures of._..t"'a"'n~--

took precedence over Mao's at public damonstrations.l8
li'Or awhile~ at lea.st • the unity seemed colnplete.
Moscotr~

he.d followe'l tVJo distinct lines in her rela-

tions t1i'tll Nationa.list China from 1937 to 1949.

One had to

do tdtl:< Yanan. and through Yenan, t•Jith ChUngking; ·the
other had ·to do 1r1ith Chungking directly.

One >va.s

Communist policy, the other a. policy of a state tovmrds
another state.l9

strict intsrpretai;ion of the 1945 Trea.ty

had led to usurpa:t;ion of pov1er by tile Conl.!nunists in

Manchuria•

i~ithdrawal

of Hussian troops at a

tim~" ~Jhen

events :made Nationalist occupation of th.is region impossible,

'

,,

15 ~ xork I3,mes, March

"16
'-\
,,-\

;;n. 1950,

p. 10:5.

Nevi~ ;J:imes 1 Apl'ill6, 1950, p. 44:3.

17 ,He1!J ~ '&:tmas, May 24, 1950, P• 19:3.

\V .

~\

18 Ne1:1 ~ Ume!j, August 27, 1950, p. 5:1.
19 ::>. Okazaki, "Moscot;, Yenan, Chungking," Paoif:Lc
14:107·12 1 !'!arch, 1941.

;t~i'f'ai;'s,

mat;erially aided the "Rod" cause.

The stripping o.f'

liiJanchurian industry helped in a negative walr' since the
Chinese Communists could not have used it
not tor some time.

any~1ay,

at least,

Russian abendornnent o:t' arms in

positions tvhore the Kungcbanteng could easily sequester
them further helped ·tne ".Reds. 11
Attacks in Russian newspap\')rS on l\iationr>.list .
policies heightened the rupture bett4een the two. groups.
An article

in the 'Val'

mm,

~'ior\j;iw CJ.a§~

for June 19 1 l£44 1

implied the necessity :t'or Chiang to unite his forces tvith
those of Mao.20

£zvesti~

criticized Cldang in his

prosecution of the w>.r against the Japanese,2l
added its voice to the e.fi'ort.22

Red Star

Pravda charged that

Chinese corruption in Government led to the defeat o;f'

·Kuominta.ng t •.roopa.23

These could hardly be ·the utterances

of a state ready to enter a ·treaty o.f alliance

~>J:i.th

another state in good faith, especially V!h<m tbat :r&ate is
a dictatorship in absolute control of the press.

~~o NaJa!

X9.t1t :Cimes •

J'lme 20, 1944 0 P• 10;4,.

2l. NqvJ Io.rk T.1,lll\il!h December 3, 1944 t p. 136:8; Decem*
bar 4, 1944, p. 14:6; June 4, 1945 0 p. 2:6.
~ im:l, ~

Xinae§, March 14, 1945, p. 10:3.

23 ~~'rimes, Fcibruary 19, 1945, P• 4;4.

140
lf tne U.i3.1,:.R. playe.cl. a oomparatively minor role in
Chinese internal activities betv1een 1945 ancl 1950• her role
as

11

Big J3rother•124 to the Chinese Colll!llunists has been more

than adequately :fulf.tlled in foreign affairs.

On every

major political issue Mao Tse-tung and Joseph Stalin

presented. a. unit;ed front to the world.

J'vlao has denounced

the Atlantic Pact.25 circulated the stook.holn:1 Peace

Petit.ton, and vowed to follow the doviet international.
policy.26
In January • 1948, tv1a.o urged the forme.tion of an
As.:!.an Cominform in order to better the articulation 1:Jith
vJorld Collllllunism. 27 The central .Execut.tve Committee of the
Chinese Communist Party, in July 1 Hdopte<t a resolution
supporting Russia•s stand on the defection of' I•lflrsha.ll
'.rtto~

even tt1ough seven months previous Mao had said he

planned doing some o:t the same things.

Said. Mao:

The obJects that the ne111 dll!mocra.tic revolution are
to eliminate, are only i'eudalism e.nd monopoly

24 This name is used in a Chinese Comnumist Hand•
book published by the Hopeh~Hunan-Shantung District
Headquarters o.f t;M Chinese Co:mmunist Party, New ~
Times, January 14, 1948• p. 11:6.
,'"· 25 ijew York Times, April 5 1 1949, P• 138:3.
'~26 !J<H·J .~ 'l:ime§, December 17, 1949, P• 1;1.

"

''27

!WJt ~ '£imes, ,J"anua:ry 2, 1948• p. 11:2.
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capitalism • , • • Because o.f too backwardness of
China • s economy H will still be necessary to permit
the e:dstence .for a lone; period ot the capitalist
economy represented. by the broad petty bourgeosie and
the middle bOt;u:ge.osia, even a:f"ter the n~:rticntvide
victory of the Hevo1ut1on.213
This incongruous reversal is explainable only on the
assumption of increasecr Iiuss1an influence.
--------:sov±et-Ru-ss-1-a-t-J.&-s-·t.tl;-ken-u-p-t-he~cas-a-fa-x-seat-i-ng~-----

"Red" China at the United Nations. ·rhe United states has
been her major adversary.

British recognition o£ the

J?eiping Government on January 6 1 1960• one month aftor

recognition o.f the Peiping Government by India and Burma,
seemed .for a time to n1ake hal' position stronger.

H011JE!Ver,

the tvar in Korea has changed. all that.
X.1ea.nwhile• the Na.tionalists i"Jait on l''ormosa.

United Nation bombers raid along t.he Manchurian
The Kremlin uses the Chinese

to further its aims for

t~henever

t10rld

border.

end vloorever it cm'l

aont;rol.

28 ~ ~ :J:irnel\! 1 July 12, 1948• p. 1011, quoting
made by tvla.o 'rse..tung to the Central Execu-

from a speech

tive Cormnit·t;ee in DlaC(lJ'!lber 1 1947.

Cil!U'TER VII
CONCLU~1IONS

The Chinese CommurJist Party cannot raise the living
standard in China without substantially jeopardizing its
hold on ·che people.

A mcnolithic state exists because

economic consicte:ratiom>
of pov1er.

overshadot~

political usu:rpation

;Jilen men a:t,>e .fed and properly clothed in the

industrial society that theo:retioany is the base of.
Communism, they turn to some o·cher

governments~

.form.

ColllJm.:trlism in China he.s an emotional side tlla.t led
its believexs into the long fight rox surviv.al.
fought for a cause.
1~ay

Communists

They believed in the right of their

and they still believe in it.

points out; in i1is §g'[i§!<

&~!isaoa

Howenr, as Dallin

!.i!ll!! th!f .W

~.

devotion

to--a cause is not enough to make that cause ;just or make it
succeed. 1 Japanese kamikaze f'liexs willingly sacrificed
tb.ei:r lives i

Hitler's

s. s.

legions :t'ought long and 111ell;

med:teve.l \;itch html;s aroused sincere religious i'anatacism.

In each <ilase these

~Jere

a dedicated winority.

Others

W3l'e

SI-Iayed to the bmmer for a limited time.

1 David J. Dallin, Sov;j,qt !1ussit;t and '!lh!i! Far East,

P• 226.
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So it has been in China.
has ruled since 1927.

11 hard, closely-knit core

ll'ollowers have multiplied as

economic conditions worsened.
hlhen the North Koreans crossed the thi'rty-eigP,th
parallel, they started a tlame in Asia ttmt has consumed
much of

th~

resources of' an impoverished continent.

China's entry has prolonged that engagement and lad to her
alignment against the United Nations.

This could be a

fatal step to a young government.
However • history shot4S people uniting for foreign

war.

This may be happening in China, even in the face of

continuing reports of increased guerrilla e.otivity.

liiith-

out the Korean ''ie.r thel'e might be even more unrest.
The Chinese leaders have forfeited their chance for
the rapid ellleliora.tion of' a long-suffel'ing people.
is a major war to tha ind.ustrial United
it be to ag;l'arian China'?

l~tates.

Korea

~>Jhat

must

Ji.'Ven >vith the help o:t Russia she

cannot hope to keep the peace 1at home in any sustained
campaign.

industry,

Time is needed to consolidate agriculture, build
~mCJ.

stimulate conunerce.

According to T•.

z.

Koo • four ta.ctors have been

favorable to the gro1,1th of Communism in China.
1. A disinte~ration oi' the rural economic system.
The t:11end of· farm ·\vorker:; to the cities.
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2. Warlord rule impoverished the land.
3. Chinese intellectual life has long been
familiar with communal organization and the equalization of property, particularly land.
4. Pl'essu:~~o from Japan and the uncertain international situation.s
'l'o these we

\~ottld

add the ineptness o.f the KUomintang in

keeping in ·tcmch >vith the people and their needs and the

Me.rxism.
Chinese "!leo" leaders are not agrarian reformers in
·the sense ot our 1930 editorials.

They are Marxist.

!Jo

denial o.t' this basio t:'act has ever come from .Peiping.

On

the contrary, every word, every action bears evidence to
its truth •. As Edgar snow pQt it1
My personal feeling in the matter is that liberals
who build up hopes that the communists of China are
different and only reformers and have abandoned
revolutionary methods to achieve their program are
doomed to ultimate disillusionmE!nt. • • • Their
religion remains international socialism and if
conditions change they may adopt whatever methods they
believe necessary in order to stay on the locomotive
of history.3

From 1920 to the present. the thllead of in:tlernational

Communism l1as ivot:tnd thllough the deliberations of the
:If' • in soma points, certain leaders seem to

Kungohantang.

i(hina

2 T.

\:ea!Q.~

3

z.

Koo, ··"Communism Bound to Fail in China,"
ReVI,ew, 65:495, August 19, 1933.

~gar Sno~;.

Thq

~ttlfl

tor J\Sia, P• zso.
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have deserted the fold• it has been a tempora:!.'Y Gxpedien·t
brought on by some economic, political, or military factor
without effaot on the ultimate goal.

Disagreement bat\'Jeen

.Mao 'l'se•tung and Li Li-san has .never concerned ·the aim of

Comrnunism, only the means of achieving tha.t a.im.
Communist ideology has

~~lways

\1/hile Li wanted to use the

been the motivating cause.

•~orkingmen

in the cities to

advance !'larxism, Mao wanted to use the farmers.

Land l'e•

form was a good stimulant because it was so badly needed.

Mao was the man t;o use this wedge because he understood
the farmer•s problems.

So far his progrrun has been

suocessi'ul.
However, there are certain th:tngs

\~hich

are

unfavora.ble to Chinese Communism that ;je need to consider.
The social an<1 ethical code o.f her people has been one of

the strongest opposing forces.

Virtues

o:r

filial piety,

respect for olt1 age, obedience, tolera.nce, and mutual
benevolence betv<een man r1nd m.e.n td.ll be ha:l:'d to circumvent.
Twenty centuries of teachings by the sages cannot be

eclipsed in twenty years.
some argUJJlel:lt may be ad.venoed for the socializing
implications of Communism through Confucius.
&n~ects

we read:

In tb.e
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Ts ze-kung asked about gove:nment. The Master said:
'The requisites of government a:e that there be
suf'!'ioienoy o;f' food, su:t'fioienoy of milita:y equipment,
and the confidence of tl'J.e people in the rulel'.' Tsze•
kung said• 1 !1' it cannot be helped, !U').d one of these
must be dispensed vJith, 1vhich of the three should be
.t'orgone first 1 1 1'J.'he milite.ry equipment,' said the
Master. 'l'sze•kung again asked, 'If it cannot be
helped and one of the remaining two must. be. dispensed
with, which of them should be i'orgone? • The Mastilr
replied, •Part vlith the food. From of old; death has
-------be.en-th<:1--lot-o.f-al-l-men-;-bt:tt-i-f-the-peoPle-ha.ve-nc'------faith in their rulers, there is no standing for the
state. •4
The duty o:t:' ·the government to supply food is the essential
point.

'l'his phase of

~1lao' s

program of lend redistl'ibution

has historical. significance, albe::J.t remote.

Con:l.'ucius

pre:l.'arred to let even this go to keep the confidence of the
people.
No Communist state dares disband its military •

A

military gova:rnment cannot keep the confidence of' the
people.

If its f'ood supply do,;;s not match its promises,

the Communist state will soon lose the confidence of the
people.

This remains an unrasolved dilemma.
The will oi' the Chinese people has n<wer had a forum

for expression in its long existence.

D:rives towards

· . nationalism manifest in the politics of seventeenth and
Eighteenth C6ntury

I~urope

have been notably absent in

4 ililliam D. Gould, G. B. Arbaugh 1 and R. F. Moor a •
Ql'ieijtal fhi,losophies, P• 125.
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Chinese history.

\11th the overthrow of the Manchus in ·

19ll, some semblance of.natlonal stirrings was

evi~enoed•

bt;rt the local tone end reversal to tiarlordism in the next

decade negated its· continuity.

liNen sun Ye:t; .. stom, the

cc1<Jotic idealist. frien.c1 of the common man., at·iaempting by
benevolent propa.:J;anda in hJs ~·t>Jin ghu ll_'"·t_,_o~ev._o""l,.,v~e:-_·_.a,.._.------~
dictum of the B;OOd life w.:!.thout recourse to the practical•

· ities or large sections o:f his homeland, met >vith failure
in the eor;fusion of its implementation.
Democracy t-1as poorly imitate(] under the Kuomintang;
it has no chance under Communism.

Elections do take place

in "Hed 11 China and res1.D.ts ;;ould seem to indicate that non•
Communists outnumber Communists in elected bodies. 5
However, parliamentary controversy continues to concern

adaptation to local conditions ol' basic priMiples laid
dc1n1 by Party Haadquarters, rather ·t.han those principles

·themselves; the raethods of carrying out, :r:a:ther ·than
d•,cisions. for or against i'unclan1ental lines ot' yolicy; and•

f'inally 1. rnat tors concerning the ability, e.f.ficienoy, and
honesty of personnel, the evaluation of popular e:ttitudes,
the assessment of results 1

~iorld

al1cl

future pote.ntialit.:tes o:r

5 11 1'l1e Chinese Communists and Their Programme •"
J:ogau. 5:71, F'ebrua:ry, 1949.
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aotion.

The impetus continues to come from the top.

A

chain of' oorrunand extends through the Communist .Party into
the organizations of' elected of':f'icials at every level.
Irregardless of his political label, every officer foll.o11S

the dictates of the Kungcnantang or he no longer is an
official.

In closing. le·t us consider the Communist aims as

published in the

~

flag

Dai~~ New~

in 1930.

l.

JJ;xpulsion of foxeigners.
Jl;limination of,' militarists.
Est&.blishmant of government run by laborers,
peasants, and soldiers :f':ron1 the ranks.
· 4. Oonf'isaation of all banks.
5. Abolition of all unequal treaties.
IS. Cancellation of' aLl loans.
7. Union witll the •world prolata:ria.t • and l:loviat
2.
3.

Russia.•

Adoption of an eight hour day.
Labo:r: insurance and une1nployment t',lomptmsation.
10. Oon:f'isoation of all factories who refuse to obey
Communist rule.
ll. Nationalize.tion o:t land arul churches.
12. Abolition of the land tax.6
B.
~.

Very few o:f' these aims havo be<>n car:ded t;o aomple•

tion,

'l?b.e

Hussin~s

seem to have more polftJer than any other

foreign group over had.

Communist militarists have been

substituted :f'or the warlords.

Government by "laboreu.

peasants, and ;;oldiers from the ranl{s" is a paper government ;;ithout sovere:J..gnty.

Old tres:t:l.es have been abrogated,

6 !IYew 1$1'.1£ Times, iJeptember 28, 19m, Seat5.on III,
P• 4t3.
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but new ones have been entered into \d,th Bussie that
threaten to bo even more reprehensible.
negotiated "teJith the Soviet Union.

Loans have been

'.rhe Korean war has

postponea almo<>t all social legisle:tion.

Land deeds are

placed in the :repositori.es of villages and controlled by
the ColllDlunists.

Taxes have probably inareased, if not

through impositions • certainly through ••loans" to the
regime.

The "Radii victory has bean fraught !41th negatives,
substitutions, and militarism.

China deserves better.

CHAPI' EH VIII

I.

CHEN TU•HSIU

Chan Tu•hs:l.u war; born in 1879 to a family of

the

classics~

pattern o:r the Chinese educational systom at

an early age m1d turned his energy to reform.
the 1/lest had enforced its

~~ill

Seeing how

on China, b.e dete:rmi:ned to

master the teohnic,.il kno111ledge of tile Occident.

At t;he

age of' tt1enty•o:na he vJent to Tokyo to enroll :l.n ·the
l:U.gher Nol'mal Bahool in prepaJ:<ation for hi;; l:l.:t.'G wo:rk as a

In 1907 he lett Japan :tor l''ranoe whexe he formed a

strong at·taal:lment for the 1rrench people.

Ha returned to

China in 1910 cotlV:l.uced that only radical changes could
save his country.

In succession he became a high school

principal • seorata.ry ·to the governor of' Al1lli1e1 Province 1

and, .finally, oommiss:l.oner of education in tho provincial
government.
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Yuan Shih-kai •s rise to

pm~er

Revolution" by sun Yat-san in 1913.

led to a "Second
Although not of the

KUomintang, Chen supported this movement, and upon its
failure 111as .forced to flee the country.

tt'hen Yuan •s power

.f'aded in the st:umner ot 1915, Chen returned to China,
settling in t,he F·renah concession of .Shangha.i.
started a newspaper,

~

:;{outn,

~Jhioh

Hero he

promised a. thorough

overhauling of' morality, education• and economics.
Insisting on a return to "plain language," for the next
five years he led

!:'-

oampldgn against the literary abuses

of classicism.

Chen was made dean of the College ot Letters at
Peking University 1'Jhere his librarian was r.i '.Ca-chao,
later to become co-rounder
Communist Party.

t~ith

Chen of tlle Chinese

These two men started the tieeklj( \(i£:l,tt2 as

a political organ in an etfort to preserve the cultural
emphasis ot the Nmi :;{O!Jth, and in so

doin(~

made the College

of' Letters a "hotbed" of' revolution.

\!/hen Germany • s :rormer interests in
tt~rned

l~hantung

1r1e:re

over to Japan at Versailles, riots broke out in

Peking.

Students from the University st;orm•Jd through the

streets and into a party given by lea.d.<'ll'S of ·tt1:1 proJapanese faction,
several

pro:t\~;ss\9rs,

Held responsible !'or these disorders,
including Chen, were foroad to resign.
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He was then imprisoned for eighty-three days.
Chen's conversion to Communism came in the spring of
1920 at a meeting

t~ith

Gregory Voitinsky ~ ;:;eoratary-General

o:t the Far Eastern Bureau of the Comintern.

As a result of

this conf'•erenoe 1 t11.e ChimJse Soo1a11st Youth Group was
'

'

organized..

>'lith

Comintern, other

$5,ooo.oo
br~mohes

a month coming from the
were founded in princip!ll.l

Chinese eitias.
P.ressux•e from the Russ3.an "advisers" resulted in the
calling of the National Congress of the Communist Party of
China on J'uly J., l92l, in the F'renoh Concession o.f
Shanghai.

Chen 111as in Canton at ·chis time end did not attend

the gathering.

Nevel!theless, he oJas aleoted cha.irman o:t:

the Central Exeolltive committee--a group charged with
establishing perfect laison

\~ith

tb.e Communist International..

Always the teacher, Cll<m accepted the position o:r
dean at the College ot' Letters at Stla.ngh.ei University.

·rhe

Party undertook to tra.ns:form the University into a training school for revolutionists.
competent for this job,

Chen assembled a

fao~lty

Included was Ch 1 u Chiu•pai, Chen's

sucoesso:11 in the J?al!ty. who had just returned t'l!om MoscoN,
Chen •s

influence in tho Communist J?ar.ty waned almost

before the organization got started,

New Litel!ature

Iv!oV~lment

His leadership

and the May Fourth Movement

or
~Jere

the
to

'
'

153
be his greatest achievements.

Others were destined to lead

the Party he fathered to power.

Throughout the period of Conununist•Kuomintang
alliance .from 192:3..1927, Chan disagreed wj;th prominent

members oi' the lei't•wing.

He and Borodin could not agree

on their assessment of tile Kuomintang.

He and !vlao 'J.'se-tung

disagreed on the place of' the peasant and the proletariat

in the revolution.
Following the oou'R of Chiang

K~1i .. ailek,

Chen l'<'lsigned

from his Party offices and retired to Shanghai.

further and furtnar

~n1ay

Drifting

f.:rom Stalin ortilod.oxy, he ••as

formerly expelled from the Chinese Communist Party in
November, 1928.

From tru1t time until his deatll in 1943 1

Chen :remained violently anti-RUssian.

Al:rested in 1932 on

the charii5e that llis activities constituted a threat to th.e
Chinese Republic, he openly xe•aff'irmed his faith in

Co11ununism.

:i:'entenoad to :fifteen years in prison, he was

released in 1937 by a gfmeral ammlSty l,';l'amted political

prisoners at t;ha beginning of th® Japanese War.
Chen Tu..hsiu used his four years in pri<>on doing
research on philology and spent his later years writing a
treatise on the characters engraved on bones used by the
ancient Chinese !n divination.
On the

~a.nint)

Hit; last work \Vas •:mtitled 0

lW! Gl!j.§!}:l,:t;ioatio:g 2t: C\mracl(ers.
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II.

H:SU TE!l•LI

Hsu Teh-li, elder statesman of the Kungahantang•
teacher of' Mao tse-tung, receivarl his early training in the
Classical tradition.

A n"'tive ot Changshe. 1 he taught for

many years in tlmt Hunan city.
i,lfrren ttre-ai1IJ.ngo-to westernizat-i<>n fiNrt oameabout.

Hsu enrolled in a six•n1onth Bhort-Course Taacher Training
School at

Ning~hsiang.

He was exposed to pleas !or the

doctrines of Dun Yat•sen but did not burst into revolutionary ardor.

Hsu preferred tea.ching.

Returning to Changsha on completion of his
teacher-trtiining course • Hsu started a school :ror young
iuen.

Here revolutionary concepts were given a place ·dth

conventional training in ideographs and composition.
subtlety, arlti-monarchie.l ideas wore incorporated into the
presentation of all subjects.
Not satisfied >·sith his Normal School li<'Ork, Hsu
successively taught at a girls 1 school in Changsha,
studied primary education in J·!il.pan, during 1r1l'licb time he
met Bun Yat-son and joined the T 1 ung-meng l:luit and ostabUsh•
ed e, project to educate laborers in night courses.
After the 1911 Hevolution, he gained

prasti~e

in

the educational field as director of the Changshe First
Normal ,9cnool.

He even survived the counter-revolution oi'
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Yuan

Shih~kai

in 1913.

However, within five years his

unorthodox methods end radical agitation caused his removal
from his post e.nd subsequent slight to Shanghai.

J!'rom this

city he embe.rksd fox :Paris and Berlin to join in the groups

that

\~ere

to be so vital. to the Chinese Communist Party in

the f'uture.
Hsu Teh-1i remained in Europe for three years.

on

his :return to China he joined the Kuominteng and became coleader of the Ii;xeoutive Conunittee of the Ch.angsha Branch.
Identified with the extreme lert-wLr.g, Hsu often disagreed
with Chiang Ke.i-shek.

~lhen

the Hed Flag was raised at

Nanohang, he cast !us lot with General He Lung and .fled to
Hong Kong.
A.t the age o;t: fifty-one, Hsu

for :t'urther study.

t~as

ordered to Mosaow

H.e attendet"l f'un Yat-sen University,

the training center :t'or revolutionary leaders or tre Far
East.

Sho;r:tly the:r:eaf.te:r he was assigned. as commissioner

of education for the soviet Areas in China, one of the
civil affairs nosts vJhich controlled domestic activities
'

during the vmr.

asu

'J~eh-U

has not l'ir>en e.s high as some of his

friends in th<.l J?arty heirarob.y, but his influance has been
profound.

.1\.li~ays

the pedagogue, his students carry on his

training, tel.k about his work, and revere his

\~ord.

156
III.
~~o

MAO '£&E-'£UNG

Tse-tung was born in 1893 to a family of farmers

in the Cha.ngsha valley.

Bts father had

pro~pered

over the

years, advancing to a point financially >Vhere b.a could
assure his sons an education.

Determined tlw.t Tse-tung would

into the night i hovJever 1 revolting against ttlis training,
the youth showed

tl1f>

associated 1r1ith those

complete diBragard
\~ho

:f'Ol'

money otten

ha.ve not had to earn it.

Mao attended private school .t't•om the age of' eight to
thirteen.

His liking for the old popular novels sorely

tried the patitmce of his teachers.

He is reported to have

given up l1is reading of. these novela when he

StWJ

that it

al1>Je.ys the gr<>at man, the prince • who was dominant.

~Jas

Next 1

he turneo to the revolutionary Journals of sun Yat .. sen and
Liang Ch 1 i•Ch 1ao.

In July • l\!21, Mao Tse-t(mg f.o:rmally joined the

Chinese Communist l?al'.'ty.

After coming to Sh.allghai to

participate in the esta.blistm1ent o:f'

·~he

Party and .report

on the peasants oi' Hunan Province, he re·t.urneri to Changsha
as chief· of tlle Hunan Committee of. tile Communist Party.
Since Hunan is predominantly agriculturl'll. Mao organized
peasant unions in direct contradiction to th'll Comintern 1 s
edict for ooope:re.t:ton with the Kuomintang.

Moxeover • the
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InternationHl insisted that the .firm base o.f any Bolshevik
revolution must be ·t;he urban prolete.ria.t,
the center or pO\•Jer.

The cities vlere

Mao saw 1 t differently.

Late in 1923, Ma.o

~~EW

accused of

devia.tioni~:>m,

severely repr:l.ruanded, and fell from tt1e l?arty • s good
With a promise to mend his ways, he attended the

gx•aces.
First

'Nationa~

Cong:r<l!lS of the Kuomintang in the 1.dnter of

1924 and later served on

·~he

F.xecutive Committees of the

.shanghai :SL1reaus of bot!1 the Communists and the Nationalists.•
He

I' as

appoirrted head of the Pa:rty 1 s Hunan :Peasant

Bureau in 1926 and irmae(lia:tiely returned to his old unorth·
odox fixation,
in

~iUAWat

In a report entitled, .Qu the

!Zee;s~mt

l'loyemenit,

he v1rote that "all revolutionary part:l.s s • • •

1~111 be put to the test by these L.PeasauW masses. n2

Fiejected by the l9iZ7 Fifth Congress o.f the Communist Party 1
·t;11is report ef'fect.ed a split ths.t out Mao

¥'arty until 1931.

on:

:t.'rom the

After organlr.:tng thlll abortive Autumn

Crop Uprising in Hunan in 1927 1 he fled into tha countryside hunted by i;he Kuom:lntang and in disfavor with
remained of the Communist Party.

'\~hat
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:Mao ·,w,s captured. by a company of militia but

escaped by bribing 11is captor.

Joining a band of fugitives

on the f..iangsi border 1 he quickly 1•ose to leadership of the
group.
Mt~o

These t'J<Jo battalions became the co:r.e oi' the force

led to Chingkangshan in southern Kiangsi and later

became the cadre o.f the Red Arrlly.

hlh11e Chu J:eh and Mao

Tse•tung built theiJ: def<lnsive strength in the Kia.ngsi Jlrea,

the Kungchantnng v1as annihilated as an effectively working
forclil.

Li J.J. .. san still pressed for control of the cities

but military reverses discredi"Ged his ambitions.

ln 1931 the Party transferred its Headquartars.to

tho Kia:ngsi soviet.

During a J.w.lt in the Long M.':lrch• four

years lat<lr • Nlao was elected its ehief'.

Today he is

chairman of all ruling bodiaH of the Corumunist Party.

There :ts no one to challenge !:.tis position.
IV.

C!ID TEH

Chu 'l'eh came of a >1e1l-to-do femily in no:rth<lrn
Sz.echtvan.

ltls early life

\oJ/3-S

devoted to .preparation for an

official positlon through ttte tj,me•honored study oi' the
Classics.

\Jhen, in 1906, the Court abolished ·t;he examina•

tion system, Chu determined on acquiring ,,estern knowledge.
Finding his taste ran to physical rather ·than the
:tnt eJ.le c·tual, he enrolled at Yunnan Mili taJiy In" ti tut;e
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\vhere he made a good record,

Upon g:raduation in 1911 he

jointed the Yunna11. Army of Ts 1 ai, soon to be

ttachun oi'

that Province, ani to reward Chu for his sexvices by
appointment

l'tS

commander of his alma mater, the Yunnan

J'ilili'tary !n:;tit;ute.
From here on Cl1u 's fo:rtunos prospered, until, in
19131, he was named

Cornmission•~:r

o.f f'Dlice for• 'Yunnan.

'l'his post ,zave him ai'fl•!!Gnce in tne community, and Chu Teh,
in tl'Ue warlord style, maintained a splendid establishment
complete with retainers, concuM.l1es, and motorcurs.

His

success cvas short .... lived, howevex, !'or his enemy, th<'ldeposed

ml~itary

governor, T'e.ng

chi~yao•

retook

th~l

Province by milHaxy force H!ld Chu vtas forced tc floe to
Chungldng.

l'l'inding it politically inexpedient to vwrk for

the :rulers in this area, he tr-aveled to canton and
Shanghai.

In tb,ose cities, outside the pall of' interior

smugness, he embraced t.ht1 causa of Sun Yat-sen and ideal-ism
of

t1:10

young men, 'ang Ohing->-Jei anc: Chiang Ka.i-sllek.
Chu \vent to Germany in 1924.

introduced to Communism.

lJhile t;h<ll'e b.e ;vas

He. Joined ·the Party in 1925 and

returned to China at; the beginning of the follo\dng year.
Bent to Chungklng, he accepted the of;f'er of command of a
division by G<m<lral Yant.£ Shen that had been made him on

his previous visit.

Keeping his Purty a!'.f'iliatJons secret,

160

Chu

~lasted.

no time in indoctrinating these ·troops toward
-

Marxist ideology.

.=

When the Northern U:Xpedition sta.rted he joined

forces with Chu P 1 e1-te• his former chief and classmate at
Yunnan Military Institute.

revealed himself

as a

At Nanchang on August 1, he

"Red" by rejecting Cb.u F'ei•te•s

order to suppress the rebellion.
After the failurl!l of the swatow Commune. Chu •reh

began his work or building a Communist Army in China.
Retiring to the Canton-Hunan bol'der with less than one
thousand impoverished men, he joined the army of Fan
Shih-sheng. accepting the post of regimental con'Unender.
By close cooperation \'lith the dissatisfied peasants

of' the area, Chu extend• d the region under his control.

May, 1928, he attached his forces to those of

~1!to

In

Tse-tung

on Chingkanshan and took over the military leadership of
both groups.

Three years later, on October 7, l9::S1, at ·ehe

First Congress of soviet Representatives in Jui-chin, Chu
Teh was appointed

Army.

Commander~in•ClU.ef

of the

Ne\~

:J!'ourth

:):ntermittent guerrilla campaigns ware waged against

Nationalist forces with some measure o! success.

After the Japanese invasion of July, 1937, and the
subsequent alliance of Communists and Nationalists, Cllu
'.Nab. was named collllllander of the Eighth Route Army.

l6l
'I'hroughOut world ;e:'ar ;ci Chu stuck to his policy o!'
harassment without engaging the Japanese in large .. scale
battle.

This umJillingness to engage the enemy in

decisive comba.t v<id,med the breach developing bet;veen
ChUngking and Yena.n.

At the 1t1al' 's end Ch.u l'ei'used to obey Chiang • s order
to surrender Japanese troops to the Kuomintang,
Lin Piao

~~as

instructed to adve.nce on Ililanchuria and unify

pro-Col!llllunist forces there.
t~hole

Instead

The drive that >-Jas to take the

mainland a\>Jay from the Nationalists

1~as

underway.

Today Chu Teh is first vice-president oi' the Central
Government Collllllittee.

The Korean War
Ht~le

power of ·t;he military,

ha~> Elnh!J.nCed

the

by generals is still the

accepted practice.
Chu•s prestige has not diminished.

He remains

Chinese Col!llllunism•s first soldier.
V,

CHOU

El~·L.III

Most oi' Chou's young life
!~s

\~as

spent in Manchuria.

a son of an official, his early study

Classics,

•~as

with the

Realizing the need .for Westernization, he for-

sook Confucius and enteretl Nankai University.

Here Chou

agitated against the govermnent and organized the "AvJalren
Club" to furtha:t: tllis movement.

I ~-
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In 1920 he v1ent to France • partic.1.pating in the

meeting wlliah finally founded the Paris
Chinese Communist J?a:cty.

~firming

o.f intel'national Golll.W.unii.lm, Chou

Branch o.f the

recognition in the rallil:s

\~as

r<in•arded on his return

to China by appointment as secrete.ry of canton Branch

or

__________t~h~e~l?~a~r~ty~·L______________________________________________________
This -was the year for establishment of the hhampoa
JVJilitary Academy and Chou TI:n-lai found a place on its

faculty in the all-important Political Training Department.
From this position he v1as able to spread Marxism throughout
the officer corps.

However, the virus did not spread

easily or well, and Chou v;as soon assigned to organize
terrorists in shanghai tmdar the direction of Chen 'I'u·hsiu.
After the abortive uprising of
he fled. to Nanchang.

l!i~irah

and April, 1927,

\'iitl'lin the ne:.r•t few months his banner

f'le1>1 in a number oi' minor proletarian revolts,

&tll

doomed

to failure.
Chou -went to Moscow as a member of the
delegation to the Oomintern in 1928.

Chines~

The following year h0

was again in Cbinu, this time as chairman of the O:rganiza•

tion Bur€ aU and

st~ppo:rter

of Li Li-san.

When Li •s

policies were abandoned, he was transferred to the Milit;ary
Affairs l3ureau, a post that 1r1as to become as lmportant as

his previous one.

Strangely enough. the purge of the
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nTrotsky 11 faction did not seriously affect Chou•s career.
At Ju:Lchin, in Ul3l, Chou entered the service of
Mao Tse-tung and ChU Tah• the new
Communists.

ma~rte:rs

He became ch!i!.irman of' the

ne~1

of the \";hinese

Politburo and

a:l.'ter the Long J\l.tarch took on the .functions or a foreign
_ _ _ _ _m..,..inister :for the rebels at Yenan •.________________
As folieign minis tell, he entered into negotia:t.ions

wit.h Chiang Kai•shek at .Sian during ths Genel'alissirno •s
captivity by Chang Hsueh•liang.

Here he concluded an

agreement for joint purticipacion in the war agains·t Japan.

Bho:rtly chel'et1fter • hG t,;as Bent to NankirJB; as Communist
repl'esentati·ve to

i~ha

"United. Front.''

Th:r:oughout th.a wal' • first in Nanking an:l later in
Chungking, Chou -worked for the coalition goval':nmerrt as a
tvadge towal'ds ge'vting ovantual "Red•• oontl:'ol.

Failing in

this, milite.ry victory in 1949 gave him ttl\l top administl'a•
tive post in the Chinese Conununist Governrnsnt--Premier of

the .state Admi:nlstrative Council.
I•ore:i.gn !'linister,

he

In his capacity a.s

helped bring <cbout the "Treaty of

F:riandsn:l.p and J1llianca" bat>1aan China and
!io;~

reg~\rd

13ovie t Union.

Qhou llln•lai concerns himself with gettin& "Had"

China. a seat on the United Nations.

this

t~he

have been frustl'ated.

understanding of. tl:llil

~~est

So flU' his ei'fo:rts in
Bas:i.caJ.ly Chou lacks

and its motives.

Blinded by
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Russian propa.ganda, he pursues a foreign policy that
alienates the whole v1orld.
Yet, Chou has done
public life,

lllany

an about-face in his long

If someone else should start, Chou En-lai

might follow.
VI-.-LI1'Cl?"!AO,-----------------

Lin Piao is one

or

the few graduates of the \Vhampoa

Military Academy in the ranks or toe Communists.

Born in

1908, his family operated a small textile mill in Huangan.

nevolutionary ideas came early in Lin•s lii'a.

He migra.ted

to the industrial city of V.'Uaha.ng and joined the "Social
't!el.fare Club, 11 a group immersed in \/esterniza.tion.

It wa.s

an easy step 'lio membership in the Communist Youth League.
After graduation from Whampoa, Lin >1as commissioneo
in tha Citizens 1 Ravoltltionary Army of the KUominteng.

He

abandoned his Nationalist career in August, 1927, when he
led his troops to Join the "Red" insurgents at Nanchang.

l''ith Chu 'hh he marched to Chingkangshan.
Un

comm~1nded

the First Army Group on the Long .March.

On arrival at 'Yenan, he was appoin·i;ed Director of thiil Red

aca.demy ,. and in 1937 was given command of the One Htmdreo

Fifteenth Division.

During ivorld war II Lin •s reputation

grew as m master tactician.

Plans of battle for the Eighth
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H.oute Army. a:r.•e Ol'lildited to him.
l~t

the Je.panese surrender in 1945, Lin Piao received

the job of securing Manchuria to the Communists and
establishing in that Provine(!) a i'ormidable base for operations southward.

Pushing out, his troops were instrumental

in bringing the offensive against Chiang to a successful
conclusion.

\vl1en the Nationalists were driven :from the

mainland, Lin undertook the capture of Eainan in 1950.

one

measure of Lin Piao•s prominence in Communist

China may be gained by recounting the number of posts he
holds in the Peiping Government.

He is Commander of the

l<'ourth Field Army, Chairman of the Gentre.l Gt>:l.ne. ..!idm:lnistrativlil Area, Commander of ttlil Central China. Military Area,
secretary of the regional Communist Party Eureau, and Chair•
man of the Financial anti. Economic Bureau for Central China.•
Yet • the story of Lin Piao bas been ca.ught up in the .
maelstrom of worlc\ events.

His Fourth Jl"iel.d Army has

S\lfferad enormous .casualties in Korea.

Rigid control of

communications be.s probably caused little te,rnisbing of
Lin's :reputation.

As long as he follows the Party's dic-

tates this will remain so.
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VII •

LI LI •SJlN

The firebrand of Chinese Communism, the advocate of
quick victory through the proletariat, Li Li-san first ceme
into efi"ecti ITiil control of the Party after Chen Tu-hsiu' s
removal in August, 1927.
attacks

011.

·rse-tung.

His policies C!arried through

Changsha in opposition to the
For f'ailure he

~ll!lS

wi~;hes

tt10

of Mao

strippecl of his Party offices

and exiled to Moscow in 1931.
During the years the Chinese CollllllUnist Party
struggled in rural areas, Li rerr.ained in Russia.

Not until

the soviet Army invaded Manchuria did he return to his
homeland.

Here, in 1945, Li •s political life in the

Communis·t regime began again.

The .Party had a firm peasant

base and could now use his lmo1r1ledge in the cities it was
soon to conquer:.

Appointed political adviser to Lin Piao,

he followed that General to victory in the ensuing
campaigns against

the Nationalists.

Held in a\>eyanoe by his Kremlin masters, Li is now
af:f.'orded the oppol'tunity to do the l'<ork he most wants to do
--organize the workers in the cities.

As vice-president of

the General Federation of' Labor, his task is becoming
increasingly important to the "Red" Government.

!i.'ven Mao

Tse-tung a.ppea.rs to be swinging towards that idea.

16'7

REJlations between Mao end Li au oordial as of the
At a recent Congress of the Asian trade unions, Li

moment.

praised

~'Iao •s

leacllilrship and humbly confessed. his

transgressions.

0\1n

In spite of this dispJ.ay of humility, Li

still looks. tovw.rd

Mosoo~1

too often for meny Chinese.

'rhe

analogy between him and JJ:a.stern guropean Cominunists who
were shipped. back .from the u.s • .s.n. is striking.

''!hila !"lao and J,i are striding together at this
moment, neitJJ.ar•s life would.·indicata that eithar could
Ostensibly, Li has assumed

change basic behavior pa.tterns.
the role

ot

passive

tollol~er.

K;reml:!.n <h1lOl'aes otherwise.

He will clo so until the

J.~i Li~san

may be tb.e ·.rroJan

Horse in the Chinese Communist Camp.
VIII •

LIU SHAO-CIU

Born in Hunan, L1u Shao-ohi began his stud:t.es in
preparation fo!! a teaching

ce.!!<H~l'

in the.t Province.

Jmter-

:f.ng the Chengsha First Normal Sctlool, he was a classmate oi'
.Me.o

·:rse ...tung: and came under the radical influence of Hsu

Teh-11.

Upon graduation. Liu went to Shanghai filled with

revolutionary zeal and there joined the Socialist Youth
Group ot Chen Tu-hsiu.

Liu Shao-chi's early efforts on behalf of the Party
concerned themselves with tho labor movement.

liis first
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assignment was to the coal lllinflls of' Kiangs:!..

was his agi·tation for reform that he

'tJaS

Headquar·tars of the Labor £Jecretariat.

so successful

transt'<ll:r:ced to the

Thrown into the

web of intxa-.Pl'J.rty strife• this group p:roducecl large,
militant unions.

The All•Ohina Labor Federation was.

o:rganized \'lith Liu as vice-president.
When Chiang cleaned the Oo!lllllunists ou·t; of the

Kuomintang in 1927, Liu probably went to J)!losc0¥1 as so many

of ·the other "Reds" did.
1931 is not recor.dad.

flo1ri®V<al' •

his 1t10rk from 1988 to

In the latter year he turns up

again as an organizer of. underground unions in

Ch~~ghai.

By 1932 111e find him installed as Chairman of tt1e All-China

Labor Fedel•ation in its nevi ooenter at Juichin, the :Kiangsi
••.Red 11 capital.
In this capacity Liu organizer1 laborers into three
categories:

(l) IJea.sant unions, (2) unions of sales clerkS

and handicraft workers, and (3) unions of coolies and. transportation "10rkers.
11

These organizations W3re Cl'eated to

assist positively in the creation of the Red Army. 10

Leadership within the unions was eonsts.ntly juggled to

keElp this aim paramount.

Improvement in VJOrld.ng con<'l.iti..ons

was not an end in itself, but purely a maanB of' moving the
workers into a position to help in gaining the Communist
rise to power.
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After the Long March, Liu once again dropped from
sight.

P:resUlllably on his second visit to Moscow, there was

little nGed fox his peculiar brand of.agitation in

ngricultural Shensi.
\liith the union

o1'

Kuomintang and :Kungchantang in

1937 1 we find him on the $cane, this time engaged in

rallying the ShaP.ghai workers to the cause o.f antiJapanese aggrassion.

Fox•ced underground, he

~~orkcd

consistently for the Communist Party'. s eventual seizure of
control.
'l:b.G lied-Nationalist split in 1941 brought Liu back

to Communist axear..
th® ::!entral Committee

He \vas
t\~o

el1~vated

to i;he .$ccretariat of

years later, that body tha.t

conducts tho everyday business of the Party.
was given a seat in the Political Bu:reau.

In 1944 he

Liu had arrived.

Liu Ghao-chi •s sponsorship of a revised Party
Constitution at Yenan :l.n June, 1:145, ma:rl{s his most
notorious achievement to date.

C:redited as among

th(~

principal designe:rs of' this document Wtlich establishes t11e

supremaoy of Party machinery over too.t of' the .statcl 1 he
ploads tor a centralism of po.'l er in the Central_ Comm:l.ttee.
\'lh.ile tl:te :Party Gongross may choose the Central Committee,
this same Central Collllllittae may postpone :!.nd<J.finitely the

meetings of a Party CongrliJlilS • thus negating; :1. ts .pow e:r.
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On foreign .policy Liu has be&n a "Vigorous ad"Vooate
of the Kremlin line.

He l'hmounced Tito in 1948 e.nd makes the

United .States snd imper:l.alinm synonomous.
philosophy separates

i;les·t.

:'ovi<~t

His. proposed

Nationa1isrrl i'xom that of -J;he

i:Oomet:!.meR t11e actlons of Moscorl leave him hard-put

f'or expla..l'lations.

Nevartbeless • so long as China 1>1alks

111lth Russia, tiu Shao-chi 111111 remain a potent .force in
Chinese polH:ical J.:l..fe.
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